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Introduction
9The problems of India’s development and governance are routinely linked to the logic 
of India’s electoral democracy. As a result, a great deal is known about elections, but 
paradoxically our knowledge of politics and society between elections is relatively 
underdeveloped. As much as anything else, development and governance outcomes 
are shaped by how the government functions between elections; including how it relates 
to citizens on a regular basis, how it provides routine public services to them, and how 
public order is maintained. Further, governance processes are nested in the social and 
political relationships between citizens and government functionaries. 
Since the mid-1990s, the National Election Studies have systematically researched 
electoral behaviour in India, covering the 1996, 1998, 2004, 2009 and 2014 parliamentary 
elections (see, for instance, Asian Survey (volume 52, issue 2, 2012), and special issues of 
Economic and Political Weekly 2004 (51), 2009(39) and 2014 (39)).  In addition, numerous 
State Assembly election studies have also been conducted. These and other studies show 
that even marginal citizens of India are wooed at the time of elections (Banerjee, 2014; 
Ahuja and Chhibber, 2012). But what happens to state-citizen interaction once elections 
are over? 
The normal assumption is that a great deal of distance marks state-citizen interaction 
between elections. What is the nature of this distance? In what way do political actors 
engage or disengage with citizens? In what ways does the bureaucracy step into this 
void? What explains the distance between political actors and citizens in everyday 
governance? Is the state closer to its citizens in some parts of India, but not in others? 
Which classes and groups are served better? Furthermore, how do different groups 
of citizens view the state and do such perceptions differ in different parts of the 
country?  Our current insights into these questions are based on studies in specific parts 
of India and in particular aspects of citizen–state interaction (Gupta, 2012). There is an 
urgent need to go broader and study nationwide governance patterns across a whole 
range of issues.
No systematic nationwide studies have been undertaken about politics and society 
between elections. We still do not know enough about which social groups (castes, tribes, 
religious communities, classes, gender) get better public services (water, sanitation, 
roads, electricity, irrigation, education, medical care); which groups do the police protect 
in times of need and which ones it does not; in which states, marginal groups face less 
discrimination from government agencies and fellow citizens; which states do a better job 
of providing public services. These questions are at the heart of a fuller understanding 
of the problems of everyday governance and development in India. To generate such 
knowledge, we need a data gathering effort that allows a nationwide understanding of 
everyday development and governance. 
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The Key Issues
Substantively, the following sorts of issues, directly addressing governance, development 
and public policy, are of great relevance here. An illustrative list of enquiries is set out 
below:
A. Delivery of public services and public order 
What communities receive what sorts of public services (for example, education, health 
and sanitation, power, transport, irrigation)? What are the mechanisms that promote or 
hinder service delivery? In what ways are services distributed? What roles do political 
agents and/or community engagement activities play in service delivery? What strategies 
do citizens deploy to engage with the state? What are the state-level and urban-rural 
variations?
B. Identity and consciousness 
What are the primary identities – national, sub-national, religious, caste, urban-rural – in 
different parts of the country?  Are urban identities different from rural identities?  Is the 
South different from the North in the way caste and religious identities are experienced 
and expressed? How do religious, caste and linguistic identities interact? Which one 
becomes dominant in which part of the country and how?   
C. Discrimination and violence  
Which communities face discrimination from the State and/or fellow citizens?  Which ones 
face violence from the State and/or fellow citizens?  Are there State-level differences? Is 
there an urban-rural difference? For instance, Ambedkar had famously argued that the 
village is a cesspool for Dalits in particular (and, arguably, for lower castes in general) and 
the city would offer them a better life.  Is that true?  Which States provide evidence for 
Ambedkar’s claim, and which ones do not? Similarly, in which States do minorities face 
acute deprivation? Is there a relationship between discrimination by state authorities and 
discrimination by fellow citizens? 
D. Citizen perception of state Institutions: 
How do citizens perceive state institutions and their capacity to govern? Does this vary 
by social category? To what extent do citizens trust the (a) legislature (b) executive (c) 
judiciary (d) bureaucracy and (e) police (f) army? Do citizens relate to parts of the state 
machinery – different departments and across hierarchies – differently? Is there a State 
level or urban-rural variation in perceptions? These questions are centrally related to the 
legitimacy of the state and the citizens’ sense of belonging.
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E. Economic process and governance: 
How is economic regulation by the state experienced by citizens? Do traders, hawkers, 
and street vendors face harassment, by whom and of what kind? How do citizens secure 
building and business approvals from the state? What are citizen attitudes toward 
taxation? Are there varying levels of corruption in government-business and farmer-
government interface in different States? Which States are better and how? How do 
citizens relate to global economic networks? How do they understand the impact of 
global forces on their lives? Does this vary from State to State and city to city? What are 
the emerging forms of governance as previously agricultural labour shifts to industry? In 
what ways do economic communities engage with the state?
This report, the third in the collaboration between Azim Premji University and Lokniti 
(CSDS) conducted in 2018 covers 12 States: Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West 
Bengal, and Delhi. The chapters below report a summary of our findings.
References:
Ahuja, Amit and Pradeep Chhibber (2012), “Why do the Poor Vote in India?”, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 47 (4): 389-410.
Bannerjee, Mukulika (2014), Why India Votes? New Delhi: Routledge.
Gupta, Akhil (2012), Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India. 
Durham, N.C. Duke University Press.
12
2.
Social 
Identity
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2.A / Social Ties
The idea of India, especially around multi-culturalism, has moved considerably farther 
from how it was imagined in early years of independence. The idea of Indian secularism 
has been constantly challenged since the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. While a liberalised 
economy by definition should embrace openness, what we are seeing is that our social 
lives remain equally homogeneous and exclusive as before if not more. Urban growth 
which was to end casteism and other social divisions, seems to be only reinforcing these 
identities through modern ghettos. Technology and social media too, especially in the 
times of majoritarian politics, have in the last couple of years spawned an entire industry 
of fake news and rumours against minority communities. This section therefore, rather 
than ‘real numbers’ is more about our attitudes and our perceptions that tell us about the 
substantial cleavages that exist on social lines. Perceptions have a crucial story to tell with 
respect to our lived social universes. Perceptions in many ways become the function of 
social distances between these universes in any case. Given that identity is theoretically 
not seen as a stable category, but something that is always framed in response to socio-
economic contexts, post 1990s India has witnessed a much stronger consolidation of 
caste and religious identities for both progressive and conservative politics1. 
Of course, these cleavages are by-products of modernity. They have been in place since 
precolonial times and have only exacerbated since then2. Electoral politics in India feeds 
off social cleavages and social identities. While it can be in the form of progressive Dalit 
politics, it also exists in the regressive and dangerous right-wing politics which stokes 
majoritarian sentiments in order to consolidate Hindu upper caste votes. The heightened 
anxiety over ‘love jihad’ and the frequent resurfacing of cases of caste violence only add 
to these social divisions. The relationship between caste and religion and electoral politics 
therefore an intrinsic one. 
For these 12 states, we look at the data on what we are calling a ‘social universe’. Using 
a sample of data cutting across caste and religion, we try to understand what the social 
life of these communities looks like on an everyday basis. Using ‘close friendship’ as a 
marker, we attempt to see how people respond to having close friends from across caste, 
class and gender which gives us a sense of how these communities co-exist. We also try 
to understand if people’s voting choices are also determined by these social relationships. 
Though the literature from social scientists on new social movements and right-wing 
politics post the 1990s shows that we have progressively moved to much stronger social 
cleavages, we rarely have a sense of the extent of this polarisation. Which states look 
more polarised than others? What are the possible caste and religion dynamics in a 
particular state? Does it vary between rural and urban areas? Or with literacy? Apart from 
giving us a sense of understanding these societies better, it is indicative of how electoral 
politics get shaped in each state. 
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1. Friendship Ties
This section represents the cumulative data on ‘social universe’ that Indians inhabit. 
Following the wisdom of the previous two reports, we look at friendship as a prime 
indicator of how inclusive or exclusive our social worlds are. In the survey, question 44 
asks a rather simple, binary and straightforward question, “Is any of your close friends 
a…?” followed by 8 categories: Dalit, Adivasi, OBC, Upper Caste, Muslim, Christian, 
Hindu and Opposite Gender. The respondents could reply with either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ or 
‘Don’t Know’.
Across 12 states, quite predictably, the number of people who have close friends who 
are Hindu and upper caste is the highest (Figure 2A.1). This is followed by OBCs as a 
group, probably because several OBC groups have been the dominant caste in specific 
regions. Overall, on the issue of caste, this year’s report reflects the trends of the first 
report on Haryana, Karnataka, Gujarat and Odisha, but shows a considerable drop in 
comparison to last year’s report. A little over 50 percent of respondents claim to have 
a Dalit friend, and 35 percent of respondents claim to have an Adivasi friend.  But with 
respect to respondents having Muslim and Christian friends, the number is significantly 
higher than previous years’ reports. With respect to gender too, this year’s report shows a 
considerably higher degree of friendships between men and women.
Figure 2A.1: Have a close friend who is a:
States like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and West Bengal reported an exceptionally high 
number of respondents who have Dalits as close friends (Figure 2A.2). This is probably 
a function of a political culture influenced by communist and Dravidian politics. In Uttar 
Pradesh, the number dwindles to 32 percent. But this dwindling down is not necessarily a 
function of invisibility. Given the political rise of Dalits, with the Bahujan Samajwadi Party 
in power, the acrimony and anxiety that upper castes feel for the Dalits in the social world 
may have exacerbated. Delhi and Uttarakhand too report a significantly high number of 
respondents saying they have close Dalit friends.
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Figure 2A.2: Have a Dalit close friend (by State)
Across all the states, around 55 percent of Upper Castes and OBCs claimed to have 
close Dalit friends. This number is down to almost 20 percent when it comes to Adivasis 
claiming the same. Within Dalits themselves 71 per cent of Dalits had another close Dalit 
friend.
Figure 2A.3: Have a Dalit close friend (by Caste and Education Level)
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Figure 2A.4: Have a Dalit close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)
Levels of education of the respondents show an interesting trend (Figure 2A.3). With 
respect to upper caste and OBC respondents, the number reporting that they have a 
close Dalit friend increases progressively with levels of education. This shows the impact 
of Ambedkar on the Dalit community, whereby entering educational spaces has become 
an important part of Dalit consciousness. Adivasi  respondents however show an obverse 
trend. The more educated an Adivasi respondent is, the thinner are the chances of her 
having a Dalit friend.
Figure 2A.5: Have an Adivasi close friend (by State)
The number of urban respondents saying they have a Dalit friend increases marginally 
across groups (Figure 2A.4). With urban Adivasi respondents however, the numbers echo 
the previous  figure and show a considerable drop of 14 percent.
17
With Adivasis, the numbers predictably report a significantly higher number for north-
eastern states (Figure 2A.5). While Assam reports 51 percent of respondents saying 
they have Adivasi friends, with Nagaland and Tripura, it jumps up to 74 and 77 
percent respectively. Mizoram is the only outlier in this respect with only 5 percent of 
the respondents claiming to have close Adivasi friends which is surprising given that 
the Adivasi population in the region is so high. But this is probably because the Mizo 
population may not necessarily identify with being ‘Adivasi’. This gets substantiated 
when we see (Figure 2A.17), where 97 percent of Mizo respondents claim to have a close 
Christian friend. Southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala report 44 percent and 37 
percent of respondents respectively claiming to have close Adivasi friends while northern 
states like Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand had only 20 to 25 percent of their 
respondents claiming to have the same. 
Looking at a caste-wise analysis, roughly 30 to 35 percent of upper caste, Dalit and 
OBC respondents said they had a close Adivasi friend (Figure 2A.6). But among Adivasi 
respondents themselves, only 49 percent of them claimed to have a close Adivasi friend, 
which is highly unusual. But if our Mizoram surmise is correct, then it may be the Mizoram 
numbers which are bringing it down. A closer look at individual states may reveal 
more. But strictly from the point of view of this figure, this is a considerable drop from 
the numbers in previous years’ reports which showed an exceptionally high degree of 
intermingling among the Adivasi respondents.
Figure 2A.6: Have an Adivasi close friend (by Caste and Education Level)
This figure too, shows far more revealing trends within Adivasi-Adivasi interactions rather 
than other groups. Education seems to have had a limited impact on the interaction of 
other communities with Adivasis. While it hovers between 29 percent and 37 percent 
across upper castes, it remains roughly stable for OBC respondents. The highest 
difference shows up within the Adivasi community itself which swings between 43 to 68 
percent.
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Figure 2A.7: Have an Adivasi close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)
Across rural or urban respondents there are very little differences except among the 
Adivasi community (Figure 2A.7). It is indeed important to understand to disaggregate 
the data further to understand what may possibly be causing such curious results, 
especially since this data contradicts the observation made in previous reports. Though 
data acquired through this survey will be able to throw some light on state-wise data for 
Adivasis, only a longer, closer study on Adivasis in these states can reveal the causes for 
these curious trends.
Figure 2A.8: Have an OBC close friend (by State)
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As the OBC category is far from a unified group, with powerful dominant communities 
as well as considerably weaker communities within the category, it is hard to generate 
an overall sense of marginalisation within OBC groups. It is clearly evident that OBCs as 
a whole do not face the social stigma that some other marginalised communities may 
face.  Most states report significantly high number of intermingling of OBCs with other 
communities. The only states to report abysmal numbers are Jammu and Kashmir and 
Mizoram but that may be a function of low OBC numbers in both the states (Figure 2A.8). 
When the numbers are segregated as per caste, the numbers reflect similar trends. Across 
upper castes, Dalits and OBCs the percentage of people claiming to have OBC friends is 
significantly high. Its only falls significantly when we look at Adivasi respondents.
Figure 2A.9: Have an OBC close friend (by Caste and Education Level)
With education too, the numbers remain roughly within a small range for upper castes 
and Dalits. With Adivasis respondents, the number of people claiming to have an OBC 
close friend falls drastically with education (Figure 2A.9). While 47 percent non-literate 
Adivasi respondents say they have an OBC close friend, the number drops with Adivasi 
respondents educated even up to primary levels. Within OBC respondents, interestingly, 
it goes up with education. While only 59 percent of OBC respondents claim to have a 
close OBC friend, 76 percent of college educated OBC respondents claim to have a close 
OBC friend.
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Figure 2A.10: Have an OBC close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)
Our attempt to see if the rural-urban divide has an impact on the numbers reveals the 
same trends as before (Figure 2A.10). Across upper caste, Dalit and OBC respondents, 
the numbers do not change hugely. And again, the only outliers here are the Adivasi 
respondents where the numbers fall drastically from 36 percent to 14 percent with urban 
Adivasi respondents.
Figure 2A.11: Have an Upper Caste close friend (by State)
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Both Delhi and Kerala report an extremely high number of respondents claiming to 
have a close upper caste friend (Figure 2A.11). Most other states also report a fairly high 
number of respondents who have a close upper caste friend. In Assam, Kerala, Tripura, 
Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Delhi, the number of respondents claiming to have an 
upper caste friend is considerably lower than the numbers reported for a close OBC 
friend. With Mizoram, the numbers for both remain roughly the same and extremely low. 
Quite like the figures on OBCs, this figure also reflects a significantly high number of 
upper caste, Dalit and OBC respondents who have a close upper caste friend. The 
numbers again, drop considerably when we look at Adivasi respondents. This may be a 
function of the fact that this report has Assam, Tripura, Nagaland and Mizoram where the 
upper caste population is far lower.
Figure 2A.12: Have an Upper Caste close friend (by Caste and Education Level)
With education, the intra upper caste interactions go up by 10 percent between non-
literate and college educated respondents (Figure 2A.12). When it comes to Dalit 
respondents and OBC respondents, these numbers increase by 23 percent and 20 
percent respectively. It is only with Adivasis that the numbers actually fall by 10 per cent 
with college education.
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Figure 2A.13: Have an Upper Caste close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)
Across the rural urban divide too, the numbers are predictable. For urban respondents 
from Dalit, OBC and upper caste groups, the numbers increase significantly (Figure 
2A.13). Given the ubiquity of upper castes in all kinds of institutions, workplaces and 
offices, this is not surprising. It is only with urban Adivasi respondents that they fall by 11 
percent in comparison with rural Adivasi respondents.
Figure 2A.14: Have a Muslim close friend (by State)
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When it comes to looking at numbers of Muslims, clearly Jammu and Kashmir and Kerala 
report significantly high numbers of friendships with Muslims (Figure 2A.14). Delhi and 
West Bengal report close to 66 percent and 59 per cent of respondents who claim to 
have close Muslim friends. In Assam, despite the communal polarisation around National 
Registration of Citizens, the numbers are close to 57 percent. Interestingly, 38 percent of 
respondents from Nagaland respond positively to having a close Muslim friend.
Across the states, while 49 per cent of Hindu respondents said they have a close Muslim 
friend, with Sikh and Christian respondents it falls to 36 and 29 percent respectively. Quite 
predictably, given increasing communalism and religious polarisation, close to 90 percent 
of Muslim respondents report that they have a close Muslim friend.
Figure 2A.15: Have a Muslim close friend (by Religion and Education Level)
Education seems to have had a limited impact on friendships with Muslims (Figure 
2A.15). There could be two reasons for this. While education has hardly proved to be 
an antidote to communalism, the presence of Muslims, going by the Sachar Committee 
Report, in middle class occupations, neighbourhoods and educational institutions owing 
to lower social mobility, has been thin. Amongst Hindus, while 41 percent of non-literate 
respondents claimed to have a close Muslim friend, the numbers only increase to 57 
percent with respondents with college education. For Christian respondents too, the 
numbers only increase from 28 to 38 per cent between non-literate and college educated 
respondents.
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Figure 2A.16: Have a Muslim close friend (by Religion and Rural-Urban)
When we take a closer look at the data based on the rural-urban divide, the numbers do 
not reveal anything particularly different apart from the fact that with urban respondents 
overall, the social interaction with Muslims is slightly higher (Figure 2A.16). While both 
urban Sikh and Hindu respondents report a higher number of Muslim friends than their 
rural counterparts, with Christian respondents the number barely changes.
Figure 2A.17: Have a Christian close friend (by State)
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Both Nagaland and Mizoram have an extremely high number of respondents claiming to 
have Christian friends owing to their extremely high concentration in these states (Figure 
2A.17). Kerala too comes quite close with 85 per cent of respondents acknowledging to 
have a Christian friend owing to the strong Syrian Christian population. States like J&K, 
Assam, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Punjab have reported a considerably low number of 
intermingling with Christians but again, that may be a factor of population. In Tamil Nadu 
and Tripura, 61 and 53 percent of the respondents respectively, claim to have a close 
Christian friend. 
Figure 2A.17 shows that when we look at respondents from other religions claiming to 
have a close Christian friend, we see only 37 percent of Hindus and 26 percent of Muslims 
respond in the affirmative. With Sikhs, the number falls to 21 percent, probably because 
we have Punjab as one of the states for the survey, a Sikh dominated state with only 1.1 
per cent Christian population. The intra-Christian friendships are predictably as high as 95 
percent.
Figure 2A.18: Have a Christian close friend (by Religion and Education Level)
When we look at the numbers across education levels, the numbers increase for 
respondents in all religions, but only marginally (Figure 2A.18). For Hindu respondents, 
it increases from 29 percent among non-literates to 41 percent among college educated 
respondents. For Muslim respondents too, the number jumps up from 17 percent to 
32 percent. Among Christian respondents it increases from 83 per-cent to 97 percent. 
However, the sharpest jump, as other tables on education would also reveal, is seen 
between the non-literate to the primary educated ones.
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Figure 2A.19: Have a Christian close friend (by Religion and Rural-Urban)
Across the rural-urban divide too, there is an increase in the number of urban respondents 
claiming to have a close Christian friend (Figure 2A.19). This is different from their rural 
counterparts, where the numbers do not increase considerably. For Hindu respondents it 
goes up from 35 to 41 percent, while for Muslim respondents, it goes up only from 25 to 
28 percent. For Sikhs though, the increase is relatively higher - 9 percent. 
Figure 2A.20: Have a Hindu close friend (by State)
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Respondents in most states report an exceptionally high number of Hindu friends. 
Mizoram is the only state which reports very low levels (19 percent) of Hindus as close 
friends because of very low Hindu populations (Figure 2A.20). In Jammu and Kashmir 
however, 45 percent of respondents speak of close friendships with Hindus, but that 
may be reflective of the differences across Jammu and Kashmir as separate regional 
identities. The puzzling finding is from Nagaland which reports 52 percent of respondents 
claiming to have close Hindu friends. With an 88 percent Christian population, it is indeed 
surprising that respondents have such a high number of Hindu friends.
In terms of religion, the numbers of Muslim respondents claiming to have Hindu friends 
stands at 59 percent, but for Christian respondents, it comes down to 38 percent (Figure 
2A.21). Interestingly, for Sikh respondents, the number is only marginally higher (64 
percent) compared to Muslim respondents.
Figure 2A.21: Have a Hindu close friend (by Religion and Education Level)
With education, the numbers hardly vary for intra-Hindu friendships. For Muslim 
respondents however, the number saying they have Hindus as close friends goes up from 
47 percent (nonliterates) to 65 percent (college educated). For Christian respondents too, 
the numbers go up from 39 percent to 51 percent with college education. The numbers 
on Sikhs too display a similar trend with education.
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Figure 2A.22: Have a Hindu close friend (by Religion and Rural-Urban)
Among rural and urban respondents, quite like the previous tables on the same question, 
it shows an increase with respect to urban respondents, but nothing spectacular (Figure 
2A.22). The only place we see a sharp increase is with respect to Sikh respondents, 
with numbers jumping from 58 percent for rural respondents to 78 percent for urban 
respondents. The fact that the numbers across rural and urban respondents do not 
increase significantly is reiterative of our observations made in the previous reports - the 
assumption that moving to the cities essentially loosens one’s ethnic and kinship ties and 
literally forces us into friendships with people from other ethnic, cultural and religious 
groups, may not necessarily be true.
Figure 2A.23: Have a close friend of Opposite Gender (by State)
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In terms of gender, Nagaland and Kerala report the highest degree of friendships across 
gender (Figure 2A.23). While 75 percent of respondents from Nagaland say they have 
a friend from the opposite gender, in Kerala, 67 percent of the respondents replied in 
the affirmative to having a friend from the opposite gender. Between Mizoram, West 
Bengal, Tripura and Uttarakhand, roughly 40 to 50 percent of respondents have the 
same response. The lowest numbers are seen in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Tamil 
Nadu at 23, 25 and 28 percent respectively. Across states 43 percent male respondents 
acknowledged having a female friend. It was marginally lower, at 41 per cent, for women 
respondents.
Figure 2A.24: Have a close friend of Opposite Gender (by Gender)
An almost equal number of men and women respondents acknowledged having a friend 
from the opposite gender in each educational category (Figure 2A.24). With education, 
clearly the numbers show a clear increase in both genders. Again, there is a sharp jump in 
these numbers between the non-literate and primary level educated category compared 
to any other education level.
Figure 2A.25: Have a close friend of Opposite Gender (by Gender and Rural-Urban)
Across the rural and urban divide too, the numbers between men and women are roughly 
the same (Figure 2A.25). Interestingly, more number of rural men and women say that 
they have a close friend from the other gender.
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2. Approaching a Leader
Caste has been in the eye of the storm of Indian politics since the mid-1970s. Some 
of the issues that have been raised are comparative resource allocations, entitlements 
to seats in state institutions and decision-making bodies, vote bank politics, access 
to education, health, and livelihood, as well as equitable opportunities in the domain 
of social relations—all of which are decisive factors when it comes to choosing one’s 
political leader. Despite widespread awareness programmes, the Upper Castes are 
indignant about the positive discriminations made available at formal institutional levels 
by the Indian Constitution to alleviate the problematic conditions of lower castes and 
addressing problems faced by them. Instead of reducing these gaps, processes like the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report in 1992 aggravated the animosities 
between caste communities and raising debates on whether reservations should be made 
available on caste/tribe identities of individuals or their socio-economic conditions. Andre 
Beteille’s pointed out that one significant fall-out of reservations has been the increase 
in difference of socio-economic conditions between individuals belonging to the same 
caste/tribe community, as opposed to between them and the mainstream3. Middle and 
Upper castes’ questioning of reservation found a fresh lease of life with the rise of a right 
wing political environment in India since the middle of this decade. Several attacks in 
the last four years on the marginal communities, including the Dalits and Muslims, has 
compounded their vulnerabilities in the face of direct actions taken against them with the 
patronage of organised right-of-centre political forces. These groups have infringed upon 
freedom of discursive engagements in universities, and local recreational collectives such 
as clubs and libraries.
In this survey, we asked the respondents whether they held a preference for leaders from 
their own caste group or religious community. We measured this through two forced 
choice questions (Q55 and Q56): “Suppose there are two leaders from same political 
party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your caste/religion 
while the other from a different caste/religion, whom would you be willing to contact 
first?”
Approaching a leader: Caste
One salient point that may be highlighted here is that the results in this section of the 
report have clubbed data on the Adivasis and caste communities. This categorisation may 
appear to be convoluting the boundaries between the caste and Adivasi communities, 
generally considered to be completely separate categories of identity on the account 
of castes being segments of the Hindu community, and Adivasi identity being based 
on ethnicity. Thus, while the term used in Hindi for caste is ‘varna’, for Adivasis, the 
term is ‘JanaJati.’ However, there is scholarly opinion that traditionally castes and some 
Adivasi communities have been contiguous categories; and gradual alterations in 
their relationship to land, commercialisation of natural resources, and entry into state-
arbitrated market economy have brought about a ‘Hinduisation’ of Adivasi identities. 
Scholars also agree to some extent that the caste and tribe identities were reformed and 
frozen by the British for administrative expediency, which was a commentary in itself on 
the porous boundaries between tribes and other social formations that coexisted in the 
Indian society 4.
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Figure 2A.26: Preference on caste of leader to get work done (by State)
A large share of respondents in seven of the 12 states responded that they would 
approach a leader from their own caste (Figure 2A.26). Support for this view is highest 
in Mizoram (75 percent) and Nagaland (72 percent) where at least seven out of every 
10 respondents prefer a leader from their caste. On the other hand, most respondents 
in Kerala (74 percent), Punjab (56 percent), Jammu and Kashmir (55 percent), Assam 
(52 percent) and Uttarakhand (50 percent) do not hold a caste preference for the 
leader they would approach to get work done. However, the share of respondents who 
prefer a leader from same caste and those who hold no such preference is less than 10 
percentage points in Assam (5 percent), Tamil Nadu (2 percent) and Delhi (1 percent). 
In contrast, this difference is stark in Kerala, where 54 percent more respondents hold 
no caste preference, and the north-eastern states of Mizoram and Nagaland, where 52 
percent and 45 percent more respondents prefer a leader from the same caste.
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Figure 2A.27: Preference on caste of leader to get work done 
(by Caste and Rural-Urban)
When disaggregated by caste of the respondents interviewed (Figure 2A.27), the 
preference for leaders from the same caste is more prevalent among Dalits (54 percent) 
and Adivasis (71 percent). The trend is in the opposite direction among respondents from 
the Upper Caste and OBC. The preference is striking among Adivasis. While 44 percent 
more Adivasis prefer an Adivasi leader, the difference among Dalit, upper caste and OBC 
respondents falls to less than 15 percentage points.
When we explore the preferences among rural and urban members of various castes, we 
observe a larger share of Dalit and Adivasi respondents from both rural and urban areas 
prefer a leader from the same caste and a majority of upper caste and OBC respondents 
do not hold a caste preference (Figure 2A.27). However, a comparison of net preference 
among rural and urban respondents shows some decline in preference for leaders from 
the same caste. For instance, 56 percent of rural Dalit respondents prefer a Dalit leader 
but 48 percent of urban Dalits prefer a Dalit leader — an 8 percent drop. Similarly, the 
preference for Adivasi leader falls by 6 percentage points among urban Adivasis. 
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Figure 2A.28: Preference on caste of leader to get work done 
(by Caste and Economic Class)
We also observe a decline in preference for a leader from the same caste among 
wealthier respondents, compared to poorer respondents and a corresponding increase 
in the share of respondents who do not hold a caste preference (Figure 2A.28). Further 
analysis of the caste of the respondents shows variation in the preferences across 
economic classes. Upper caste respondents show the largest decline in the preference for 
an upper caste leader, from 48 percent among the poor to 37 percent among the upper 
class.
Approaching a leader: Religion
The following figures of religion, and its intersections with the State, rural/urban regions, 
and economic class, as determining factors for choosing one’s political leader.
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Figure 2A.29: Preference on leader to get work done (by State)
Seventy seven percent of respondents in Mizoram prefer to approach a political leader 
who shares their religious identity, followed by 68 percent in Nagaland, 59 percent in 
Uttar Pradesh and 56 percent in West Bengal (Figure 2A.29). On the lower end of the 
spectrum stands Kerala, where only 22 percent respondents reported that they would 
approach political leaders of their own religious community only. The difference between 
Kerala, and the next lowest, Punjab, is 19 percentage points; and the total range is 55 
percentage points. On the other hand, 21 per cent of respondents in Mizoram feel the 
religious identity of the leader does not matter.
Figure 2A.30: Preference on leader to get work done (by Caste and Rural-Urban)
25%
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Figure 2A.30 further explores the choices of political leaders through an intersection of 
religion and urban/rural region. Twenty nine percent of Christian respondents in rural 
areas say that religious identity of a political leader does not matter, while 69 percent of 
them say they would go to one from their own community. Comparably, 67 percent of 
Christians in urban regions would approach to political leaders from the same religious 
background. While 60 percent of the respondents belonging to other religious identities 
in rural regions say that they would approach political leaders from their own community, 
only 32 percent of respondents from the same category in urban region would make a 
similar choice.
Figure 2A.31: Preference on leader to get work done (by Religion and Economic Class)
When looked at through the intersection of religion and economic backgrounds (Figure    
2A .31), 40 percent of Hindu upper class respondents prefer a political leader from the 
same religious community, while for poor Hindus, that number is 51 percent. Again, while 
72 percent of poor Christians feel they would prefer someone from the same religious 
community as a political leader, 68 percent of the poor from this community feel the same 
way. At the same time, in almost all religious communities, the share of respondents who 
do not hold any such preference increases with greater wealth. For instance, 54 percent 
of upper class Hindus and Muslims feel that religion does not matter, compared to 43 
percent and 42 percent of the poor Hindus and Muslims respectively.
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Do religious prejudice and caste discrimination persist behind the veil of Indian secularism 
and constitutional culture? In this survey, we explore attitudes towards religious and 
caste communities along four dimensions: work ethic, peacefulness, patriotism and 
affirmative action. We examine whether the respondents consider certain communities to 
be worthy of affirmative action based on historical disadvantage or intra-group economic 
disparity. We also examine the controversial provision of affirmative action to historically 
dominant caste communities. On topics of diligence and industriousness of communities, 
peacefulness and patriotism, the responses are constructed along a 10-point scale. For 
affirmative action, this survey utilises a form of forced choice questions, albeit leaving 
some space respondents to decline to answer. 
We begin this chapter with perceptions about whether various caste groups are 
hardworking or lazy and then explore the responses for patriotism and peacefulness of 
religious communities. Finally, we analyse the respondents’ perception on affirmative 
action for Dalits, Adivasis and dominant caste. The responses to these questions are 
examined through demographic and socio-economic factors such as religion, caste, state 
and literacy of respondents.
1. Lazy or Hardworking
“Poverty is a matter of lack of opportunity, not a willing choice or fate of the poor.”5 It 
is often suggested that Dalits, Adivasis and people from other backward communities 
are lazy, and do not deserve state support in the form of reservations 6. This also implies 
that if these people study and work hard enough, they can automatically lift themselves 
out of poverty. This perception, when viewed at a national level, ignores the reality that 
while some of the positive changes brought about by economic growth have provided 
new opportunities for Dalits to move away from their traditional, non-remunerative 
occupations 7, the outcomes for Dalits still remain lower than those for other caste 
groups 8. 
In this section, we analyse the results for the question (Q22 in our study) for Dalits, 
Adivasis, OBC and upper caste: “On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at the 
bottom stands for extremely lazy and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely 
hardworking, on which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities?”
The respondents were shown a scale from 1 to 10 and asked to select a point on the scale 
(Figure 2B.1). If the respondent declines to answer, ‘No Opinion’ was recorded. 
2.B / Discrimination and 
Stereotypes
Figure 2B.1: 10-point scale used for questions on ‘Hardworking or Lazy’
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In the results below, if the responses are at 7th point or above on the scale the responses 
are considered as leaning towards ‘hardworking’ and if the responses are at 4th point 
or below they are considered as biased towards ‘lazy’. The centre of the scale (5th and 
6th points on the scale) indicate an ambiguous attitude that proved difficult to interpret. 
It may be considered either as no opinion or that a community is neither ‘Extremely 
Hardworking’ nor ‘Extremely Lazy’ but a combination of the two. Additionally, it must be 
noted that not all states have significant populations of Dalits, Adivasis or upper caste. 
The question on perception was asked only in the states with a substantial population of 
the caste groups.
As per the 2011 Census India data, Dalits comprise around 16 percent of India’s 
population 9 and more than 70 percent live below the poverty line 10, with no access 
to basic resources. They suffer from among the highest rates of unemployment in the 
country 11.
The overall results show that Dalits are perceived as extremely hardworking by 21percent 
of the survey respondents while 4 percent feel that Dalits are extremely lazy (Figure 2B.2). 
Overall, the trend shows that a majority of respondents (63 percent) perceive Dalits as 
hardworking, while 20 percent of the respondents view Dalits as lazy. 
Similarly, a majority (60 percent) of the respondents perceive Adivasis as hardworking, 
with 17 percent of the respondents feeling that Adivasis are extremely hardworking. 
However, with respect to upper caste, 49 percent of the respondents perceived this 
community to be generally hardworking; 10 percentage points below Dalits and Adivasis. 
Furthermore, a significantly smaller share of respondents (11 percent) of the respondents 
perceive the upper caste to be extremely hardworking and 5 percent feel that the upper 
caste are extremely lazy.
The share of ‘No Opinion’, although not included in the Figure 2B.2, shows an interesting 
variation. While less than 20 percent of the respondents declined to express an opinion 
with respect to Dalits and upper caste, 25 percent of the respondents did not provide a 
response for perception about Adivasis.
Figure 2B.2: Perceptions about Dalits, Adivasis and Upper Caste as being Lazy 
or Hardworking
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The survey on perception about Dalits was conducted in 10 states: Assam, Jammu and 
Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Delhi and 
Uttarakhand. 
Overall, while the responses of a large share of respondents across the states tend 
towards hardworking, the results present interesting variations (Figure 2B.3). While in 
most of the states less than 20 percent of the responses tend toward perceiving Dalits as 
lazy, a higher share of respondents in Uttar Pradesh (34 percent), Uttarakhand (29 percent) 
and Tamil Nadu (20 percent) hold the same view.  This trend can also be seen in the share 
of respondents who perceive Dalits to be ‘Extremely Lazy’. 8 percent of respondents 
in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand and 7 percent in Tamil Nadu perceive Dalits to be 
extremely lazy, whereas less than 5 percent in other states hold the same opinion. Figure 
A.3 shows that the share of responses hit a peak at ‘Extremely Hardworking’ for almost all 
states except Kerala and West Bengal where the largest share of respondents (23 percent) 
is at 8th point on the scale, that is, generally hardworking.
Figure 2B.3: Perceptions about Dalits as being Lazy or Hardworking (by State)
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An extremely significant result is that of ‘No Responses’ in various states. In Kerala, 41 
percent of survey respondents did not answer this question, followed by 25 percent in 
Assam and 23 percent in Tamil Nadu. In other states, this number was significantly lower 
and in the 6 percent to 20 percent range. This result can point to one of two issues: a 
genuine lack of opinion or a strong sense of social desirability. 
 
Most upper caste, Adivasis and OBCs feel that Dalits are extremely hardworking. While 
almost 30 percent of Dalits identify themselves as extremely hardworking, this was less 
than 25 percent among other caste groups (Figure 2B.4). A more positive self-perception 
of caste and religious communities is a recurring trend in later figures as well.
Figure 2B.4: Perceptions about Dalits as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Caste)
If we view the survey results in terms of literacy levels of the respondents and their views 
about Dalits, we see a somewhat inverse relation (Figure 2B.5). The overall perception 
remains that Dalits are generally hardworking, with around 20 percent of respondents, 
across education levels, stating that Dalits are extremely hardworking. However, closer 
observation shows a fall in the share of respondents who feel that Dalits are generally 
hardworking (levels 7 to 10), from 67 percent among non-literates to 56 percent among 
the college educated. There is a similar rise of 8 percentage points among the share of 
respondents who feel that Dalits are generally lazy (levels 1 to 4). 
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Figure 2B.5: Perceptions about Dalits as being Lazy or Hardworking 
(by Education Level)
Although on average, six in every 10 respondents in the states surveyed (all 12 states in 
this case) feel that Adivasis are generally hardworking, state-wise disaggregation shows 
considerable variations (Figure 2B.6). In most states, over half of the respondents show 
support for the idea that Adivasis are hardworking. However, in Mizoram more than half 
of the respondents (56 percent) are neutral in their opinion on the hardworking nature 
of Adivasis while less than 40 percent feel that Adivasis are industrious. For states such 
as Mizoram, Nagaland and Uttar Pradesh, much of the opinion concentrated around the 
middle while in other states the opinion concentrates towards the higher end of the scale. 
Notably, the share of respondents in the lower end of the scale is extremely low and in 
states like Assam, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and West Bengal, this number is 
less than 10 percent.
These results must nevertheless be read with a pinch of salt. The share of respondents 
who declined to give an opinion was a shocking 63 percent in Mizoram and 41 percent 
in Kerala. In Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Punjab and Tamil Nadu, almost a 
quarter of the respondents refused to provide any answer. One may question whether 
such high rates of no responses is a result of low Adivasi population in these states. 
However, Mizoram and Nagaland, states with large ST populations —94 percent and 86 
percent respectively — also register a significantly large number of ‘No Opinion’. 
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Figure 2B.6: Perceptions about Adivasis as being Lazy or Hardworking (by State)
The general perception among survey respondents belonging to various caste groups 
is that Adivasis are generally hardworking (Figure 2B.7). Surprisingly, it appears that 
members of other caste categories hold a slightly better perception about Adivasis than 
the Adivasis themselves. This is a break from a trend we notice across this chapter, where 
the largest positive support of a caste or religious community comes from respondents of 
that community. It is worth noting that in response to this question, about 37 percent of 
Adivasi respondents chose not to answer; this is almost 20 percentage points higher than 
other caste communities. It is possible that the large share of ‘No Opinion’ and of Adivasi 
population in Mizoram and Nagaland may be driving this number. 
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Figure 2B.7: Perceptions about Adivasis as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Caste)
The survey results show interesting results when analysed on education levels of the 
respondents (Figure 2B.8). Respondents who are non-literate have a much better 
perception of Adivasis as hardworking, with 21 percent of them stating that Adivasis 
are extremely hardworking. However, at the same time, for respondents with higher 
education levels, the opinions seem to move largely towards the middle of the scale and 
minimally towards the lower end of the scale. Education also seems to have some effect 
on response rate; almost 10 percent fewer college educated respondents declined to 
answer compared to non-literate respondents. 
Figure 2B.8: Perceptions about Adivasis as being Lazy or Hardworking 
(by Education Level)
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This question was asked in 11 states where there are significant upper caste populations. 
When we disaggregate the survey responses by Indian states, we observe that in seven 
states (Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Nagaland, Tripura, Delhi and Uttarakhand), 
the upper caste are generally viewed as being hardworking (Figure 2B.9). This result 
is particularly pronounced in Kerala, Tripura and Uttarakhand where 60 percent of the 
respondents hold this view. 23 percent of the respondents interviewed in Uttarakhand 
perceive upper caste to be extremely hardworking. In general, the share of respondents 
who feel that upper caste are extremely hardworking is significantly lower than that 
recorded in other states. In Kerala, once again, we find an extremely large number (41 
percent) of ‘No Opinion’.
Figure 2B.9: Perceptions about Upper Caste as being Lazy or Hardworking (by State)
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Across caste, almost 60 percent of the upper caste respondents perceive themselves 
to be generally hardworking and 16 percent perceive themselves to be extremely 
hardworking (Figure 2B.10). The perception of the other caste groups, although generally 
positive, is not as high. Nearly 8 percent of Dalit respondents and 6 percent of OBC 
respondents perceive the upper caste as being extremely lazy. More than 25 percent of 
the respondents of Dalit and OBC community view the upper caste as being generally 
lazy. While the opinion of the Adivasis seem to concentrate around the middle of the 
scale, this group also records the largest share of non-response at 25 percent. 
Figure 2B.10: Perceptions about Upper Caste as being Lazy or Hardworking 
(by Caste)
Unlike the trend seen with respect to Adivasis and Dalits, education seems to have a 
positive correlation with positive perception about upper caste (Figure 2B.11). As the 
share of ‘No Opinion’ drops with greater education, the share of respondents who view 
the upper caste as being hardworking falls too. 
Figure 2B.11: Perceptions about upper Caste as being Lazy or Hardworking 
(by Education Level)
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2. Patriotic or Unpatriotic
Religion and faith are central to the lives of people in South Asia. In particular, the politics 
of the majority and minority religions has played an important role in shaping the ideas of 
the nation, state and citizenship in this region 12. Religious and social minorities have been 
subjected to constant majoritarian domination and cultural policing in India 13. 
Gyanendra Pandey notes that “Nations, and nationalisms, are established by defining 
boundaries”14 and in many cases involving minority religions, the boundary is faith 
itself. There is a persistent notion that only “Hindus”, and those communities termed 
as ‘Hindus’, can be loyal to India and that the affinities of certain other communities 
lie outside India, therefore making these communities ‘unpatriotic’. Many proponents 
of this idea, referred to the concept of punyabhoomi and pitrubhoomi to validate the 
questioning of patriotism among the minorities. Yet, as some have shown, Indian Muslims 
continue to pledge their allegiance to the Indian state15. 
The survey asked a question (Q13) on patriotism of various religious communities through 
a 10-point scale, similar to the one shown in Figure 2B.1: On a ladder of 10 steps where 
the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely unpatriotic and the 10th step at the top 
stands for extremely patriotic, on which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following 
communities?
Figure 2B.12:10-point scale used for questions on ‘Patriotic or Unpatriotic’
Figure 2B.13, shows the general trend in perceptions held about Muslims, Christians, 
Hindus and Sikhs as being patriotic and unpatriotic. While a bulk of the responses with 
respect to Muslims and Christians seem to centre around the middle of the scale, most 
of the responses on Hindus and Sikhs concentrate around the higher end of the scale. 
The results show that around 30 percent of the respondents consider Muslims to be 
unpatriotic and about 20 percent feel the same about Christians, whereas less than 10 
percent hold the same view about Hindus and Sikhs. Despite the bleak numbers and 
unlike the Hindu nationalistic rhetoric on this subject - which believes that Hinduism is 
the source of Indian identity and Muslims are the principal adversary16 - 51 percent of 
the respondents perceive Christians to be patriotic and 45 percent of the respondents 
perceive Muslims to be patriotic. Sikhs are also considered to be patriotic with 26 percent 
of the respondents perceiving this community to be extremely patriotic.
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Figure 2B.13: Perception of Religious Communities as Unpatriotic or Patriotic
The trend in responses across the states shows a tendency around the middle of the 
scale in Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Tripura (Figure 2B.14). While most 
responses in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand gather towards the lower end of the scale, 
the opposite is true in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir and Kerala. Over 40 percent of the 
respondents in Uttarakhand and close to 60 percent in Uttar Pradesh perceive Muslims 
to be generally unpatriotic. Furthermore, 19 percent of respondents from Uttar Pradesh, 
14 percent from Uttarakhand and 12 percent from Tamil Nadu believe that Muslims are 
extremely unpatriotic. In stark contrast, around 58 percent of the responses in Assam and 
over 65 percent of the responses in Jammu and Kashmir and Kerala record a positive 
view of Muslims; over 20 percent perceive Muslims to be extremely patriotic. This result 
is very interesting, given the press reportage of religious conflict and seeming intolerance 
between the local Assamese and migrant Bengali Muslim populations particularly in 
Assam in recent times 17. Still, one must view these results in the light of response rate 
which shows that half of the respondents in Mizoram and over a third of the respondents 
in Kerala did not record any opinion. 
47
Figure 2B.14: Perceptions about Muslims as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)
As noted in the case of self-perception of caste groups, religious communities also 
tend to perceive themselves in a much more positive light than how other communities 
perceive them (Figure 2B.15). 45 percent of Muslims consider themselves as extremely 
patriotic and almost 80 percent perceive themselves to be generally patriotic. The other 
communities, it appear, do not hold the same view; only 17 percent of Sikhs and less than 
10 percent of Hindus and Christians hold the view that Muslims are extremely patriotic. 
Negative perceptions about Muslims are highest among Hindus compared to other 
communities. Over a third of the Hindu respondents perceive Muslims to be unpatriotic 
and 12 percent feel Muslims are extremely unpatriotic. Whereas only about 4 percent 
of Christians and 6 percent of Sikhs hold this view, a proportion similar to Muslims 
themselves. Most responses among Christians, Sikhs and Other religious communities 
tend to centre on the middle of the scale. Additionally, Christians also record the highest 
‘No Opinion’ in this analysis.
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Figure 2B.15: Perceptions about Muslims as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic 
(by Religion)
Greater education does seem to lead to higher response rate and a more negative 
view of the Muslims. While 49 percent of non-literate respondents feel that Muslims are 
patriotic (level 7 and above), there is a 6 percent drop with respect to college educated 
respondents. Nevertheless, the changes seem rather marginal.
In most states surveyed in this project, the perceptions about the Christian community 
are around the middle of the scale, whereas in states like Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, 
Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura around 70 percent of the respondents hold a positive 
view about Christians (Figure 2B.16). As noted in earlier results, Kerala (38 percent) 
again records the largest share of ‘No Opinion’, followed by West Bengal (31 percent).  
In Assam and Tripura more than 20 percent of the responses show that Christians are 
perceived as extremely patriotic. Except for Uttar Pradesh, less than 30 percent of the 
respondents in most states perceive Christians as being unpatriotic.
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Figure 2B.16: Perceptions about Christians as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)
One remarkable trend is the perception of two minority religious communities about each 
other. In Figure 2B.15, we had noted that Christians generally hold a neutral perception 
about Muslims, however in Figure 2B.17, we find that Muslims hold a very positive view 
about Christians. In fact, Muslims hold a more positive view of Christians than Christians 
hold of themselves. While 12 percent of Christians feel that Christians are extremely 
patriotic, 24 percent of Muslim, that is twice that share of Christians, hold the same view. 
Additionally, a higher share of even Sikh respondents have a positive view of Christians, 
with 18 percent finding Christians to be extremely patriotic and about 47 percent tending 
towards this view. Hindus, on the other hand, tend towards the middle of the scale. 
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Figure 2B.17: Perceptions about Christians as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic 
(by Religion)
Literacy does not seem to impact the responses about Christians. Respondents across 
various levels of education have mostly similar perceptions about Christians, which is that 
they are patriotic.
The state-wise disaggregation of the perceptions about Hindus shows marginal variations 
and responses, as noted earlier in this chapter, and is consistently positive across the 
states (Figure 2B.18). Most states lean towards the higher end of the scale, except for 
Mizoram and Nagaland where much of the responses concentrate around the middle 
of the scale. The share of respondents who hold a positive view about Hindus is around 
70 percent or more in all states other than the two north-eastern states where the same 
share is between 50 percent and 60 percent. In Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Tripura 
and Assam over a third of the respondents view Hindus as extremely patriotic. Mizoram 
records the highest share of ‘No Opinion’ at 48 percent followed respondents from Kerala 
at 37 percent.   
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Figure 2B.18: Perceptions about Hindus as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)
It is not surprising to find that over a third of Hindus regard themselves as extremely 
patriotic, but it is also remarkable that a roughly equal share of Muslim respondents (31 
percent) also feel the same way about Hindus (Figure 2B.19). While Sikhs also hold a very 
positive view of Hindus, only Christian respondents have a slightly different perception. 
Only 8 percent of Christians perceive Hindus as extremely patriotic and most responses 
among Christians have a tendency towards the middle of the scale; this community also 
records the highest share of ‘no responses’ among the religious communities studied. 
Nevertheless, most respondents across religious communities perceive the majority 
community to be patriotic.
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Figure 2B.19: Perceptions about Hindus as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic 
(by Religion)
As noted in earlier sections, education does not seem to have a significant impact on 
perception. Generally, 75 percent of the respondents across literacy levels view Hindus as 
being patriotic.  
Unlike the other reports in this project series, we analysed the results for Sikhs specifically 
to the large share of Sikh respondents this time (Figure 2B.20). This question was asked in 
9 states which have Sikh residents. Predictably, states with significantly large the Punjabi 
speaking populations, particularly Punjab, Delhi and Uttarakhand, hold a very positive 
view about Sikhs.  Interestingly, Assam and Uttar Pradesh also hold a similar view of Sikhs. 
However, the share of respondents who perceive Sikhs to be extremely patriotic is much 
lower in the states with negligible Sikh population, such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West 
Bengal. In West Bengal particularly, most responses gather around the middle of the 
scale. These three states also record the largest share of ‘No Opinion’.  
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Figure 2B.20: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)
Over half of the respondents of every religious community hold a positive view of Sikhs 
(Figure 2B.21). As expected, over a third of the Sikhs view themselves to be extremely 
patriotic and about 71 percent perceive themselves as highly patriotic. 22 percent of 
Muslims respondents, 24 percent of respondents belonging to other religious groups 
and 19 percent of Hindus feel the same way. Less than 20 percent of Hindus and only 13 
percent of Christian respondents attribute utmost patriotism to Sikhs.
Figure 2B.21: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by Religion)
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People’s perception of Sikhs being patriotic or unpatriotic remains vastly similar across 
education levels of respondents. 28 percent of respondents without a formal education 
feel the same way about Sikhs as 26 percent of those with a college education or 
above – that Sikhs are extremely patriotic. Similar views are expressed by 25 percent 
of respondents with a high school education and 23 percent of those who have only 
completed primary schooling.
3. Peaceful or Violent
Religion is deeply embedded in Indian society and it plays an important role in shaping 
the social, cultural and political ideologies about contemporary issues facing the country 
like politics, terrorism, social norms and development. Indian news media is often rife with 
controversies emerging from statements about the seemingly violent and anti-national 
behaviour of certain religious minority communities. To explore the perceptions of people 
about religious communities further, we asked a question (Q48) dealing with this subject: 
On a ladder of 10 steps, where the 1st step at the bottom stands for extremely violent 
and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely peaceful, on which step from 1 to 10 
would you place the following communities?
Respondents were shown a scale from 1 to 10 and asked to select a point on the scale as 
shown in Figure 2B.22. If the respondent declined to answer the question, ‘No Opinion’ 
was recorded. 
Figure 2B.22: 10-point scale used for questions on ‘Peaceful or Violent’
The results regarding the perception about religious communities as peaceful or violent 
are shown in Figure 2B.23and show varying trends. Perceptions about Hindus, Sikhs and 
Christians largely concentrate around the higher end of the scale whereas perceptions 
about Muslims are concentrated around the middle of the scale. While 65 percent of 
the respondents consider Hindus and Sikhs to be generally peaceful (level 7 and above), 
a similar positive perception is held by only 42 percent of the respondents towards 
Muslims; a decline of more than 20 percentage points. At the same time while 19 percent 
of the respondents hold the perceptions that Hindus and Sikhs are extremely peaceful, 13 
percent of respondents hold the same view about Muslims and Christians.  At the other 
end of scale, 3 percent of the respondents perceive Hindus, Christians and Sikhs to be 
extremely violent but the number for Muslims is 5 percentage points higher, at 8 percent. 
Overall, while less than 20 percent of the respondents feel that Hindus, Christians and 
Sikhs are generally violent (level 4 or below), the same is not true about the Muslim 
community which is considered by 31 percent of the respondents are being violent.
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Figure 2B.23: Perception about Religious Communities as Peaceful or Violent
In this section, we will analyse the results regarding each of the four religious communities 
separately across states and religions of the respondents.
In Figure  2B.23, we noted that the overall results show that Muslims are considered in 
a rather poor light. However, this trend cannot be generalised across the states. Figure 
2B.24 shows the spread of perceptions across the states.
The state-wise disaggregation of the results shows multiple trends across states.  In 
Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Mizoram and Nagaland, most of the responses 
cluster around the middle and towards the lower end of the scale, denoting that most 
respondents in these states tend to hold a negative view of Muslims. On the other 
hand, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Tamil Nadu show the opposite trend; most 
respondents perceive Muslims to be peaceful. In other states, like West Bengal and 
Tripura we notice spikes at the extremes ends of the scale and right at the middle, but 
there aren’t significantly large numbers of responses in the ranges in between. 42 percent 
of respondents from Mizoram and 38 percent of the respondents from Kerala refused to 
provide any response to this question.
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Figure 2B.24: Perceptions about Muslims as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)
As noted in earlier figures, respondents tend to perceive their own community in a much 
more positive light than the other communities. The disaggregation of the results by the 
religious community of the respondent, seen in Figure 2B.25, shows the same sentiment. 
81 percent of Muslim respondents affirm that their community is peaceful and 36 percent 
feel that they are extremely peaceful.  Other communities, except for the Sikh community, 
do not seem to share this view. Most of the responses among the Sikhs centre around 
the middle and towards the higher end of the scale, thereby denoting that the Sikh 
community perceives Muslims as being generally peaceful. On the other hand, the 
responses among Hindus and Christians cluster around the middle and more towards the 
lower end of the scale. A higher share of Hindus (11 percent) and Christians (6 percent) 
perceive Muslims to be extremely violent, compared to 3 percent of Sikhs.  
Notably, most of the responses (39 percent) from other religious communities such as 
Buddhists, Jains and so on, show that they perceive Muslims to be generally peaceful. 
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Figure 2B.25: Perceptions about Muslims as being Peaceful or Violent  (by Religion)
As a variable, literacy does not produce much variation in the results with respect to 
perceptions about most religious communities. However, when it comes to perceptions 
about Muslims, we certainly do find some movement in numbers across the literacy 
levels. Greater education seems to not only reduce the share of ‘No Responses’ from 22 
percent among non-literates to 16 percent among the college educated, it also seems 
to worsen the perception about Muslims.  16 percent of the non-literate respondents 
consider Muslims to be extremely peaceful, but this number drops as levels of literacy 
increase, to 11 percent among college educated. Nearly 50 percent of the responses 
from the non-literate population tend towards the perception that Muslims are very 
peaceful. However, this falls almost 10 percent percentage points to 40 percent among 
those educated up to college or above. 
Across the states, Christians are generally perceived as being peaceful (Figure 2B.26). 
This perception is most prevalent in the responses from Mizoram and Nagaland where 87 
percent and 71 percent of the respondents perceive Christians to be largely peaceful. As 
Christians form a large share of the population of these two states, the overwhelmingly 
positive sentiment from the two states may be attributed to self-perception.  26 percent 
of respondents from Mizoram, 19 percent from Tripura, 17 percent from Uttarakhand and 
16 percent from Assam consider Christians to be extremely peaceful. The other states 
particularly Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu share a similar sentiment 
about Christians where most of the responses tend to cluster around the higher end of 
the scale.
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Figure 2B.27: Perceptions about Christians as being Peaceful or Violent 
(by Religion)
Figure 2B.26: Perceptions about Christians as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)
As noted in the earlier figure, the perception about Christians among the religious 
communities is that they are generally peaceful (Figure 2B.27). While 78 percent of the 
Christians support this view, between 50-60 percent of Hindu, Muslim and Christian 
respondents support this view and almost 80 percent from other religious communities 
hold this view. Furthermore, among non-Christian communities, Muslims record the 
highest share of respondents who state that Christians are extremely peaceful. 
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When we examine people’s perceptions on how peaceful or violent Christians are based 
on their literacy levels, we receive responses similar to the views expressed in the earlier 
sections of this chapter. Christians are believed to be extremely peaceful in nature across 
the board. Though we do not see any major changes in perception across education 
levels, the share of respondents who perceive Christians as peaceful (level 7 and above) 
increases from 54 percent among non-literate respondents to 60 percent among the 
college educated.
While Figure  2B .21 showed an overwhelming support for peacefulness of Hindus, 
the state-wise disaggregation shows a slightly different picture (Figure 2B.28). Over 
75 percent of the respondents in Delhi, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand 
consider Hindus to be peaceful (level 7 and above). Furthermore, 44 percent of 
respondents in Uttarakhand, 31 percent in Tripura and 26 percent in West Bengal believe 
that Hindus are extremely peaceful. On the other hand, in states such as Nagaland, 
Mizoram, Jammu and Kashmir and Tamil Nadu, the bulk of the sentiments concentrate 
around the middle and, to some extent, towers the lower end of the scale. Over 20 
percent of the respondents in Jammu and Kashmir and Tamil Nadu and almost 30 percent 
of the respondents in Mizoram and Nagaland perceive Hindus to be violent. 40 percent 
of respondents from Kerala and Mizoram did not provide their view on this question.
Figure 2B.28: Perceptions about Hindus as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)
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Figure 2B.29: Perceptions about Hindus as being Peaceful or Violent 
(by Religion)
As expected, 75 percent of the Hindus consider themselves to be peaceful and a quarter 
of Hindus feel that the Hindu community is extremely peaceful (Figure 2B.27). A little 
less than 60 percent of Muslims and Sikhs also perceive the Hindu community to be 
peaceful and around 14 percent of respondents from both religious communities feel 
that Hindus are extremely peaceful. However, the responses from Christian respondents 
show starkly different opinions. A large share of Christians (37 percent) provide a neutral 
view of Hindus (level 5 and 6) whereas around 30 percent tend towards the view that 
Hindus are very violent and 34 percent head towards the opposite view that Hindus are 
very peaceful. The Christian community also record the highest share of respondents who 
declined to provide their view.  
Across different levels of literacy, while there isn’t a stark change in the responses, there 
are some interesting marginal differences. The results show a marginally smaller share 
of college educated respondents (64 percent) who perceive Hindus to be peaceful 
compared to the non-literate respondents (66 percent).
This question was asked in states with significant Sikh populations such as the northern 
states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand. (Figure 
2B.30) It was also asked in states with smaller Sikhs populations such as the southern 
and eastern states. While the overall perception about Sikhs is positive and towards 
the higher end of the scale, we notice certain differences between the states with 
significant Sikh population and those with a negligible population. In the states with 
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Figure 2B.30: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)
higher Sikh population, the general trend points to an extremely positive view of the 
community. While over 65 percent of the respondents in Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi and 
Uttarakhand held a positive view, almost 80 percent of the respondents in Punjab held 
a similar perception. In states like Assam, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, where Sikhs account 
only a fraction of the population, a similarly large share of respondents hold a positive 
view of the Sikhs, albeit slightly lower than their counterparts from the northern states. 
Interestingly, West Bengal record the lowest share of respondents who perceive Sikhs 
to be extremely peaceful and a bulk of the responses concentrate around the middle of 
the scale. Over 40 percent of survey respondents from Kerala and West Bengal and 31 
percent from Tamil Nadu did not express their views on this question.
Across the religious communities, there is generally a positive perception about the Sikh 
community (Figure 2B.31). Over 60 percent of Hindus, Muslims and Christians perceive 
Sikhs to be peaceful while over 70 percent of Sikhs hold the same perceptions about 
themselves. More than a third of the Sikhs consider themselves to be extremely peaceful, 
though the same perception was held by considerably lower share of respondents from 
non-Sikh religious communities.
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Figure 2B.31: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Peaceful or Violent (by Religion)
Formal education does not seem to have any impact on perception about Sikhs. The 
percentage of respondents who consider Sikhs to be very peaceful remains consistent 
across literacy levels.
4. Dalits: Historical Disadvantage or Laziness?
Casteism, as a form of discriminatory social stratification has existed in India for a long 
time. Post-independence, several affirmative policies like reservations in educational 
institutions and for employment in the public sector as well as protective legislation like 
the Scheduled caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 were 
passed.  The social and economic conditions of the Dalits, Adivasis and OBCs continue 
to be dismal despite decades of such policy actions as they are often subject to forms 
of discrimination and exclusion from mainstream society. While in the earlier sections 
we looked at how various caste groups are perceived — as lazy or hardworking— in 
this section we will delve into the contentious issue of affirmative action for Dalits and 
Adivasis through questions Q46a and Q46b which asked respondents for their opinion 
on causes of the poor economic conditions of the marginalised sections of Indian society. 
Respondents were provided with two options to choose from: first, that the Dalits/
Adivasis were being held back by historic injustices and second that the Dalits/Adivasis 
are just lazy:
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Figure 2B.32 Cause for poverty among Dalits
“Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree 
with most? 
Statement 1: Generations of unfair treatment has made it difficult for Dalits/Adivasis to 
improve their economic conditions 
Statement 2: Dalits/Adivasis are not trying harder; if they try hard enough they will be well 
off.”
The results in Figure 2B.32 show that over 40 percent of the respondents hold the view 
that Dalits have suffered unfair treatment through the ages and this could be the reason 
for their poverty. On the other hand, 27 percent of the respondents felt that Dalits weren’t 
trying hard enough to alleviate poverty. Interestingly, a high proportion of respondents 
(31 percent) did not express any view. 
In most of the states, the dominant view is that historical injustice has made it difficult for 
this community to prosper (Figure 2B.33). In other states such as Jammu and Kashmir, 
Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, most respondents did not hold any view. In fact, in 
Mizoram and Tripura over half of the respondents did not provide any opinion on the 
matter. However, in stark contrast, the dominant opinion in Tamil Nadu is that Dalits are 
not trying hard enough to improve their life conditions. This opinion finds significant 
traction in Uttarakhand as well.  
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Figure 2B.33: Cause for poverty among Dalits (by State)
Figure 2B.34 Cause for poverty among Dalits (by Caste)
Most respondents across caste groups agree that the reason for Dalits being poor is 
external, that is injustice of the ages (Figure 2B.34). Typically, 56 percent of Dalits blamed 
historical unfairness for their poverty. More than 40 percent of upper Caste, OBC and 
other respondents agreed with this view. Adivasi respondents however did not follow the 
dominant view; while more than 50 percent of them did not answer this question, of the 
remaining, only about 30 percent mentioned historical unfairness as the cause for their 
poverty.   
65
Figure 2B.35: Cause for poverty among Adivasis
5. Adivasi: Historical Disadvantage or Laziness?
In the earlier section, we discussed that the perceptions regarding the cause of poverty 
among Dalits and most respondents had cited historical injustice as the cause for poverty. 
As Figure 2B.35 shows, most respondents hold a similar opinion about the Adivasis 
in India. 40 percent of the respondents feel that generations of unfair treatment has 
hindered the economic growth of Adivasis.  
When disaggregated by states, as shown in Figure 2B.36, the results show that most 
states share the feeling that Adivasis are a historically disadvantaged community and 
that is the main cause for their poverty. This feeling is particularly strong among people 
residing in Kerala, West Bengal and Delhi where over half of the respondents have cited 
this problem. In Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab and Tripura, most 
respondents declined to provide an answer. However, it is notable that Nagaland, where 
Scheduled Tribes constitute around 86 percent of the population (according to Census 
2011), a third of the respondents feel that Adivasis are not trying hard enough to alleviate 
themselves from poverty. A striking result from the survey comes from Tamil Nadu 
where 41 percent support this view. The share of ‘no responses’ is at the highest among 
respondents in Mizoram (66 percent) and in Punjab (50 percent). 
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Figure 2B.36: Cause for poverty among Adivasis (by State)
Figure 2B.37: Cause for poverty among Adivasis (by Caste)
Members of all caste categories perceive that the historically unfair treatment of Adivasis 
is holding the community back from improving their economic conditions (Figure 2B.37). 
Interestingly, almost half (48 percent) of Adivasi respondents declined to answer this 
question. As noted in the earlier table, a large share of respondents from states (Mizoram 
and Nagaland) with high Adivasi population had declined to give an opinion. 
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Figure 2B.38: Affirmative action for Dominant Caste
6. Dominant Caste: Privileged All or Privileged Few?
In the recent past, we have increasingly witnessed pushbacks from dominant caste, be 
it the Patels in Gujarat or the Jats in Haryana and so on, who despite holding strong 
political and economic clout in their respective states, have demanded affirmative action. 
It would be natural to presume that rejection of such claims would then be the most 
commonly held view. Such kind of affirmative action is particularly important today with 
reservation being announced for the upper caste. 
We asked the respondents their view on affirmative action through a forced choice 
question (Q. 46c): 
“Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree 
with most?”
Statement 1: Over the last 50 years, dominant caste has acquired large political and 
economic power hence they should not be given any special assistance.
Statement 2: Only few from dominant caste have acquired large political and economic 
power, while a majority among them are not as privileged. Hence they should be given 
more privileges in society 
Unlike the other survey questions discussed in this chapter, responses for this have been 
reviewed only from 9 Indian states. In the remaining 3 states surveyed, West Bengal, 
Uttarakhand and Jammu & Kashmir, no clear dominant caste(s) could be identified.   
The results, Figure 2B.38, show that 42 percent of the respondents are in favour of 
assistance for dominant caste population in that state. While 29 percent of respondents 
do not support any such action, the remaining 29 percent did not provide their opinion 
on the issue.  
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Figure 2B.39: Affirmative action for Dominant Caste (by State)
Across the surveyed states, the results in Figure 2B.39 show that most respondents in five 
states — Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab and Tamil Nadu — support state assistance 
for the members of the dominant caste. While over half of the respondents in Punjab (60 
percent), Mizoram (57 percent) and Nagaland (57 percent) support this view, the support 
among respondents in Tamil Nadu and Kerala was around 45 percent. 
Most respondents in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi show the opposing view — 46 percent 
and 59 percent respectively — which is that dominant caste do not deserve any special 
assistance. 47 percent of the respondents in Assam and 62 percent in Tripura did not 
provide their views on this subject. Of the remaining respondents in both Assam and 
Tripura, an equal share of respondents support state assistance for dominant caste and 
disagree that the dominant caste should be given any perks.
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Figure 2B.40: Affirmative action for Dominant Caste (by Caste)
The disaggregation of the results by the caste of the respondents shows fascinating 
results (Figure 2B.40). While a slightly larger share of upper caste (38 percent) feel 
that dominant caste should not be given any state assistance, over half of the Adivasi 
respondents (51 percent) and 42 percent of the OBC respondents support assistance 
for dominant caste groups. It is fascinating that more than double the share of Adivasis 
who oppose state assistance for the dominant caste, support positive initiatives by the 
state for the dominant caste. Interestingly, Dalit respondents are equally divided between 
those in favour of providing state support and those against. Other caste groups are 
in favour of assistance to the dominant caste in their state. Overall, the share of ‘No 
Opinion’ among the caste groups remains between 27 percent and 33 percent. 
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Gender and sexual orientation hold a strange place in Indian society. There are deeply 
held beliefs, which are often conservative in nature, regarding the position and power of 
women and the status of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the 
society. Yet, much of the discussions on these topics have been through media and, over 
the last year, at courts. This survey explores the attitudes held towards women in their 
roles as mothers, daughters, wives and sisters. Is it more important to educate boys? Can 
women decide whom they want to marry? Should the mother and father have equal child 
rearing responsibilities? This survey also looks at the attitudes held by society towards its 
gay and lesbian members. 
2.C / Gender
1. Role of Women
In India, allocation of gender roles within families is rooted in, and shaped by specific 
social, and historical processes like the practice of sati, or purdah, a long colonial rule. 
In the post-colonial period women struggled for opportunities in education, equal 
participation in the workforce, access to public spaces, right to representation, and 
making choices for themselves. In the decades after independence from colonial rule, 
women have expressed themselves through the intersections of gender, caste, religion 
and class, as felt over strong regional and local variations. While there have been 
struggles to legislate women’s rights, the social processes to bring the laws to deliver 
their objectives in everyday lives of women have been intriguing and complicated. 
While the primary emphases on women’s traditional place as nurturers, carers, as well 
as embodiment of family’s honour and ability to procreate have pushed women towards 
increased confinement to the private domain, the post-liberalisation era has also opened 
up important debates about women as being equally relevant in the area of paid work, 
particularly the service industry. This has created further tensions within the fabric of the 
family facing wage shrinkages, rising costs, and decreasing state support to supplement 
these. As Smitha Radhakrishnan points out, the quest is for women to strike a balance 
between the old and the new roles, or, being “appropriately Indian”18. 
In this study, questions around gender relations have been classified into four main ideas 
– gender relations at home, agency in decision making processes in marriage and support 
for equal treatment in work and education (Figure 2C.1). These attitudes were explored 
through seven statements with responses ranging from of ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly 
Disagree’ (See Q65 in the questionnaire).
Figure 2C.1: Statements on Role of Women
Family
Marriage
Education 
and Work
A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work.
Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing.
It is up to women to decide whom to get married to.
Women should have the right to decide to get married or not.
Educating boys is more important than educating girls
Men should be paid more than women even if it’s the same job.
Women should have 50% reservations in all jobs.
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Overall, 35 percent of respondents covered in the survey said women should prioritise 
home over work, and 65 percent said women should be equally responsible for child 
rearing (Figure 2C.2). It may be asked whether equal responsibility for child rearing 
really means equal distribution of responsibility and decision-making between men and 
women. On the other hand, 44 per-cent said women have the right to decide whether 
to marry and 42 per-cent said they have a right to decide who to marry. Here, it must be 
highlighted that 12 percent of respondents felt that women should not have the ability 
to decide whom to marry and 11 percent felt women should not have the right to decide 
whether to marry. The opinion on women’s abilities are therefore quite unevenly split, 
which creates the space for further questioning as we see in the following sections.
Figure 2C.2: Support for Statements on Role of Women
Family
With respect to gender relations at home, there is a preference for women’s confinement, 
even seclusion to the domestic sphere in much of India and South Asia 19.  When there 
is economic rationality that drives a woman to work, it is largely to work on the family 
farm or in a family enterprise. But if this occurs it is both an outcome of the micro-
level ideology of gender discrimination within the family but also a result of macro-
level inequality in the wage and opportunity structure 20. It is also frequently argued that 
women’s concentration in the domestic sphere leads to their loss of power within the 
family by reducing their opportunity to earn income that is independent of their husbands 
or other kin 21. Childcare has largely been perceived as the woman’s domain. Caregiving 
across cultures is often the result of social behaviours, organised social networks, 
acceptable norms of male and female behaviour, and family ideologies. Some empirical 
investigations of family structure and functioning in modern India have been undertaken 
in recent years 22. However, notions of Indian family practices and division of childcare 
labour have often been based on anthropological accounts23 that have largely been 
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immersed in traditional Indian mythology and cultural symbolism has and have not taken 
into account the variability that exists in family arrangements and socialisation practices24. 
Many researchers have found that there has been a shift from traditionally stereotyped 
roles toward quasi-egalitarian roles among urban, higher-income, better educated 
dual-earner families25. The argument is that greater opportunities for employment and 
education challenge patriarchy, and techno-economic changes may have contributed 
to an improvement (in women’s status in India and to possible increases in men’s 
participation in childcare26. Thus, we find we have to keep in mind the heterogeneity and 
dynamism of gender roles while relating work and care and their linkages as well as their 
contribution to the status of women in India.
The following figures illustrate the respondents’ views across the seven variables, namely, 
state, gender, economic class, region [rural/urban], and religion and some intersections 
of these, on women’s prioritisation of home over work. “Work” here stands for paid work, 
mostly in wages, where the “home” would represent unpaid/non-waged work done by 
women supplementing the wages earned by the family. Some further concerns that this 
table may raise are, for example: a) what would the opinion about women’s home-bound 
paid work be, considering that this is category is quite common; b) how would women’s 
work in family farm/business, which stands exclusive of household labour, and contributes 
directly to the family’s earnings, be viewed; and c) what would the picture look like 
across generations, considering that vast shifts for women born in the 1980s to the urban 
workforce, giving them access to financial independence and decision making, while 
renegading their older counterparts to traditional roles.
Women Should Prioritise Home Over Work
Figure 2C .3 in this chapter looks at state-wise distribution of the above. The strongest 
agreement with the proposition that women should prioritise work over home is seen 
in Mizoram, at 53 percent, with Tamil Nadu lagging behind by as much as 8 percentage 
points, and Uttar Pradesh following closely at 45 percent. Jammu and Kashmir, and 
Punjab are at 41 percent. It is probably more revealing that there is an evenly sprinkled 
vote percentage on “somewhat agree”, between 19 and 36 percent across the states 
on this matter. One might imagine that this distribution offsets the figures pertaining to 
“strongly agree” and may render a shadow weightage to the positive opinion. It is only 
in Delhi that we see strong disagreement on this question, at 39 percent. However, even 
this is much lower than the “highly agree”-percentage point of 53 in Mizoram.
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Figure 2C.3: Women should prioritise home over work (by State)
Figure  2C .4 provides gender-wise figures on each of the opinion categories. The 
numbers are very close to each other, and in most cases are equal. For example, 35 
percent of men and 35 percent of women respondents strongly feel that women should 
prioritise home over paid work. However, when strong agreement and moderate 
agreement are put together, the figures across genders are greater than cumulative 
figures of strong disagreement and moderate. In other words, 64 percent (that is, 35 
percent ‘strongly agree’ +29 percent ‘somewhat agree’) of male respondents are in 
agreement with the proposition. This figure is more than double of the total of 31per cent 
(14 percent ‘strongly agree’ + 17 percent ‘somewhat agree’) of male respondents who 
disagree. The trend is similar in female respondents too; overall, more women agree than 
disagree with the proposition
Figure 2C.4: Women should prioritise home over work (by Gender)
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When we look at the responses to the same question from men across the different 
states in the survey, Mizoram shows the highest percentage of agreement, followed by 
Uttar Pradesh at 46 percent, and Tamil Nadu at 45 percent. Delhi registers the highest 
strong disagreement (37 percent). In Mizoram, only 2 percent men and in Uttar Pradesh, 
6 percent men, strongly disagree with this. The responses from Nagaland show a more 
even distribution of opinion across the scale: 20 percent strongly agree, 30 percent 
somewhat agree, 30 percent somewhat disagree, and 18 percent strongly disagree. 
 
Interestingly, similar figures are seen across the states for female respondents: 52 percent 
women in Mizoram strongly agree that women should pay more attention to home, while 
in Delhi, 41 percent women strongly disagree with the idea. Apart from Delhi, women are 
more in agreement that home precedes work in all the states. 
Figure  2C .5 looks at the distribution along rural and urban locations. As suggested 
before, here too, the aggregate agreement percentage figure (including strongly and 
somewhat) is greater than the rest of the opinion categories (including somewhat 
disagree, strongly disagree, and no opinion) read together. For example, 36 percent of 
respondents in the rural areas covered in the study strongly agree to women being more 
relevant at home, and 29 percent of them somewhat agree. The disagreement figures 
are 14 percent (somewhat) and 15 (strongly). Even when combined with the ‘No Opinion’ 
figure of 5 percent), the agreement side is heavier. It is similar for the overall urban trends. 
More men in rural areas think that a woman’s place is at home, than their counterparts in 
urban areas. However, the percentage point difference between rural men and women 
in strong agreement is only 1. On the other hand, in urban areas, an equal share of men 
and women strongly agree, at 31 percent. It is worth noting that the strong agreement 
figures for urban areas match with agreement of the same category across genders, that 
is, for urban men as well as urban women. The overall rural figure as well as the gender 
segregated rural figures are similar to the overall urban figures, with just a 1 percent 
difference for rural men. The strong disagreement figures for urban men and women 
match with the overall figures, but are a lot higher than the strong disagreement figures 
in rural areas overall, and for men and women. The responses for ‘somewhat disagree’, 
‘somewhat agree’ and ‘no opinion’  among urban and rural respondents are almost in 
sync with each other.
Figure 2C.5: Women should prioritise home over work (by Rural-Urban)
75
Among religious communities that strongly agree that women should prioritise home 
over paid work, the lowest percentage is for Hindus (31 percent). This is distantly followed 
by Christians at 38 percent, Muslims at 40, Sikhs at 41, and Other at 42. Notably, another 
29 percent of Hindus were in the ‘somewhat agree’ category and figures for Muslims, 
Christians, Sikhs, and Others are 25 percent, 31 percent, 24 percent, and 33 percent 
respectively. However, for both Hindus and Sikhs, the figures for ‘strongly disagree’ are 
over 20 percent, as opposed to those for Muslims (18), Christians (11), or Other (10), 
which may suggest that it is more acceptable among Hindu and Sikh communities for 
their women to participate in paid work outside their homes. 
Finally, with respect to economic class, the same pattern follows: the figures for ‘strongly 
agree’ across all economic classes, namely, poor, lower class, middle class, and upper 
class are 34, 35, 36, and 33 percent respectively. The 3 percent difference between the 
highest (36, for middle class) and the lowest (33, for upper class) may not be related 
to like education. Workforce participation for women may not completely depend on 
education, but economic necessities of women themselves or economic condition of a 
family. Even though the collective rate of participation of women in the workforce has 
been falling over the last 15 years 27, a mid-30 percent rate of strong agreement with 
the proposition may not mean that women from any of these economic classes are not 
participating in the workforce, Some of the reasons cited for this are: problems with 
measurement, women’s enrolment in higher education, and increase in family incomes 28. 
The last one seems difficult to understand in the case of the poor, as their income growth 
has been substantially lower in the last 2 decades (1.9 percent).29 It may also be true that 
while women from the lower economic class participate in the workforce, they have to 
carry out additional (and unpaid) housework—which connotes a double burden on these 
women. 
Women and Men should have Equal Responsibility for Child Rearing
The next set of figures examine the proposition: women and men should have equal 
responsibility for child rearing through variables of gender, State, rural and urban regions, 
religion and economic class. It is interesting to note that the difference here, between 
the agreement and disagreement percentage figures is much greater, with an overall 
tendency towards agreeing with the proposition across all the variables. When juxtaposed 
with the intelligence from the last set of tables, this section raises at least two questions: 
a) does the idea of equal attention to child rearing by men and women complement 
the idea of women’s need to prioritise home over labour force participation? and b) 
does the household provide any support to women towards any paid labour that they 
may be performing, over and after prioritising home over paid work, and making equal 
contribution to child rearing? One other concern that arises from the figures is the lack 
of information about who else, besides women take responsibility for child rearing: other 
female members in the family, or, male parents—in other words, does equal by women 
imply the other equal portion by men?
Figure  2C .6 looks at the overall survey data for this through the lens of gender. 63 
percent of male respondents and 66 percent of female respondents strongly agree that 
men and women should have equal responsibility for child rearing. The ’somewhat agree‘ 
figures for this are much less compared to the ‘strongly agree’ figures: only 22 percent 
for males, and 19 percent for female respondents. On the other hand, there is almost no 
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strong disagreement with the proposition, and the somewhat disagreement figures are 
only a little over 5 percent across the gender identities.
Figure 2C.6: Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing 
(by Gender)
When we look at the state-wise distribution of opinion (Figure  2C .7) on sharing of child 
rearing responsibilities, the highest numbers in the ’strongly agree‘ category are seen in 
Kerala and Delhi (76 percent in both), followed by Nagaland (72 percent), Jammu and 
Kashmir (71 percent), and Punjab (70 percent). While Tripura and Uttarakhand reflect 
more than 65 percent figures, Assam, Mizoram, and Tamil Nadu are above 60 percent, 
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal are in the 40s.. As in the case of the last table, here too, 
the percentage of people in each of the States that ‘somewhat agree’ is much lesser than 
their counterparts who ‘strongly agree’. In States like Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, West Bengal, and Delhi almost none ‘strongly 
disagree’. Punjab is just above 5 percent, and Uttarakhand, just at 5.
Figure 2C.7: Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing 
(by State)
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When we look at the data of men and women in rural and urban regions, and compared 
with the overall figures, the responses for ‘strongly agree’ are all above 60 percent, for 
‘somewhat agree’ between 17 and 22, for ‘somewhat disagree’ below 10 percent, and 
even less for ‘strongly disagree’(Figure 2C.8
Figure 2C.8: Women and Men should have equal responsibility for child rearing 
(by Rural-Urban)
If we look at the data through the lens of economic class, the percentage distributions are 
tilted towards strongly agreeing and somewhat agreeing more than towards somewhat or 
strongly disagreeing. The strong agreement figures follow an ascending order from 60 to 
69 percent between poor and upper classes respectively. All figures for ‘somewhat agree’ 
are around one-third of the figures for ‘strongly agree’. 
Marriage
The prescriptions and gender roles in family life in India have been largely rooted and 
shaped by cultural texts like the Hindu Shastras, Ramayana and Mahabharata which have 
combined with regional, local and religious influences. These have emphasised strict 
traditional dichotomies of male and female responsibilities: women as nurturers and 
caregivers in the subservient role of wife and mother, and men as providers and protector 
of family honour and prestige. These roles temper gender social relationship within the 
private sphere of marriage and have traditionally limited women’s choices and agency 
in decision-making around the choice to get married, as well as the choice of partner, 
as these remain strongly influenced by culture, class and caste. This section examines 
agency in decision-making captured by perceptions around women’s role in decision-
making around marriage. 
Marriages in India have traditionally been a site to cement caste and family ties. 
While it has been pointed out that attitudes towards marriage in India are ‘markedly 
conservative’30, there is a shift towards weaker sanctions for inter-caste unions 31. The two 
statements discussed in this section are:
“Women should have the right to decide to get married or not”
“It is up to women to decide whom to get married to”
While the above statements could point to a dichotomy between a traditional arranged 
marriage and a modern love marriage, it could also be read as a rise in a companionate 
form, ‘a bond between two intimate selves’32 within the institution of an arranged 
marriage. Some evidence suggests that a couple’s prospective personal happiness has 
now become as important in an arranged marriage as it is in love marriage. Several 
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anthropologists 33 describe this shift in detail, although they may emphasise the 
opposition between ‘modern’ love and ‘traditional’ arranged marriage. In reality, whether 
or not parents take part in choosing their children’s partners, we find understandings 
around marriage steadily transforming into a more companionate form34 that privilege 
agency and choice over sanction and coercion. 
Women should have the right to Decide to get Married or not
The general trend that we see in the data is an overwhelming support for choice in the 
decision to get married and strong societal sanction that women have the right to choose 
whether to get married or not (Figure 2C.9).
Figure 2C.9: Women should have the right to decide to get married or not
(by Gender)
This trend is supported in the state-wise disaggregation as well, where the idea of choice 
finds support across the states, especially in Kerala, Nagaland, Mizoram and Tamil Nadu 
(Figure 2C.10). While above 60 percent of the respondents in most states agreed with the 
idea of women’s right to choose to be married, the highest proportion of the population 
who strongly disagreed with this idea were in Punjab (51 percent) and Uttar Pradesh (49 
percent).
Figure 2C.10: Women should have the right to decide to get married or not
(by State)
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Both genders largely support the idea of a women’s right to decide, with the women 
in UP registering slightly higher support (7 percent) than their male counterparts. Male 
perception of women’s right to decide on whether to get married is over 50 percent 
in almost all states except UP (47 percent) and Punjab, where about 50 percent of 
men agree with this statement. In general, men in Nagaland (90 percent), Mizoram (87 
percent) and Tamil Nadu (77 percent) registered the highest support for this idea, while 
women in Nagaland (90 percent), Mizoram (88 percent) and Kerala (78 percent) displayed 
the highest amounts of support for this idea.
Rural and urban areas show comparative levels of support for the idea - 70 percent in 
rural areas and 75 percent in urban areas (Figure 2C.11). When we disaggregate it by 
gender, we see the group that shows maximum support is urban women (77 percent), 
followed by urban men (74 percent) and rural women (70 percent). Rural men (68 percent) 
show slightly less support for this idea, across categories.
Figure 2C.11: Women should have the right to decide to get married or not 
(by Rural-Urban)
In disaggregating perceptions according to religion, we find highest support for this idea 
amongst Christians (87 percent), followed by other categories (81 percent). Hindus (96 
percent) and Muslims (66 percent) are almost on par, with the least support exhibited by 
the Sikhs (55 percent) in agreement and 39 percent strongly disagreeing with women’s 
right to decide to get married.
We find support marginally increasing as we move across classes from the poor to the 
upper class with 51 percent strongly agreeing with the idea that a woman has the right 
to decide whether to get married. We see a  marginal decline of support for a woman’s 
right to decide on marriage, as we climb lower down the class structure - upper class 
(77 percent), middle class (71 percent), lower class (68 percent) and poor (68 percent), 
pointing to a possible correlation between class and attitudes to marriage.
It is up to Women to Decide whom to get Married to
In highlighting the question on a woman’s right to choose her partner, we find strong 
support across gender (Figure 2C.12). Women in general show higher support for this 
idea (71 percent), with men following closely behind (70 percent).
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Figure 2C.12: It is up to women to decide whom to get married to (by Gender)
Across states as well, women generally find support for making their own decision on 
choosing their spouse with the strongest support coming from Mizoram (60 percent), 
Uttarakhand (53 percent), Nagaland (52 percent), Kerala (51 percent) and Delhi (47 
percent) as seen in Figure 2C.13. Punjab was the only outlier with 49 percent disagreeing 
that this decision is up to the woman. This is across gender with a high percentage of 
both men (37 percent) and women (40 percent) strongly disagreeing with a woman’s right 
to choose her spouse.
Figure 2C.13: It is up to women to decide whom to get married to (by State)
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Gender perceptions on choice of spouse did not significantly differ across men and 
women in the other states, with only very marginal differences (Figure 2C.14). Rural and 
urban areas showed very similar levels of support for the idea, with urban women at 76 
percent, and urban men close behind (75 percent). Rural women and rural men were on 
par (69 percent) in their support of the idea that a woman can choose her spouse.
Figure 2C.14: It is upto women to decide whom to get married to (by Rural-Urban)
In disaggregating this perception according to religion, we see no significant variation 
across religion with Christians (83 percent) expressing the strongest support for this idea, 
followed by Other (79 percent), Hindus (70 percent) and then closely by Muslims (67 
percent). Sikhs remain the striking outlier where 34 percent strongly disagreeing with 
the notion, more than any other community, although more than 50 percent of the Sikh 
community still supported the idea.
Endorsement for this idea steadily increases as we move up class categories with 68 
percent of the poor to 77 percent of the urban upper class agreeing that women have the 
right to choose their spouse.
Education and Work
Perceptions about the value of education have altered dramatically in the last few 
decades, with sustained administrative attention towards ensuring universal primary 
education, and campaigns towards fostering more inclusive education for the girl 
child, like beti bachao beti padhao. Studies like Majumdar 35 have found that families 
from different socio-economic groups all have one thing in common: they place a lot 
of emphasis on their children’s education. Education is widely seen a route to upward 
mobility 36, provided that basic quality is assured 37. However, gender plays a crucial 
difference in determining people’s motivation. Economists are of the opinion that 
parental decisions regarding ‘investing’ in schooling for girls and boys are determined 
by perceived differences in ‘returns’. Sociologists on the other hand, underline social 
considerations such as perceptions of gender roles (implicit in gendered division of 
labour) and preferences for sons (biased intra-household allocation of resources) that 
have led to educational discrimination against the female child. The perceived difference 
in benefits for boys and girls, and a combination of economic and sociological factors 
have led to an undervaluation of female education 38. The link between labour markets 
and education may be a vicious cycle with persistent underinvestment in the education 
of girls, leading to economic inefficiency. Additionally, labour markets re-enforce 
discrimination against women, which would be further linked to economic incentives. 
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While there is a distinct bias against education of girls which is then linked to material 
benefits and opportunities that a woman can derive from paid labour, there is a surprising 
amount of support for reservations for women. However, this may very well fall within 
patriarchal logic as the average women being less educated than the average man may 
act as proxy for her husband while occupying reserved seats. Some researchers note that 
women have less of a voice in some political arrangements, in that they don’t field as 
many questions or speak comfortably in public. Others point out that having an elected 
woman representative ensures an increased voice for women as there is a level of comfort 
in airing concerns with women present. Women elected as leaders under the reservation 
policy have also been seen to invest more in public services most closely linked to 
women’s concerns 39. Others 40, also do not find any merit in the tokenism argument, 
showing that female leaders perform no differently than male leaders. They point out that 
in the right institutional factors, particularly if women have political experience and live in 
spaces less dominated by upper castes, they perform no differently than men.
Keeping the above debates in mind, this section will discuss responses on considering 
girls’ education to be a lesser priority than that for boys. The following figures explore 
the responses through four different variables, namely, gender, State, rural/urban region, 
and religion. The responses have a pattern across the tables: the percentage figures 
are heavier towards disagreement with the proposition; there are even percentage 
distributions between somewhat agree and somewhat disagree slots for some States.
Educating Boys is more Important than Educating Girls
Figure 2C .15 segregates the responses to the idea based on gender identities: male and 
female. 42 percent of male and 43 percent of female respondents strongly disagree that 
educating boys is more important than educating girls. 22 percent of both somewhat 
disagree, while 17 percent and 16 percent of male and female respondents somewhat 
agree. 13 percent in both categories strongly agree. The notable aspect of the table 
is the combined figures produced when we add the strongly agree and somewhat 
agree columns, which are 30 percent and 29 percent for male and female respondents 
respectively. This in itself is a considerable proportion of people covered under the 
survey. Also, when considered separately, 42 percent of male respondents and 43 percent 
of female respondents, who strongly disagree with the idea, are not very ideal figures 
either.
Figure 2C.15: Educating boys is more important than educating girls (by Gender)
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If we look at the state-wise divisions, the percentages of people that strongly agree are 
quite uneven. As seen below (Figure  2C .16), only 16 percent of respondents in Punjab 
strongly disagree with the idea, while the figure for the same in Jammu and Kashmir is 
64 percent. There are three more states, where over 50 percent of respondents strongly 
disagree, namely, Mizoram (61 percent), Nagaland (58 percent), and West Bengal (62 
percent). Four states exhibit strong disagreement figures between 20 and 30 percent: 
Tripura (24 percent), Uttar Pradesh (27 percent), Delhi (29 percent), and Kerala (30 
percent). In Jammu and Kashmir, there is an additional 13 percent who somewhat 
disagree, matched  by the figure for West Bengal. On the other hand, for Kerala, where 
30 percent strongly disagree, there is another 33 percent who somewhat disagree, taking 
the total disagreement bracket to 63 percent. The figures for each of the slots for Punjab, 
apart from the 16 percent mentioned above, are similar.
Figure 2C.16: Educating boys is more important than educating girls (by State)
Figure  2C .17 looks at the question by dividing respondents into rural and urban regions. 
40 percent of rural and 46 percent of urban respondents strongly disagree, while 22 
percent rural and 23 percent urban respondents somewhat disagree. A total of 31 percent 
rural respondents (13 percent/strongly agree+18 percent/somewhat agree) are in the 
combined agreement category. The combined agreement figure for urban respondents is 
26 percent, showing a difference of 5 percent between the rural and the urban totals.
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Figure 2C.17: Educating boys is more important than educating girls (by Rural-Urban)
Across religious communities 52 percent of Sikhs strongly disagree with it, while for all 
other religions the figures are below 50 percent. The percentage figures for the column 
representing “Other” religions are all between 20 and 30 percent, where 25 percent 
strongly agree, 20 percent somewhat agree, 27 percent somewhat disagree and another 
22 percent strongly disagree. In contrast, the figures among Hindus are 13 percent for 
strongly agree, 18 percent for somewhat agree, 23 percent for somewhat disagree, and 
40 percent for strongly disagree. 
Men Should be Paid More than Women Even if it’s the Same Job
The following three figures again use the variables used in the previous set to illuminate 
opinion on the proposition that men should be paid more than women even if it’s the 
same job. An important point to note is that globally, differences between genders in 
wage rates are common and often stark. This causes difficulties for women’s access to 
resources despite putting in the same effort (and often more, considering the labour 
towards unpaid housework), and ability to make decisions as individuals. This causes 
ripple effects in all aspects of individual as well as lives of the families, like children’s 
education, women’s ability to claim their rights within family, and their access to property. 
Figure  2C .18 talks about male and female respondents’ degree of approval on women’s 
right to equal wage/payment for equal work. 13 percent of men and women strongly 
agree that men should be paid more than women, and 43 percent men and 44 percent 
women strongly disagree.
Figure 2C.18: Men should be paid more than women even if it is the same job 
(by Gender)
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Figure  2C .19 explores state-wise disaggregated perceptions and we can see that, 
there is a 60 percent disagreement with the idea only in Punjab. In the other states, the 
disagreement percentages are all below 60, and goes down to 26 percent for Tamil 
Nadu. Additionally, in Tamil Nadu, 28 percent respondents strongly agree that men 
should be paid more, supported by another 19 percent who somewhat agree. Notably, 
in Nagaland, only 6 percent strongly agree with and 56 percent strongly disagree. 
The “somewhat” figures here are 12 and 20 percent respectively for agreement and 
disagreement. On the other hand, in West Bengal, while the strong agreement figure is 
only 9 percent, the strong disagreement figure does not carry through the effect: 34 per 
cent of strong disagreement, a figure that is not remarkable compared to what is seen in 
other States. The majority, here again, lies in the “somewhat” bracket.
Figure 2C.19: Men should be paid more than women even if it is the same job 
(by State)
In rural regions, 41 percent respondents strongly disagree with the proposition, while in 
urban regions, it is 48 per cent (Figure  2C .20). The strong agreement percentage in both 
regions is 13 percent, while 20 per cent respondents in both somewhat disagree. Overall, 
the disagreement side is heavier.
Figure 2C.20: Men should be paid more than women even if it is the same job 
(by Rural-Urban)
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With respect to religious communities, the highest percentage in strong disagreement 
comes from the Sikh community, followed by Muslims at 46 percent, Hindus at 42 percent 
and Christians at 41 percent. All strong agreement percentages are below 20. However, 
when the “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree” percentage figures for each 
of the groups are added, we see a parity among all the religious groups, including the 
category “Other.”
Women should have 50% Reservations in all Jobs
Women’s reservation for public sector jobs has been a contentious topic. It has been 
pointed out that reserving 50 percent positions in each job sector would increase chances 
of participation by women in the paid labour force in India, considering their absence 
in the past. Some states already have a certain percentage of positions in public sector 
jobs reserved for women (33 percent in Gujarat, 30 percent in Madhya Pradesh, and 33 
percent in Karnataka). Our study, however, extends to all jobs, across public and private 
sectors. It may be also borne in mind that there is an uneven gender representation in 
certain kind of jobs, for example, women are considered more suitable in caregiving, 
nursing and positions involving affective labour Similarly, in areas associated with the 
use of physical force, like those involving heavy machinery in mining or manufacturing, 
men are considered more apt. One contentious area of employment in the public 
sector in India is the police force, where reservation for women has been recommended 
to the effect of having at least three women constables at each station and installing 
women help-desks 41, yet the real figures for women in police force are only a dismal 7.28 
percent 42.
Figure  2C .21 explores the responses to this through the lens of gender. Interestingly, 
while 38 percent of female respondents strongly agree that asking for 50 percent 
reservations in all jobs is valid, no more than 30 percent male respondents feel the same. 
Similarly, while 17 percent male respondents strongly disagree, no more than 12 percent 
women support this view.
Figure 2C.21: Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs (by Gender)
Figure 2C.22 explores the status of opinions in the different states covered. Nagaland 
shows the highest percentage that ‘strongly disagree’ (26 percent), while Tripura shows 
the least. The strongest agreement is in Tamil Nadu, followed by Tripura. But in Tripura, 
another 26 percent somewhat agree with the idea, which takes the total percentage of 
agreement to a much higher level than disagreement. On the other hand, for Nagaland, 
the percentages are equally distributed over the opinion categories.
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Figure 2C.22: Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs (by State)
The rural/urban regional distribution is shown in Figure 2C.23. In each, the figures are in 
descending order from strong agreement to strong disagreement. Also, the category No 
Opinion here is quite heavy compared to many of the other tables.
Figure 2C.23: Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs (by Rural-Urban)
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2. Same-Sex Relationships
Same sex relationships in India have been historically stigmatised or at best tolerated. By 
the late 20th century, the understanding of homosexuality in the west had moved from 
“sin, crime and pathology to a normal variant of human sexuality”43. While many allude 
to the acceptance of different sexual orientations in the culture and heritage of India, 
prejudice against the gay and lesbian community is widespread in Indian society and 
further supported by religious and community leaders. 
Bearing in mind this prejudice, 2018 may be considered an exceptional year in the history 
of Supreme Court judgements and the LGBT movements in India. In particular, the 
judgements on Right to Privacy and Section 377 of the IPC were steps towards affirmation 
of LGBT rights in India. The question that arises from many recent judgements such as the 
one on Section 377 and women’s entry to Sabarimala is whether the court is overreaching 
by stepping up against the existing socio-religious sentiments and morality. This topic has 
ample legal literature with arguments on both sides. Roscoe Pound, for instance, states 
that law is “the most highly developed form of social control” and, as an institution, 
can be used to engineer “socially desirable results” 44. He further states that law must 
secure fundamental rights, the absence of which will dissolve society 45. In continuation 
to this idea of securing fundamental rights, the role of constitutional courts then is to, 
as SP Sathe notes, “sustain the constitution’s relevance to changing social, economic, 
and political scenarios.”46  This concept is evident in the text of the 2009 judgement on 
Section 377 at the Delhi High Court where the Chief Justice A.P Shah alluded to the 
tenets of inclusiveness, equality and dignity enshrined in the Objectives Resolution of 
the Constituent Assembly47. In the light of the results from this survey project on the 
acceptance of same-sex couples in the society, it would seem that the higher courts on 
India act as vanguards of progressive reforms.
In this survey, the attitude towards same-sex relationships was explored through the 
lens of societal acceptance of same-sex couples, rather support for legal sanctions. 
The question (Q66 on the questionnaire) was framed as support for a statement with 
responses from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’ on Likert scale and the results 
were analysed through gender, religion, state, literacy and media exposure: “Sexual 
relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society. Do you 
agree or disagree with this statement?”
In early September 2018, the Supreme Court of India read down Section 377 and thereby, 
decriminalised homosexuality in India. While the question on acceptance of same-sex 
relationships was asked in various states in the last two years, this would be the first time 
the same question would be posed after the apex court judgement. The results indicate 
a deeply conservative society where one in every two respondents strongly believe 
that same-sex relationships have no place in society and less than 10 percent accept 
same-sex couples in society (Figure 2C.24). The share of respondents who either do not 
hold an opinion or do not wish to state their opinion on acceptance of same-sex couples 
is remarkably higher as compared to the responses for other attitudes explored in this 
chapter.
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Figure 2C.24: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be 
accepted in society
A trend noted in earlier sections of this chapter on perceptions of male and female 
respondents, can be noticed in the following figures as well. Men and women hold similar 
views on acceptance of same-sex relationships (Figure 2C.25). Overall, more than a 
quarter of the male and the female respondents did not express an opinion on the matter. 
Almost half of all male and female respondents strongly reject the notion of accepting 
same sex couples and only 20 percent of men and 17 percent of women agree that 
same-sex couples should be accepted. 
Figure 2C.25: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be 
accepted in society (by Gender)
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Although, more than a quarter of the respondents overall did not express any opinion 
on the subject, disaggregation of this category across states show remarkable variation 
(Figure 2C.26). While the share of ‘No Opinion’ responses is less than 10 percent in 
Mizoram and Nagaland, the same is over 40 percent among respondents in Assam 
and West Bengal. Six out of every 10 respondents in West Bengal did not express any 
opinion on the acceptance of same sex couples. More than 20% of the respondents in 
Uttarakhand (21 percent), Delhi (22 percent), Jammu and Kashmir (23 percent) and Uttar 
Pradesh (25 percent), and almost 40 % of the respondents in Tripura (37 percent) and 
Punjab (39 percent) did not hold any opinion.
Among those respondents who do hold an opinion, a majority strongly reject the 
acceptance of same-sex couples. Mizoram at 87 percent records the highest share of 
respondents who strongly reject the statement, followed by Nagaland (63 percent), 
Jammu and Kashmir (63 percent) and Kerala (58 percent). While the role of literacy in 
influencing opinions will be explored later in this section, it is noteworthy that Mizoram 
and Kerala have the highest levels of literacy (over 90 percent) in the country. The 
greatest support for same-sex couples seems to come from Uttar Pradesh where 36 
percent of the respondents agree with the statement. Tamil Nadu (30 percent) and 
Delhi (30 percent) are the other states with relatively higher acceptance of same-sex 
relationships.
Considering that over 50 percent of the responses across the states either reject the 
acceptance of same-sex couples or do not offer any opinion, the reluctance of society in 
general to even consider, much less begin a conversation on, the acceptance of LGBTQ 
members evident.
Figure 2C.26: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be 
accepted in society (by State)
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Urban centres are generally considered more tolerant and accepting of diverse identities 
compared to rural areas. However, the results show striking similarities in urban and rural 
responses and in fact, a slightly more conservative urban populace. Figure  2C .27 shows 
that 19 percent of the respondents in urban and rural areas support the acceptance of 
same-sex couples. Surprisingly however, 5 percentage points more urban respondents 
reject same-sex couples than their rural counterparts. When these results are further 
disaggregated by gender, we notice a similar trend where a larger share of urban men 
and women strongly disagree with the statement compared to rural men and women.
Figure 2C.27: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be 
accepted in society (by Rural-Urban)
The share of respondents who reject same-sex relationships is largest among Christians 
with over 70 percent of respondents stating this opinion. Among the other religious 
communities, around 40 percent of Hindus and Sikhs and over 50 percent of Muslims 
held the same opinion. While the support for same-sex couples was highest among 
Hindus (22 percent), it falls considerably among Muslims (13 percent) and Christians (13 
percent). Furthermore, it is remarkable that at 8 percent, Christians record the lowest 
share of ‘No Opinion’ responses whereas this is around 30 percent for Hindus, Muslims 
and Sikhs.
The trend across economic classes is mixed. On one hand, support for acceptance of 
same sex relationships increases by 10 percentage points — from 13% among the poor 
to 23% among the middle class and upper-class respondents. On the other, the share of 
respondents who strongly disagree with accepting same-sex couples in society increases 
by 6 percentage points from 47 percent among the poor to 53 percent among the upper 
class. While the results seem ambiguous, a definitive result is the fall in share of ‘No 
Opinion’ responses by 18 percentage points between the poor and the upper class. The 
results suggest that class is not a significant determining factor on social attitudes towards 
sexual orientation.
When examined, the role of media shows an increase in support for same-sex couples 
from 10 percent among those respondents with extremely poor exposure to various 
media to 33 percent among respondents with high media exposure (Figure 2C.28). 
On the other side of the scale, however, the trend is not as clear. While the proportion 
of respondents who reject same-sex relationships increases with some amount of 
media exposure, it but falls by almost 10 percentage points among individuals with 
high consumption of media. As noted with respect to economic classes, the share of 
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‘No Opinion’ response consistently falls with greater media exposure. This supports 
the commonly held belief that greater representation in media might lead to greater 
acceptance of the LGBT community in society.
Figure 2C.28: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be 
accepted in society (by Media Exposure)
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3.
Political 
Identity
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There is perhaps no better time than now to take a deeper look at the right to freedom 
of expression (FoE) in India. We are living in times where public opinion regarding what 
constitutes ‘freedom of expression’, ‘who’ is entitled to such freedoms and to ‘what 
extent’ are being fiercely debated. The recent arrests of ‘urban Naxals’, students and civil 
society activists among others for allegedly ‘seditious’ and ‘anti-national’ activities and for 
posting ‘unpatriotic’ comments on social media have animated this debate further. While 
liberals have decried these developments, conservatives have welcomed these moves 
as the manifestation of a strong government that does not compromise on national 
security and pride. It is evident that there are multiple ways in which the idea of freedom 
of expression, and what constitutes “reasonable restrictions” on the freedom to express 
opinions are being framed. The purpose this chapter is to understand the different ways 
in which citizens of India perceive or interpret the right to freedom of expression as 
written in the Constitution of India, rather than assign normative judgements about what 
is the “authentic” or correct interpretation.
We interrogate freedom of expression through three themes central to India’s politics and 
society: democracy and democratic practice, secularism, and sovereign nationalism. We 
provide a brief explanation below of how freedom of expression is connected to these 
three themes. We present our findings by disaggregating public opinion based on a few 
key parameters such as caste, religion, and tribal identity, level of education, rural-urban 
and State or regional affiliations.
Using a set of six questions, clustered in three sets of two questions each, we examine 
the responses across several categories in order to understand factors influencing public 
opinion on the topic. These questions ask whether people who hold or advocate a certain 
opinion should be allowed to express their opinion freely in public. These opinions 
include: (a) a preference for dictatorship over democracy, (b) criticism of elected leaders, 
(c) ridiculing a religious Religion other than one’s own, (d) promoting violence against 
another Religion, (e) advocating violence against the Indian state, and (f) advocating 
independence for any part of India. Some of these questions are deliberately provocative 
in order to understand how people imagine freedom of expression, especially in those 
circumstances when an opinion pushes the limits to freedom of expression as articulated 
in the Indian Constitution. Such issues are of significance especially considering the surge 
in vigilante social enforcement of restrictions on speech and expression through public 
attacks, either physically or on social media.
The responses to these questions are “fully agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat 
disagree”, and “fully disagree”. The questions we examine are Q21, Q47, Q49, Q53, 
Q58, and Q64 in the questionnaire (in Appendix).  An empirical examination of the survey 
data suggests the following:
3.A / Freedom of 
Expression
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Thematic Variation
 Public opinion on freedom of expression varies across the three thematic clusters: 
democratic practice, secularism, and nationalism. Respondents are generally open, 
that is, agree to allow free expression of opinion that involves criticism of leaders, but 
less open to that involving regime and institutional replacement. However, we find that 
opinion tilts the other way, that is, toward disagreement strongly when it involves the 
question of secularism (ridiculing or advocating violence against others). Responses to 
questions on nationalism again produce divergent opinions. While respondents agree 
with allowing a free expression of demands of independence for any part of India, they 
disagree when the same opinion involves the use of force against the Indian state. It 
appears that on some issues such as secularism, public opinion is consistent with the 
reasonable restriction imposed on freedom of expression, and the need to respect the 
rights of all religious communities. However, on questions of democratic practice and 
sovereign nationalism, public opinion seems amenable to a more expansive view of what 
can be freely expressed by citizens.
Cross-State Variation
While thematic variation noted above is evident across all the States, we also observe a 
variation in the magnitude of responses across States. Public opinion appears to be very 
similar for certain States such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and, in some instances, with Uttar 
Pradesh. Responses in Jammu & Kashmir are similar to those in Delhi on some questions 
and to those in Tamil Nadu on some other questions. Similarly, opinions on certain 
questions within States in the north-eastern region reflect broad alignment within the 
region, and cohere with opinions in States outside the region on some other questions. 
Surprisingly, the largest proportions of respondents without an opinion are from Assam 
and West Bengal. The clustering of public opinion across States suggests that regional 
identities likely play a role in how freedom of expression is viewed across space, a 
relationship that calls for further empirical scrutiny.
Social Cleavages
Religious identity emerges as a key factor that differentiates public opinion on freedom 
of expression. Respondents considered a minority (Muslims, Christians, and others) 
tend to differ systematically from positions adopted by the Hindu majority. While the 
magnitude of observed differences across communities varies across the substantive 
dimensions of freedom of expression, that is, whether ridiculing religious practices or 
promoting violence against the Indian state, these differences persist. caste identity also 
appears to influence opinion on these questions but selectively; OBCs differ from other 
caste identities on some dimensions (such as dictatorship over democracy) and cohere 
with Dalits and Adivasis on others (criticising elected leaders). upper castes adopt more 
conservative positions on certain dimensions (such as criticising elected leaders) but align 
with Dalits and Adivasis on others (such as violence against the Indian state).
Education
There is also a systematic difference between non-literates and those respondents with 
higher levels of education across almost all dimensions of freedom of expression. Non-
literate respondents tend to adopt a narrower view of freedom of expression, while views 
become more expansive as levels of education increase.
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Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we examine cross-state variations in responses for 
each cluster of questions. We then focus on other important social sources of variations 
such as religious and caste identity as well as location (whether urban or rural) and 
education levels of the respondents.
Freedom of Expression in Democratic Practice
The Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression that is provided by Article 19 (1) of 
the Constitution of India, in many ways forms the backbone of several ideals such 
as democracy, secularism and sovereign nationalism that are considered sacred by 
the Indian polity. It is intuitively and logically evident that if democracy is a form of 
government that is based on the consensus of the people, then freedom of speech and 
expression is vital. One cannot possibly imagine a situation where a democratic form 
of government is antithetical to this basic freedom. As Justice Bhagwati argued in the 
Maneka Gandhi versus the Union Of India (1978), ‘If democracy means government of the 
people by the people, it is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the 
democratic process and in order to enable him to intelligently exercise his right of making 
a choice, free and general discussion of public matters is absolutely essential’. The Indian 
experience of democracy has shown how mobilisation of hitherto underprivileged groups 
such as women, Dalits, religious minorities and backward castes at particular points of 
time deepened and strengthened the foundations of our democracy. None of this would 
have been possible if the underprivileged did not have the right to resist dominant forces 
and to freely express their views and opinions in day-to-day politics.
Freedom of expression in democratic practice implies that citizens be allowed to freely 
articulate views, whether critical or not, of both democratic institutions as well as elected 
political leaders. Two questions that capture public opinion on freedom of expression 
in democratic practice are: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely 
even if they promote dictatorship over democracy, and (b) people should be allowed to 
express their opinion freely even if they are criticising elected leaders. The first question 
indicates that an individual should be allowed to freely express a view that advances a 
set of political institutions that likely curtail a multitude of political and civil rights. Does 
freedom of expression in democratic practice generate the space for individuals to freely 
promote a view that ironically calls for limiting or eliminating that very space? This is an 
important question especially because several political parties in contemporary times 
reiterate the sacrosanct nature of Indian democracy and hence express deep reservations 
about opinions that are seen as challenging the sanctity of this institution. 
The second question focuses on an opinion involving a relatively more familiar practice 
among citizens in a democracy, one that allows for individuals to freely criticise 
elected representatives. While citizen dissatisfaction (or satisfaction) with their elected 
representatives finds expression during elections, does freedom of expression in 
democratic practice allow individuals to freely criticise elected leaders regardless of how 
these leaders are generally perceived?
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Figure 3A.1: Dictatorship over Democracy (by State)
We find significant differences in attitudes toward freely expressing a preference for 
dictatorship over democracy across States (Figure 3A.1). In Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar 
Pradesh between 40 to 60 percent of respondents either fully or somewhat agree. This 
proportion declines to between 30 and 35 percent in Assam, Jammu-Kashmir, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Punjab, Tripura, Delhi and Uttarakhand. It is also worth noting that Assam and 
West Bengal exhibit the highest proportions of respondents who do not have an opinion 
- 42 and 52 percent respectively.
Figure 3A.2: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Religion)
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The distribution of responses to this question also varies across religious communities 
(Figure 3A.2). Muslims are less likely to fully or somewhat agree compared to other 
religious groups. While approximately 40 percent of Hindu respondents either fully 
or somewhat agree, only about 32 percent of Muslims do the same. About equal 
proportions of Christians and Sikhs fully or somewhat agree.
Figure 3A.3: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Caste)
While the difference between Hindu and Muslim respondents is significant, we find that 
differences across caste groups are negligible (Figure 3A.3). Dalits, Adivasis, and upper 
castes do not significantly differ from each other, and the difference in proportions of 
respondents ranges from 1 to 3 percent. However, we find that about 42 percent of OBCs 
either fully or somewhat agree.
Figure 3A.4: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Education Levels)
We also observe differences across levels of education (Figure 3A.4). While non-literate 
respondents are less likely to fully or somewhat agree (approximately 32 percent) that 
individuals should be allowed to express a view that favours dictatorship over democracy, 
about 41 percent of respondents with higher levels of education do the same.
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Figure 3A.5: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Rural-Urban)
We do not, however, find a difference across rural and urban respondents. For instance, 
approximately 37 percent of rural respondents either fully or somewhat agree while 38 
percent of urban respondents adopt a similar position (Figure 3A.5).
Figure 3A.6: Criticising Elected Leaders (by State)
About 50 percent or more of respondents across almost all the States either fully or 
somewhat agree with the opinion that people should be allowed to freely criticise elected 
leaders (Figure 3A.6). Jammu-Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu, and Delhi have 
a larger proportion of such respondents compared to the other States. However, only 
44 percent of respondents fully or somewhat agree in Uttar Pradesh. The proportion of 
respondents who do not have an opinion is highest in Assam and West Bengal - about 37 
and 31 percent respectively. Generally, we find that across these States, most respondents 
support a free expression of views critical of elected leaders.
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Figure 3A.7: Criticizing Elected Leaders (by Religion)
We find that, as with the expression of a preference for dictatorship over democracy, 
religious identity produces differences on how criticism of elected leaders is viewed 
(Figure 3A.7). Sikhs, Christians, and Muslims are more likely than Hindus to either 
somewhat or fully agree. About 75 percent of Sikhs, followed by 65 percent of Christians 
and 64 percent of Muslims hold this view while the comparable value for Hindus is about 
60 percent.
Figure 3A.8: Criticising Elected Leaders (by Caste)
We find that about 58 percent of upper Castes are likely to either fully or somewhat agree 
(Figure 3A.8). There is a 4 to 5 percentage point difference between upper Castes and 
other caste groups. For instance, between 62 to 63 percent of Dalit, Adivasi, and OBC 
respondents are likely to either fully or somewhat agree on the view that people should 
be allowed to criticise elected leaders.
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Figure 3A.9: Criticising Elected Leaders (by Education Level)
We find that this opinion is also influenced by levels of education (Figure 3A.9). While 56 
percent of non-literates are of the view that people should be allowed to criticise elected 
leaders, about 65 percent of individuals with a college education hold this position. As 
levels of education increase, the proportion of respondents agreeing with this view also 
increases.
Figure 3A.10: Criticising Elected Leaders (by Rural-Urban)
We also find differences across rural and urban respondents (Figure 3A.10). A larger 
proportion of urban respondents (66 percent) either fully or somewhat agree with 
the view that people should be allowed to criticise elected leaders compared to rural 
respondents (about 59 percent).
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Freedom of Expression in Secularism
The freedom of speech and expression is also embedded in the notion of secularism. 
Even as a conceptual idea that may not resonate entirely with the Indian experience, 
secularism is opposed to the idea of a theocratic state which by itself makes freedom 
of expression an essential ingredient for its successful practice. The Indian variant of 
secularism which calls for equal treatment of all religions makes it even more imperative 
that the freedom of speech and expression be upheld.  The Indian Constitution provides 
for the Right to Freedom of Religion under Articles 25-28 which guarantees all citizens 
the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, 
freedom to manage religious affairs, freedom from paying taxes for promotion of any 
religion and the freedom to attend a religious instruction or religious worship in certain 
education institutions. Enjoyment of these rights thus entails the provision of free speech 
and expression. 
How does one practice and propagate one’s faith without the freedom of expression? 
Or, how would minority religious groups exercise dissent to any efforts by majoritarian 
groups at encroaching upon their cultural rights? Or, how would members of any religious 
Religion resist forced conversions?
We tap into freedom of expression embedded in the idea of secularism using two 
questions: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they 
make fun of religious communities other than their own, and (b) people should be 
allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are promoting violence against 
other communities. Both questions speak to what constitutes freedom of expression in 
ethnically heterogeneous societies where equal rights for all religions lies at the of heart 
nation-building. 
While freedom of expression is fundamental to secular practice, the relationship between 
the two is not an easy one. However, the Indian Constitution does not guarantee an 
unconditional enjoyment of the freedom to express oneself freely. The first Amendment 
to the Constitution imposes a set of “reasonable restrictions” on the freedom of 
expression, curtailing public speech against the “interests of the sovereignty and integrity 
of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, 
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to 
an offence”. This position is in contrast to Western views (notably the US) on freedom 
of expression. Does freedom of expression include freely ridiculing persons from 
other religious communities and their practices, and promoting violence against other 
communities? More broadly, are these notions of freedom of expression consistent with 
the practice of secularism in India? While we do not adopt a position on this debate, 
we examine the factors that appear to drive differences in public opinion on freedom of 
expression and how it relates to an underlying idea of secularism.
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Figure 3A.11: Ridiculing Other Religious Communities (by State)
When it comes to allowing people to freely make fun of religious communities other 
than one’s own, we find that almost three quarters of respondents in Kerala either fully 
or somewhat agree (Figure 3A.11). followed by Tamil Nadu where about 47 percent 
fully or somewhat agree. About 30 and 25 percent of respondents in Uttar Pradesh 
and Uttarakhand respectively also hold this view. We find that in most other States, the 
proportion of respondents who either fully or somewhat support this view ranges from 
about 17 to 21 percent. However, this number falls dramatically in Jammu and Kashmir 
(10 percent), West Bengal (7 percent) and Delhi (13 percent). We also find that Assam, 
Tripura, and West Bengal have larger proportions of respondents with no opinion ranging 
between 23 and 37 percent.
Figure 3A.12: Ridiculing Other Religious Communities (by Religion)
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Here again we find that support for allowing people to make fun of other communities 
draws most support from Hindu and Christian communities while fewer proportions of 
Muslims and Sikhs support this position (Figure 3A.12). Approximately 27 percent Hindus 
and 26 percent Christians either fully or somewhat agree that people should be allowed 
to freely express an opinion that makes fun of other communities. The proportion of 
Muslim and Sikh respondents who either fully or somewhat agree is about 18 and 19 
percent respectively.
Figure 3A.13: Ridiculing other Religious Communities (by Caste)
We do not find differences across upper caste, Dalit and Adivasis supporting this view - 
approximately 21 percent, but a larger proportion of OBC groups tend to support this 
position - about 34 percent (Figure 3A.13). This is a relatively large difference and is worth 
exploring.
Figure 3A.14: Ridiculing Religious Communities (by Education Level)
We find that there are differences among respondents based on levels of education 
(Figure 3A.14). For instance, about 20 percent of non-literate respondents tend to either 
fully or somewhat agree that people should be allowed to express an opinion even if 
it makes fun of other communities. This proportion increases to about 28 percent for 
respondents who have a college level of education.
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Figure 3A.15: Ridiculing Religious Communities (by Rural-Urban)
A larger proportion of rural respondents tend to agree that people should be allowed to 
express an opinion that makes fun of other communities relative to urban respondents, 
and the difference is about 5 percentage points (Figure 3A.15).
Figure 3A.16:  Promoting Violence against other Communities (by State)
We find that for most States, the proportion of respondents who either fully or somewhat 
agree that people should be allowed to freely express an opinion that promotes violence 
against other communities is relatively low (Figure 3A.16). For instance, about 10 percent 
of respondents in Jammu and Kashmir hold this view. Similarly, in West Bengal and Delhi 
the proportions are about 14 and 16 percent respectively. Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Uttar 
Pradesh are States where this proportion increases to 53, 39, and 33 percent respectively. 
For the remaining States, the proportion of respondents varies between 20 (Tripura) and 
26 percent (Uttarakhand). Respondents with no opinions are mostly in Assam and West 
Bengal at about 31 and 30 percent respectively.
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Figure 3A.17:  Promoting Violence against other communities (by Religion)
In this section, we observe significant differences across religious identities (Figure 3A.16). 
Muslims are much less likely to support the view that an individual promoting violence 
against other communities should be allowed to express that opinion freely. Only about 
18 percent of Muslims either fully or somewhat agree. Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs are 
more likely to agree with this position. Approximately 28 percent of Hindus support 
this position followed by about 26 percent of Sikh respondents. We find that about 23 
percent of Christians support this position.
Figure 3A.18:  Promoting Violence against other Communities (by Caste)
Among the different caste groups we find that Dalits and OBCs are more likely to 
either fully or somewhat agree that people should be allowed to express their opinion 
freely even if they are promoting violence against other communities (Figure 3A.18). 
Approximately 28 percent of Dalits and 31 percent of OBCs support this position. 
About similar proportions of upper Castes and Adivasi respondents (21 and 22 percent 
respectively) tend to either fully or somewhat agree.
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Figure 3A.19:  Promoting Violence against other Communities (by Education Level)
We find a difference, about 5 percentage points, across respondents based on levels of 
education and the expression of ideas that promote violence against other communities 
(Figure 3A.19). Respondents who identify as non-literate are less likely to either fully 
or somewhat agree with the position that persons promoting violence against other 
communities should be allowed to express this view freely, compared to respondents with 
a college level of education. For instance, while approximately 23 percent of non-literates 
agree with this view, the proportion increases to about 28 percent among respondents 
with a college level of education.
Figure 3A.20:  Promoting Violence against other Communities (by Rural-Urban)
We also find that rural respondents are more likely to either fully or somewhat agree with 
the view that persons promoting violence against other communities should be allowed 
to express this view freely (Figure 3A.20). There is approximately a 4 percentage point 
difference between rural and urban respondents.
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Freedom of Expression in Nationalism
The third theme that freedom of expression locates itself in is sovereign nationalism. 
Though not clearly articulated in the Indian Constitution, it firmly supports the Indian 
freedom movement and the politics of post-independence India. Contrary to other kinds 
of nationalisms that were based on either language or religion, as evident in Europe and 
certain parts of Asia, the thrust for nationalism in India was based on anti-colonialism. 
More importantly, given the rich diversity of this country, the leaders of the national 
movement such as Nehru and Gandhi endorsed a pluralist and civic form of nationalism 
that transcended caste, class, language, religion or any other form of ascriptive identity. 
Though in recent times we have witnessed a series of attacks across states by vigilante 
groups on students, academics, journalists and writers for not complying with accepted 
norms of ‘nationalistic behaviour’, one cannot reasonably make the case that nationalism 
therefore is antithetical to freedom of speech and expression. Those that framed our 
Constitution would have been appalled to see how a narrow and parochial understanding 
of nationalism is being used to discipline and punish those who do not subscribe to it. 
The essence of pluralist nationalism, just like secularism, is the freedom of speech and 
expression that allows all citizens of the country, not only those belonging to the majority 
Religion, to voice their dissent. How do people in India however, make sense of opinions 
that contradict the layman understandings of nationalism and patriotism? Do they feel 
that freedom of expression should be protected at any cost or do they think that only a 
particular ‘definition’ of nationalism should triumph over all other kinds of liberties?
Two questions used to identify public opinion on freedom of expression in its relation to 
sovereign nationalism are: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely 
even if they promote the use of violence against the Indian state, (b) people should be 
allowed to express their opinion freely even if they demand independence for a certain 
part of India.
Figure 3A.21:  Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by State)
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We find - similar to our previous observations - that greater proportions of respondents 
from Tamil Nadu (49 percent), Kerala (36 percent), and Uttar Pradesh (34 percent) either 
fully or somewhat agree with the view that someone who advocates violence against the 
Indian state should be allowed to freely express that opinion (Figure 3A.21). Delhi and 
West Bengal have the lowest proportion of respondents who support this position, about 
14 and 16 percent respectively. Other states fall between these two extremes ranging 
from 20 to 25 percent. However, about 35 percent of respondents from Assam and West 
Bengal, and 33 percent of respondents from Kerala have no opinion.
Figure 3A.22:  Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Religion)
We do not find large differences across respondents with different religious identities. For 
instance, about 26 percent of Hindu, Muslim, and Christian respondents tend to support 
this position, while the proportion of Sikh respondents is about 24 percent (Figure 3A.22).
Figure 3A.23:  Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Caste)
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Responses to whether someone has the right to express an opinion that calls for violence 
against the Indian state do not show much variation across castes except that 30 percent 
of OBC respondents who are more likely to fully or somewhat agree (Figure 3A.23).  
Fewer upper caste, Dalit and Adivasi respondents support this position relative to OBCs. 
The difference between OBC and other caste respondents is between 6 to 8 percentage 
points.
Figure 3A.24:  Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Education Level)
Here too we find that agreement increases as levels of education increase (Figure 3A.24). 
A greater proportion of respondents agree that persons advocating violence against the 
Indian state should be allowed to express these views freely. For instance, while about 
24 percent of non-literate respondents either fully or somewhat agree, the proportion of 
respondents increases to about 27 percent for those with a college level of education. 
However, we find that almost twice the number of non-literates have no opinion 
compared to those with a college level of education.
Figure 3A.25:  Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Rural-Urban)
As with the previous responses, rural respondents are more likely to agree compared to 
urban respondents. In this case we find that there is a 4 percent difference between the 
two (Figure 3A.25).
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Figure 3A.26: Independence for Certain Parts of India (by State)
In most States we find a greater proportion of respondents who agree with allowing 
people to freely express independence for any part of India than those who disagree with 
the exception of Delhi and West Bengal (Figure 3A.26). In Tamil Nadu, Nagaland, and 
Jammu Kashmir, we find that close to 60 percent of respondents either fully or somewhat 
agree. We also find that this proportion ranges between 40 and 50 percent for several 
States - Assam, Kerala, Mizoram, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. In 
West Bengal we find that only 30 percent of respondents agree with this position. As 
with previous responses, Assam and West Bengal have relatively large proportions of 
respondents who do not have an opinion. Surprising, Kerala has the highest share of 
respondents who do not have an opinion (41 percent).
Figure 3A.27: Independence for certain parts of India (by Religion)
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Similarly, Hindu respondents are less likely to agree with this position (about 41 percent), 
while Muslim, Christian, and Sikh respondents are more likely to support this view, about 
48 percent Muslim respondents, and 52 percent Christian and Sikh respondents (Figure 
3A.27).
Figure 3A.28: Independence for certain parts of India (by Caste)
Across caste groups, respondents belonging to the upper caste are least likely to agree, 
either fully or somewhat, with the view of allowing people to freely express independence 
for any part of India (Figure 3A.28). Among other caste groups, 43 percent of Dalit 
respondents, 52 percent of Adivasi respondents, and 46 percent of OBC respondents 
agree with this view.
Figure 3A.29: Independence for Certain Parts of India (by Education Level) 
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We also see that across all levels of education the proportion of respondents who agree 
with allowing people to freely express independence for any part of India is greater than 
the proportion of respondents who disagree (Figure 3A.29). For instance, among non-
literates almost 42 percent of respondents agree. Forty eight percent of college educated 
respondents agree. However, we also find that the proportion of those who fully agree or 
somewhat agree is greater than 50 percent across all levels of education.
Figure 3A.30: Independence for Certain Parts of India (by Rural-Urban)
We do not find significant differences across locations. The difference between 
respondents from rural and urban locations is about 2 percentage points (Figure 3A.30).
Conclusion 
While we consider freedom of speech and expression as an a priori condition for the 
successful practice of democracy, secularism and sovereign nationalism, our findings 
display a kaleidoscopic view of this constitutional value. There are differences across 
regions, caste and religious identity on certain dimensions of freedom of expression, 
but coherence on others. Public opinion ranges from a highly libertarian imagination of 
the freedom of expression to a view that freedom of expression cannot override certain 
mainstream understandings of nationalism, secularism and democracy. While what we 
present here constitutes preliminary examination of patterns, these results open up 
potential avenues of research on public opinion formation on freedom of expression, 
both theoretically and empirically.
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The question of ‘identity’ in India has significantly manoeuvred around national and 
regional identities. In many ways, this is somewhat unique to Indian society where 
regional and linguistic identities have played a significant role unlike the west (with some 
exceptions like Catalonia in Spain or the Irish question in the UK). The diverse regional 
identities in India have always been more than merely cultural. Post-independence, 
linguistic identity got a significant traction as a political category with Hindi being 
instituted as an official language in 1965. After 1969, regional parties increased and 
formed state governments, further reinforcing regional identities. Even though Nehruvian 
didactics such as “Unity in Diversity” meant that Nationalism had to take precedence 
over regionalism, a lot has changed over the years. In a political climate where Bharatiya 
Janata Party has been able to come to power in most states, and to a great degree, bring 
a new lease of life to the question of ‘Nationalism’, this data will only be revealing to what 
extent this discourse has been successful. It would also tell us what the landscape around 
regional politics seem to have configured itself in contemporary times. As in last year’s 
report, we continue our interest in the question of identity and are keen on understanding 
how these identities have shifted or are shifting in the times of majoritarian nationalism. 
Is this form of majoritarian nationalism displacing regional identity? Or is it attempting to 
strike some form of harmony with regional identity? This data will be more telling once 
elections are held in these states. 
There are two parts to this chapter: one on self-identification and the second on linguistic 
preference. We explore whether people identify themselves as either regional or national 
and whether they have a preference for which language should be used in public. 
Furthermore, we examine whether those who identify themselves as more regional might 
also show greater preference for the local language.
1. Identity: Regional or National
In this survey, we explored allegiance to regional or national identity through Q54 in the 
questionnaire: “When we ask people how they would identify themselves, some say they 
are only (state identity) and others feel they are only Indian. While some feel they are 
more (state identity) and less Indian and other feel they are more Indian and less (state 
identity). How do you identify yourself?”
The respondents were provided six options ranging including ‘Don’t Know’: ‘Only (state 
identity)’, ‘More (state identity), less Indian’, ‘More Indian, less (state identity)’, ‘Only 
Indian’ and ‘Both Equally’. In this section, the response categories were further grouped 
according to regional identity and national identity.
3.B / The Strange Case 
of the Indian Nation: 
Regional and National
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Figure 3B.1: Regional and National Identity (by State)
When looked at as a broad category, the numbers reflect almost a clear and equal divide 
across numbers of respondents who identify themselves as more regional, more national 
and who feel both equally. To understand these numbers better, we need to take a much 
closer look.
The number of respondents who feel a more national than regional identity is significantly 
higher in states like Delhi, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and, to some extent, West Bengal 
(Figure 3B.1). Given that they are mostly northern states with Hindi as their primary 
language, it is only reflective of our reports from previous years. In states like Jammu 
and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, the numbers are heavily skewed 
towards people expressing their allegiance for their regional identities. It is surprising that 
most of these states have either experienced civil unrest (such as Jammu and Kashmir, 
Nagaland and Punjab) or have been a part of the Dravidian movement (Tamil Nadu). 
But that may a hasty conclusion because many of these states also report a considerably 
high number of people who believe that they ascribe to both their national and regional 
identities at the same time. Punjab, Assam, Kerala and Tripura have a significantly high 
number of respondents claiming they feel close to both their national and regional 
identities. Tamil Nadu however, despite a higher number of people still expressing their 
allegiance for their regional identity, also have a high number of respondents (38 per 
cent) that claim a national identity. A similarly high number of Tamil respondents do not 
have a problem with people speaking any language other than Tamil. Given the history 
of the Self Respect movement which at one point found expression in the Anti-Hindi 
Struggle in the 1960s, these numbers are surprising. What makes it even more surprising, 
is that no respondent in Tamil Nadu claimed to feel close to her national and regional 
identities at the same time. Tripura also has a significantly higher number of respondents 
who identify themselves as more national than regional.
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Figure 3B.2: Regional and National Identity (by Rural-Urban)
The numbers do not vary hugely across rural and urban respondents (Figure 3B.2). They 
follow predictable trends where more rural respondents claim to feel more regional and 
more urban respondents feel more national, but then the differences are not necessarily 
huge. Across urban and rural respondents, 30 per cent of respondents said they feel both 
regional and national at the same time. 
Figure 3B.3: ‘More Regional’ and ‘More National’ (by State and Rural-Urban)
When rural and urban respondents are split across states, we see that very few states – 
Jammu and Kashmir, Tripura and West Bengal - show a significant difference in terms of 
numbers of respondents who feel more regional (Figure 3B.3). In Tripura while 8 per cent 
of urban respondents felt closer to their regional identity, it rose to 26 per cent for rural 
respondents. With Jammu and Kashmir, while 81 per cent urban residents feel close to 
their regional identity, only 64 per cent of the rural residents feel more regional. Jammu 
and Kashmir is an outlier in this case across the past three reports, because it is the only 
state to show more urban respondents displaying a higher regional affinity in comparison 
to their rural counterparts.
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Figure 3B.4: Regional and National Identity (by Religion) 
On the question of national identities too, a few states reveal a particularly sharp 
distinction between urban and rural residents - Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and to some extent 
Uttarakhand. Curiously, in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram and Punjab, more 
rural people feel more national than urban respondents. It could be because the urban 
respondents are more aware of the regional and identity discourse. But in none of these 
cases the difference is particularly high. 
A significant chunk of respondents across the states feel close to both their regional and 
national identities. The two states that have a contrary view are Jammu and Kashmir 
and Uttar Pradesh. While the fewer Jammu and Kashmir numbers are not surprising, 
the low Uttar Pradesh numbers are. For Uttar Pradesh - a Hindi speaking state which 
has always been dominant in the national politics - it is surprising to see that in people’s 
consciousness, the two identities remain so vastly different. It may be a reflection of 
the political schisms between national parties like BJP and Congress and regional ones 
like Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samajwadi Party. In Kerala and Nagaland more rural 
respondents compared to urban ones claim to feel both regional and national at the 
same time.
While 43 per cent of Hindus feel that they are more national, there is a significant 29 
per cent who also feel close to their regional identity (Figure 3.B.4). Twenty seven per 
cent of Hindu respondents feel close to both their regional and national identities. With 
Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, 45 per cent, 52 per cent and 42 per cent of respondents 
identify themselves as more regional than national. Though 30 per cent of the Muslim 
respondents claim to feel more national than regional, the same drops to 10 and 18 per 
cent with Christian and Sikh respondents respectively. But on the other hand, a significant 
number of minority respondents claimed to feel affinity for both regional and national 
identities. The numbers stand at 26 per cent for Muslim respondents, 38 per cent for 
Christian and 40 per cent for Sikh respondents.
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Figure 3B.5: ‘More Regional’ and ‘More National’ (by State and Religion)
Among the states we see 75 per cent of Hindus from Mizoram and 63 per cent from 
Tamil Nadu feel closer to their regional identities (Figure 3.B.5). Hindus in most states 
however show average numbers, that is between 20 to 40 per cent, for the same 
view. The numbers come down drastically with Delhi and Uttarakhand. Delhi’s urban 
constitution clearly drives this trend. Among Muslims, however, the numbers are again 
high in Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. As already explained 
before, this are probably reflective of the political identities of the people belonging 
to these states. In Uttarakhand and Delhi however, the number of Muslims saying that 
they feel closer to their regional identity falls sharply to 4 and 8 per cent respectively. 
Even Nagaland, Assam and West Bengal have Muslim respondents reporting a higher 
number.  More respondents express a closer affinity to their regional identities because 
of cultural differences that mark these states. But that may not necessarily be a function 
of their religion. Among Christians, only Tamil Nadu and Mizoram report a high number. 
No Christian in UP reported that they feel closer to their regional identity. In states like 
Delhi, West Bengal and Uttarakhand, the numbers go as high as 10, 11 and 14 per cent 
respectively. Even in Kerala, which has a very strong and prominent Christian population, 
only 38 per cent of the respondents claim to feel closer to their regional identity
The figures clearly show that respondents across religions from the North Indian, Hindi 
speaking states, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand identify themselves as more 
national (Figure 3.B.5). Tamil Nadu, as noted before, is quite a surprise in this regard. 
Close to 37 per cent Hindus, 53 per cent Muslims and 30 per cent Christians feel that 
they are more national. This is a high number of Muslims. Is it because they feel safer to 
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claim their national identity for fear of persecution? Or is it because Islam as a culture 
allows them to feel this degree of affinity with other Muslims across the country? This is 
a phenomenon that has been noted in other reports as well. While in states like Kerala, 
the numbers across religion do not vary much, it varies sharply for Mizoram, Uttarakhand 
and Tamil Nadu whereby more Muslim respondents feel more national. While Christians 
across states like Assam, West Bengal, Delhi and Uttarakhand show a relatively higher 
affinity for their national identity, it drops to 7 per cent for Mizoram and Nagaland. 
Across all the states, Punjab, Assam, Kerala and Uttarakhand have very high numbers of 
people claiming to feel both regional and national. In Assam while 54 per cent Muslims 
feel this way, the number of Hindus with this view is only 35 per cent. In Punjab, while 
53 per cent of Hindus feel this way, with Sikhs and Muslims it is 40 per cent and 49 per 
cent respectively. The lowest numbers are seen in Nagaland and Uttar Pradesh. While 
in Nagaland, clearly a higher number of Christian respondents (41 per cent) feel both 
regional and national, the number for Muslim and Hindu respondents drops down to 
17 and 18 per cent respectively. In Uttar Pradesh, the numbers are scant and vary, but 
hardly significantly across the religious spectrum. While 13 per cent of Hindus identify 
themselves as both regional and national, the number falls down to 7 per cent among 
Muslims. It confirms the hunch about the electoral dynamics that this question acquires 
in Uttar Pradesh. Given that a large section of backward castes, Dalits and Muslims have 
traditionally voted for SP and BSP, they seem to have associated that with their regional 
identity. In West Bengal, while 29 per cent of Hindus and 33 per cent of Muslims claim to 
be more regional than national, this number becomes 40 per cent with Sikhs. And as far 
as Christians in West Bengal are concerned, the number remains zero, with 89 per cent of 
them feeling more national.
Figure 3B.6: Regional and National identity (by Education Level)
Education level does not seem to have a major impact on people’s responses of 
regionalism or nationalism (Figure 3.B.6). While 41 per cent of non-literate respondents 
feel more regional, 33 per cent of college educated respondents say they feel the 
same. With feelings of nationalism, there is an even slimmer difference across levels of 
education. While 33 per cent of non-literate respondents say they feel more national, it 
only goes up marginally to 36 per cent with the college educated respondents. Even the 
numbers of respondents who feel both equally regional and national barely differ. This is 
vastly different from what we have seen in our reports where increased levels of education 
(mostly college level) has clearly marked their preferences .
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Figure 3B.7: Regional and National identity (by Media Exposure)
We do not see much difference across levels of media exposure (Figure 3.B.7). The 
numbers stay within 28 to 40 per cent across the three responses. Among those with no 
exposure to media, close to 40 per cent of the respondents feel more regional while 30 
per cent of them feel national or both equally. For those with low and medium media 
exposure, 38 per cent and 37 per cent feel more regional. For people with low exposure 
to media, 35 per cent feel more national. This number is only marginally less for people 
with medium exposure. Among people with high exposure to media, 38 per cent of the 
respondents claim to be more national.
Figure 3B.8: ‘More Regional’ and ‘More National’ (by State and Media Exposure)
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Nagaland shows the biggest swing in terms of media exposure changing people’s 
responses in favour of regionalism (Figure 3.B.8). While 32 per cent of respondents from 
Nagaland with no exposure to media claimed to feel more regional, it increases to 61 
per cent of people with high media exposure saying so. Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and 
Tripura show a bit of a swing. In Tamil Nadu, 78 per cent respondents with little media 
exposure say they feel more regional and 60 per cent of respondents highly exposed to 
media feel the same.  In West Bengal while 10 per cent people with high exposure to 
media say that they feel more regional, 30 per cent of people who have no exposure to 
media say the same. Most states in fact remain within a 10-15 per cent range across the 
levels of exposure. But in a state like Delhi, the margin falls as low as 3 per cent across the 
different categories. Delhi’s proximity to the central government, being the capital city/
state, could be a factor for these results. 
Most states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Tripura display a steady increase of feelings of 
nationalism along the curve of varying levels of exposure to media (Figure 3.B.8). Only 
in Mizoram do the feelings of nationalism fall, from 45 per cent with low exposure, to 5 
per cent with high media exposure. With Uttarakhand, the numbers fall from 52 per cent 
to 42 per cent. Nagaland too shows a decrease, but only minor. Some states like Assam, 
Uttar Pradesh and Punjab show a curve that is increasing but then drops again. For 
example, while 23 per cent of respondents with no media exposure feel more national, it 
increases to 42 per cent with low exposure to media. But then with moderate exposure 
to media, the numbers fall to 33 per cent and eventually to 24 per cent for people with a 
high degree of media exposure. This may be a function of a very unique relationship that 
Assam has with the centre, especially with respect to the question of illegal immigration. 
The debate on the National Register of Citizens of India (NRC) and the new citizenship 
bill seem to have had an impact on how Assamese respondents view their relationship to 
nationalism.
The north-eastern states collectively show a very curious response to this question. 
Mizoram shows a steady, directly proportional relationship between levels of exposure 
to media and the number of respondents saying they feel both regional and national. 
Nagaland and Tripura show a declining curve, where the numbers increase with higher 
levels of exposure to media but fall to an extent when it comes to respondents with 
high exposure to media. In almost all the states, there is very little variation in terms 
of numbers except in Nagaland and Mizoram which show 26 per cent and 36 per cent 
difference respectively. Tripura and Assam both show an upswing with increasing levels of 
media exposure but then eventually fall with high levels of media exposure.
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2. Language Preference
India has a history of sub-nationalist and regionalist movements that have drawn 
on language and associated cultures. Over the years, there have been movements 
in various states, for instance Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka, which have 
pushed for primacy for the state language in public spaces. Support for the use of 
local language over any other language, thus, may be considered an expression of 
linguistic sub-nationalism. In the earlier section, we looked at how people identify 
themselves in the context of regional and national, in this section we explore whether 
people hold a preference in the languages that are used in public spaces. Question 57 
in the questionnaire is as follows and the respondents were asked to choose between 
local language and ‘Any Language’: “Some people feel it is acceptable to speak in any 
language in public places while others feel that people should speak only in the local 
language in public places. What is your opinion on this issue?”
Figure 3B.9: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language in Public Spaces
Over half of the respondents (55 per cent) feel that any language can be used in public 
spaces whereas 45 per cent of the respondents support the use of the local language 
(Figure 3.B.9). One might expect that a stronger preference for one’s regional identity 
may drive preference for local or regional language as well. However, as the next figure 
shows, there is large variation across the states and this does not entirely match entirely 
with the predominant identity in the state.
While eight of the 12 states show considerable support for the use of any language in 
public spaces, in five states — Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Assam, Punjab and West 
Bengal — a majority of the respondents prefers the use of the local language (Figure 
3.B.10). Interestingly, of the five states that support the use of local language, only 
Jammu and Kashmir and Mizoram record a large preference for regional identity, that 
is, the preference for the local language does not seem to be linked to the preference 
in identity. In West Bengal, for instance, where close to half of the respondents had 
identified themselves as ‘More National’, the preference for local language saw an equally 
large support (51 per cent). On the other hand, Tamil Nadu, a state with a history of 
ethno-linguistic movements records strong support for the use of any language in public 
spaces.
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Figure 3B.10: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language in Public Spaces 
(by State)
The preference for the use of the local language finds lesser support in urban centres, 
compared to rural areas as seen in (Figure 3.B.11). Nevertheless, a majority of both urban 
and rural respondents support the use of any language in public spaces. The support for 
local language among rural respondents seems to match with the results seen earlier (in 
Figure 3.B.2), where a higher share of rural respondents had identified as ‘More regional’.
Figure 3B.11: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language (by Rural-Urban)
However, do urban and rural respondents hold differing attitudes in different states? Is 
the support for the use of the local language in rural areas consistent across the states? 
Figure 3.B.12shows the support for the use of any language among rural and urban 
respondents in the states. While a larger share of urban respondents in most states do 
not have a preferred language, five states — Kerala, Nagaland, Tripura and Assam — 
show striking results. In these states, a greater proportion of rural respondents support 
the use of any language in public spaces. While the difference in support between urban 
and rural respondents is just 4 percentage points in Tripura, the same is as high as 20 
percentage points in Kerala. This result is extremely interesting as it questions the age-old 
trope of cosmopolitan urban areas as a melting pot of cultures and language from various 
regions.
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The trend in Delhi must be viewed in a different light because as the National Capital 
Territory (NCT), it is fundamentally an urban area. According to the 2011 census, 97 per 
cent of the Delhi population consists of urban dwellers whereas only a small 2.5 per cent 
is considered rural. However, the support for the use of the local language is extremely 
low in NCT among both rural and urban respondents..
Figure 3B.12: Preference for Any Language (by State and Rural-Urban)
Figure 3.B.13, shows some clear results and some mixed results when viewed in 
conjunction with self-identification as regional or national in Figure 3.B.4. There is a clear 
preference for the use of the local language among Sikhs (59 per cent) and a greater 
share of Hindus and Christians do not have any preferred language for public spaces. The 
result for Christian respondents is interesting since over half of the Christian respondents 
have identified themselves as ‘More Regional’. Another fascinating result is with respect 
to the Muslim community. While half of the Muslims respondents prefer the local 
language, the other half do not hold any such preference.
Figure 3B.13: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language (by Religion)
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Figure 3B.14: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language 
(by Education Level)
Figure 3B.15: Preference for Any Language (by State and Education Level)
The general trend in literacy, as seen in Figure 3.B.14, shows a monotonic decline 
in preference for local language and an equal increase in support for the use of any 
language in public spaces. However, state-wise disaggregation of this result, as seen in 
Figure 3.B.15, shows a lot of variation across the states. While the support for the use 
of any language in public spaces increases with education in most states, five states — 
Assam, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttarakhand - show a different trend. 
Unlike other states, in Assam, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, greater education seems 
to lead to a rise in respondents who feel that local language should be used in public 
spaces. West Bengal and Tripura, on the other hand, pose an entirely different trend 
in preference. In Tripura, the support for the use of any language in public spaces 
declines with primary education and matriculation and then increases among the college 
educated. The trend is West Bengal points toward greater support the use of any 
language among those educated to matriculation but shows considerably lower support 
among all other levels of education.
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Nation is an identity, both political and emotional, and nationalism is an ideology which 
defines a loyalty or a sense of affection of the citizens towards its nation. The idea of 
both nation and nationalism has always been discussed and debated in India over 
the decades, but over the past few years it has been brought centre-stage and widely 
debated by various political parties, political observers and citizens. People are now 
divided into two groups– nationalists or anti-nationalists - based on their attitudes and 
perceptions towards private and public practices. 
A closer look at the nature of the nationalism debate reveals issues centred around the 
idea of ‘conservative-nationalism’ and closely located to the idea of religious nationalism. 
The concept of religious nationalism is related to the idea that one religion and its 
practices are superior to other religions and the polity should be run according to the 
beliefs and ideology of the majority religion. 
In the past three or four years, the country has some violent incidents based on issues 
such as - a ban on consumption of beef, publicly assaults for not saying ‘Bharat Mata 
ki Jai’ (Hail Mother India), for not standing for the national anthem, and attacks and 
lynchings in the name of cow protection. This section seeks to see the pattern of people’s 
position on these issues. 
We asked a few sets of questions in our survey which revolve around the issue of 
nationalism. People were asked to give their opinion on whether the government should 
punish people  who don’t say Bharat Mata ki Jai at public places, consume beef or cow 
meat, don’t stand for the national anthem or engage in religious conversion. The result 
of the survey directs towards the regional and inter-community variations in people’s 
shared opinion on these issues. For instance, Indian States having a significant population 
of national religious minorities don’t support punishment whereas States in the Hindi 
heartland overwhelmingly support punishment for the aforesaid positions. To measure 
these variations, this section tries to present people’s opinion on these issues from all 
sampled States and from different castes and communities. 
1. Punish those who do not say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” at 
Public Functions
One of the issues highlighted and linked with nationalism was chanting ‘Bharat Mata 
ki Jai’ during public gathering and events. Though the chant is closely associated with 
Indian nationalism and the national movement for independence48, it was a form of 
Hindu nationalism as the geographical boundaries of India were personified as a ‘Bharat 
Mata’ or ‘Mother India’, draped in sari, with a crown and holding the Tricolour (National) 
flag and sometimes with a lion at the back49. This visual of the motherland was first 
represented by Abanindranath Tagore in 190550 . The image was a reflection of a Hindu 
goddess to unite the people of India to fight against the colonisers during the fight for 
independence. 
3.C / Whose Nation Is It 
Anyway?
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The personification of the motherland was not a new idea; it was used in European 
nations as well to strengthen the sense of national unity 51. But it could not work in 
same way in India as in building European nationalism because the theocratic image of 
India had divided the society on communal basis instead of uniting her. Some religious 
communities like the Muslim community, which believe in a monolithic religion, had 
resisted for the personification of India as ‘Bharat Mata’ and the communal divide on 
this issue still continued. There were several instances were Muslim leaders 52 and people 
from Muslim communities resisted chanting ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ and they received huge 
criticism and sometimes faced violence for this. Other than Muslim communities, people 
belonging to other social groups also resist obligatory chanting of Bharat Mata ki Jai at 
public functions. In the lieu of this discussion we tried to capture people’s opinion on 
whether the government should have the right to punish those who do not say Bharat 
Mata ki Jai at public events. 
The State-wise analysis on this question indicates that States where religious minorities 
are actually majorities like Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram and Punjab; or are 
present in significant proportions like Kerala and West Bengal, are less likely to support 
the idea of State punishment for those who do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai at public 
functions. Assam perhaps, is the only exception to this pattern. However, even here the 
proportion of fully disagree was found to be greater than fully agree with the statement. 
Another State in the north-east region where people who fully disagreed were higher 
than those who fully agreed was Tripura but difference was not very high. In Jammu and 
Kashmir (the State with the highest Muslim population), both the regions Jammu and 
Kashmir hold opposite opinions on this issue. More than four-fifths of Kashmiri people 
(residents of the Kashmir region) were fully disagreed with the idea of State punishment. 
On the other hand, people in the Jammu region, mainly dominated by Hindus, hold a 
more nationalist opinion and behave in the same manner as seen in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh 
and Uttarakhand. People of these States strongly support the idea of State punishment 
for not chanting Bharat Mata ki Jai at public functions. Two States from North-east India, 
Nagaland and Mizoram are mainly Christian dominated States (90 percent Christians). 
A little more than half of the people in Nagaland fully disagree with the statement and 
only one out of ten fully agree. Like Nagaland, only one in every ten persons in Mizoram 
and West Bengal fully support punishment for those who do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai. 
However, one-third of the respondents in Mizoram and a little more than two of five 
respondents in West Bengal did not express their opinion on this question (Figure 3C.1). 
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Figure 3C.1: Opinion on Punishment to those who do not say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” at 
Public Functions (by State)
Social cleavages also shape people’s opinion on this issue. Although caste identities 
are more visible in a society like India, when it comes to religious nationalism, the 
religious identities overshadow the caste identities of the people. Data clearly indicates 
that different castes of Hindus - except Tribal communities - are more likely to support 
punishment for those who do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai. However, among other religious 
communities such as Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, full disagreement is higher than full 
agreement for the punishment for those who don’t day Bharat Mata ki Jai. As compared 
to other religious minorities, Muslims are more likely to fully disagree with the statement 
(Figure 3C.2).   
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Figure 3C.2: Opinion on Punishment for those who do not say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” at 
Public Functions (by Caste/Community)
2. Punish those who do not Stand for the National Anthem at 
Public Places
The national anthem is a symbol of national unity and integrity. The Fundamental Duties 
under Article 51A of India Constitution States “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India 
to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the national Flag and 
the National Anthem”. A legislation was also passed in 1971 known as ‘The Prevention 
of Insult to National Honour Act, 1971’. Section 3 of this act specified some protocols for 
singing the national anthem and stated that “whoever intentionally prevents the singing 
of the Indian National Anthem or causes disturbances to any assembly engaged in such 
singing shall be punished with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three years, 
or with fine, or with both”. However, this act does not clearly specify any punishment 
for not standing during the singing of the National Anthem. However, in 2015 an order 
related to the National Anthem of India was passed by Ministry of Home Affairs 53. 
According to this order whenever the Anthem is sung or played, the audience shall stand 
to attention. Here also this order does not specify any punishment. 
However, on November 20, 2016, in the Shyam Narayan Chouksey vs. Union of India 
case the Supreme Court directed that all cinema halls across India must play the National 
Anthem before every feature film 54. But, in another hearing on October 23, 2017, the 
Supreme Court asked the Centre to consider amending the rules for playing the national 
anthem in movie theatres 55. And, on January 9, 2018, the Supreme court has disposed 
the case and changed the previous order and stated that playing of the National Anthem 
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prior to the screening of feature films in cinema halls is not mandatory, but optional or 
directory 56. So as of today, there is no law which States that a person has to stand when 
the National Anthem is sung or played. In the present study, we seek people’s opinion on 
punishment for those who don’t stand for national anthem at public places. 
Altogether, 30 percent of the respondents fully agree with the statement that the 
government should punish those who don’t stand for the national anthem at public 
places and 20 percent fully disagree with the statement. The respondents in the Kashmir 
region of Jammu and Kashmir strongly rejected the idea of State punishment for those 
who don’t stand for the national anthem. Three fourth of the Kashmiri people fully 
disagree with this idea. On the other hand, in the Jammu region nearly half of the people 
supported the idea that the government should punish those who don’t stand for the 
national anthem. Along with the Kashmir region, people from two north-eastern States, 
Nagaland and Mizoram also reject the idea of State punishment for not standing for the 
national anthem. Close to one third of the people in Nagaland  fully disagree, whereas 
in Mizoram 18 percent fully disagree or did not express their opinion. The same degree 
of disagreement was also visible in West Bengal where 18 percent of the people fully 
disagree and 36 percent did not share their opinion on this statement. States in the Hindi 
heartland such as Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand took more nationalist positions 
where close to half of the respondents (except Uttarakhand, with 40 percent) fully 
agree that the government should punish those not standing for the national anthem. 
Respondents in the remaining sampled States took middle positions on this question with 
an inclination towards agreement with the statement (Figure 3C.3).    
Figure 3C.3: Opinion on punishment for those who don’t stand for national anthem 
at public places (by State)
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An analysis by Caste-community wise also indicates that all castes of Hindu religion 
- except Hindu Adivasis - agree more than they disagree on the statement that the 
government should punish those who don’t stand when the national anthem is played or 
sung. The Hindu tribal and Adivasi communities are mainly located in States like Tripura, 
Assam and West Bengal. So their position on this question is mainly influenced by their 
geographical and political position. On the other hand, religious identity has a greater 
impact on their opinion. For instance, people from Muslim communities, followed by 
Christianity-practicing tribals, fully disagree with the idea of punishment for not standing 
for the national anthem. Interestingly, Sikh people have a different opinion on this 
question. Dalit Sikhs were found to be in favour of State punishment for not standing for 
national anthem whereas a higher number of Sikhs (includes Jat Sikh, Khatris and so on) 
did not agree with this statement (Figure 3C.4). 
Figure 3C.4: Opinion on punishment to those who don’t stand for national anthem at 
public places (by Caste/Community)
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3. Punish those who Eat Beef/Cow Meat
In the last two or three years, media reported several incidents where people from 
minority communities were attacked or lynched by mobs, allegedly for consuming beef 
or cow meat. There is no uniform law eating beef across Indian States, but various Indian 
States have different laws regarding cow slaughter and eating cow meat. But in given 
definition ‘beef’ is not clearly stated in these State acts. While there is no clear definition 
of ‘beef’, most Indian States have laws regarding cow slaughter and beef consumption 
ranging from a total ban on cow slaughter and cow meat consumption to having some 
relaxations. But in States like Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, West Bengal, Meghalaya, 
Mizoram, Tripura, Sikkim (a bill was proposed in the assembly in August 2017, but there is 
no such act implemented till the study was conducted in the State) and Kerala there is no 
such law. In States like Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Assam, Bihar, Odisha and Tamil Nadu, 
cow slaughter is allowed after availing a fit-for-slaughter certificate from the recognised 
State agencies.
In our study we found that in States where cow slaughter is completely banned, they 
strongly supported the punishment for those who consume beef/cow meat such as 
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand. States like Mizoram, Nagaland and 
Kerala, where there are no such laws, overwhelmingly reject the idea of punishment for 
those who consume cow meat. Tripura and West Bengal also fall in the category of the 
States where there is no law on cow slaughter, but in these two States a little more than 
one in five respondents did not express their opinion on this question. Unlike Mizoram, 
Nagaland and Kerala, these two States (Tripura and West Bengal) have more Hindu 
population and therefore, only 39 percent of the respondents in Tripura and 30 percent 
in West Bengal fully disagree with the statement that people should be punished by the 
government for eating beef or cow meat.    
Jammu and Kashmir has one of the most strict laws on cow slaughter where the slaughter 
of cow, its progeny and buffalo is punishable. An accused person can be punished 
by up to 10 years of jail and a fine that is five times the animal’s price. However, two 
regions, Jammu and Kashmir of the State have different perceptions. Jammu region of 
the State where there is a large Hindu population supports the point that there should 
a punishment for those who consume beef or cow meat whereas Kashmir region, with 
a significant Muslim population, rejects the idea that there should be a punishment 
for those who eat beef or cow meat. A little more than four out of five respondents in 
Kashmir fully disagree with the statement that the government should punish those who 
consume beef or cow meat (Figure 3C.5).
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Figure 3C.5: Opinion on punishment to those who eat beef/cow meat (by State)
The discussion above indicates that States have different opinions on the issue of 
punishment for consuming beef. It is possible that States have perhaps shaped their 
perception on this issue based on religion. Therefore, to understand how various 
communities have responded to this issue, a caste-community wise analysis is done. Beef 
consumption is a part of the food habit for people belonging to Muslim and Christian 
communities. However, we can notice the intra-religion variations in the opinion. Muslims 
strongly reject the idea of punishment for beef consumption whereas the Christian 
community has divided opinion. Adivasi Christians strongly reject the idea of punishment. 
Close to four-fifths of the respondents from this community fully disagree with State 
punishment for those who consume beef. Adivasi Christians are mainly located in the 
north-eastern part of India where beef consumption is part of their food habit and there 
is no law regarding cow slaughter and beef consumption. On the other hand, half of the 
other Christians strongly refuted  the statement. Different Hindu castes hold different 
opinions. Hindu Upper Castes and Hindu Dalits were found to be more in favour of 
punishment for consuming beef. Interestingly Hindu Dalits is also not a homogenous 
category. Hindu Dalits of Tamil Nadu, Tripura and Assam reject the idea whereas Hindu 
Dalits of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Delhi overwhelmingly support the idea of 
punishment for beef consumption. On the other side, Hindu OBC and Hindu Adivasis 
don’t support the States as the other caste of Hindu religion (Figure 3C.6). OBCs from 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu completely rejected the idea of punishment for beef consumption 
whereas OBCs from the Hindi heartland support the punishment for beef consumption.
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Figure 3C.6: Opinion on punishment to those who eat beef/cow meat 
(by Caste/Community)
4. Punish those who engage in Religious Conversion
The issue of religious conversion is an oft-debated one in India, and after 2014 it has 
become the subject of many social and political discussions. In some States these mass 
conversions occurred to draw attention towards community-based problems. There 
is no national law to prevent religious conversion and many Hindu organisations have 
been demanding a strong anti-conversion law. In 1954 a bill called Indian Conversion 
(Regulation and Registration Bill) was brought into the Parliament but could not be 
passed due to huge opposition. At present, there are seven Indian States namely, 
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Himachal 
Pradesh which have anti-conversion laws to stop forced and fraud conversion 57. Out 
of these seven States, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Gujarat and Himachal 
Pradesh are the States where this act is in force. 
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However, some Hindu organisations like Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya 
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) widely criticise religious conversions and have also launched 
a movement that they call ‘Ghar Wapasi’ to bring back to the converted people into 
the Hindu religion 58. These Hindu organisations are also demanding a strong anti-
conversion law in India. Keeping these issues in mind, we asked our respondents their 
opinion  on whether people engaged in religious conversions should be punished by the 
government. We found that overall, people’s opinion on this issue was sharply divided. 
However, the proportion of those who fully disagree with the statement was higher than 
those who fully agree. Unlike for other questions, a higher number of respondents (23 
percent) did not express their opinion on the issue of religious conversion. Disagreement 
was higher among Christian dominated States - people in Mizoram (60 percent) and 
Nagaland (44 percent) fully disagree with the statement that the government should 
punish those found to be engaged in religious conversions. Rejection was also high 
among respondents in States like Kerala (37 percent), Tripura (28 percent), Tamil Nadu (27 
percent) and Assam (23 percent). On the contrary, support for punishment for religious 
conversion was found to be greater in States like Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and 
Uttarakhand (Figure 3C.7).
Figure 3C.7 Opinion on Punishment to those who Engaged in Religious Conversions 
(by State) 
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When we look at the opinions through a caste-community lens, we find that again, 
except Hindu Adivasis, all other Hindus supported the idea of punishment for religious 
conversion. Interestingly, more Sikhs than Hindus are more likely to support punishment 
for religious conversion. Strong rejection was found among people from Adivasi Christian 
communities and people from other minority religions (Figure 3C.8).
Figure 3C.8: Opinion on punishment to those who engaged in religious conversion 
(by Caste/Community)
5. Index of Nationalism 
An index of nationalism was constructed using these four questions and based on their 
opinion, respondents were divided into three groups – 1. opposed to conservative 
nationalist thoughts, 2. centrist and 3. conservative nationalist thoughts. Those who reject 
the idea of punishment for the imposition of nationalism were labelled as ‘opposed to 
conservative nationalist thoughts’ and those who support punishment were labelled 
as ‘conservative nationalist thoughts’. People having middle responses were put in the 
category of ‘centrist’. There were a few who did not respond to any of these questions. 
Overall, two-fifth of the people take a centrist position. One-third were found to be 
conservative nationalists who believe that people should be punished for not following 
majoritarian beliefs. Nonetheless, 27 percent of the people were opposed to conservative 
position and rejected the idea of populist or majoritarian practices. Different States 
have different positions on the idea of nationalism. States like Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, 
Uttarakhand, and the Jammu region took the stand of conservative nationalists where 
more than half of the respondents supported the punishment for all four issues. On the 
contrary, people in the Kashmir region, Nagaland and to some extent Mizoram were 
found to be opposed to conservative nationalist thoughts. Respondents in Assam, Kerala, 
Tripura and West Bengal took a centrist stand on the issue of nationalism (Figure 3C.9). 
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When we look at the caste/community-wise opinion on nationalism, we found that caste 
groups such as upper caste Hindu, Hindu OBCs and Hindu Dalits hold conservative 
nationalist thoughts these issues. On the other hand, Muslims, Christians Adivasis and 
other religious minorities oppose conservative nationalist thoughts. Hindu Adivasis and 
other Christian communities took a centrist position (Figure 3C.10).   
Figure 3C.9: Index of Nationalism (by State)
Figure 3C.10: Index of Nationalism (by Caste/Community) 
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The location of the respondents also has an impact on their perceived opinions . At first 
glance, it seems that people living in urban areas would hold less conservative nationalist 
thoughts. But a further bifurcation of urban areas into towns and metro cities reveals 
that people living in the metros (Delhi, Chennai and Kolkata in our sample) hold more 
conservative nationalist thoughts (52 percent) . On the other hand, one third of the 
respondents in towns and cities oppose conservative nationalist thoughts (Figure 3C.11).
Figure 3C.11: Index of Nationalism (by Rural-Urban) 
We also examined whether the level of media exposure has any impact on people’s 
perception of nationalism. It is an important variable because in the past few years, these 
issues have been discussed and debated on media. Our data indicates that increased 
levels of media exposure also increase conservative nationalist thought. People with low 
media exposure hold a centrist position (Figure 3C.12).
Figure 3C.12: Index of Nationalism (by Media Exposure)
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Education levels have no systemic relation but our data indicated that people having a 
higher education hold extreme opinions. The proportion of people with a centrist view is 
larger among people with low levels of education (Figure 3C.13). 
Figure 3C.13: Index of Nationalism (by Education Level) 
Conclusion
To sum up, our findings are that people’s position on issues related to nationalism is 
clearly associated with their geographical and social position and linked with their 
caste and religious identity. States located in the Hindi heartland and with a higher 
proportion of Hindu population hold conservative nationalist thoughts whereas States 
located at border areas like Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Kerala, West 
Bengal and Tripura either oppose conservative nationalist thoughts or take centrist 
positions. Along with geographical position, caste and religion of the respondents also 
shapes their perception towards nationalism. Religious minorities such as Christians and 
Muslims oppose conservative nationalist thoughts whereas Hindus (except Adivasis) take 
conservative positions. 
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Has India turned populist? Personality-based politics and majoritarian nationalism have 
always been a part of the fabric of India’s democracy, but the recent success of populists 
around the world and in the 2014 elections in India, compels scholars to sharpen our 
understanding of these themes, and of populism, in India. We need to understand 
the nature, spread and depth of populism in India better, as that has implications on 
democratic disenchantment, a possible consequence of politics between elections. 
Much of the literature on populism in India is focused on understanding populism 
through electoral mobilisation, political discourse and governance, but such a focus helps 
us to grapple with only the supply side. The demand side of looking at the scale and 
depth of populist attitudes in India can help us explain how ideas at the individual level 
can generate mass outcomes59.
We adopt a conservative understanding of populism in this survey as there is scholarly 
consensus on these fundamental parameters to define populism. We understand 
populism to comprise of three attributes - popular sovereignty, the existence of a 
Manichean ethic and an aversion to public institutions.  
First, the defining feature of populism is the existence of a perceptible divide between 
the ‘people’ and the ‘other’. Populists typically believe that there is a community 
of people whose interests are not being served by some constructed ‘other’ – both 
categories being fluidly defined but nevertheless existent. Our attempt through the 
survey was to understand who these ‘people’ are and who the ‘other’ is. The question 
we had asked was: “In your opinion, who is blocking progress of people like you?” (Q8). 
The identified groups include: (a) Elites/Influential people, (b) Minorities, (c) Migrants/
Outsiders, (d) Lower castes, and (e) Upper castes. Response categories are “yes” or “no”.
Second, populist scholars agree that the division between the people and the ‘others’ 
is necessarily a moral one wherein the people are considered virtuous and the other is 
considered self-serving at best or corrupt at worst. By extension then, the relationship 
between them acquires a Manichean character whereby their relationship is antagonistic 
and not pluralist in nature and the will of the ‘people’ (or popular sovereignty) 
is pitted against the ‘other’. Our attempt through the survey was to understand 
whether respondents understand political contestations as essentially antagonistic or 
accommodative by nature. The question we had asked for this attribute is as follows: 
“Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree 
with most.” (Q26)
Statement 1: Politics is ultimately a battle between good and bad.
Statement 2: Politics is ultimately a compromise between good and bad.
Response categories include: “Agree with Statement 1” or “Agree with Statement 2.”
3.D / Populism
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And third, by implication, such people in an antagonistic relationship with the other, are 
averse to existing public institutions because they feel that the latter have been captured 
by the other, and therefore necessitates re-envisioning such institutions to live up to 
their original promise. It must be said here that in India, election is one such ‘institution’ 
that escapes this aversion and indeed is seen as a pathway to better governance. The 
question that captures this attribute is as follows: “Now I am going to read out two 
statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most.” (Q 52)
Statement 1: Elected leaders should be able to override the courts to serve the people 
better.
Statement 2: Courts should be able to limit elected leaders to protect the people better.
Response categories include: “Agree with Statement 1” or “Agree with Statement 2.”
We provide a summary of results from questions pertaining to each of these attributes. 
We also provide a summary of results from respondents who intersect with any two or all 
three of these attributes. We hope to understand what motivates the spread and depth of 
populist sentiments among respondents by exploring their individual attributes in terms 
of background characteristics. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
Populism and its three attributes. 
I. Who are the People Against?
The first question related to populism was to ascertain if there is widespread 
disenchantment with a particular group. That a little more than 48 percent of all 
respondents reflected an anti-elite attitude, which was also more than twice that of 
any other cleavage (minorities, migrants, upper and lower castes), clearly shows that 
the primary motivation behind populist attitudes is against elites more than traditional 
cleavages that typically influence politics in India.  It is also the case that this attitude is 
concentrated in a few states like Kashmir, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi 
(Figure 3D.1). On the other hand, Kerala stands out as a state that reflects a non-populist 
attitude, though it has the largest number of respondents who had ‘no opinion’ on the 
question.
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Figure 3D.1: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by State)
Figure 3D.2: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Age)
Further, the survey results do point to some underlying factors that influence respondents 
with a populist attitude. Interestingly, age, caste and religion seem to matter more than 
gender and location (urban/rural), while education and class have a moderate influence. 
We present the results on age, religion, caste and education and exclude the other 
factors considering their limited influence on the anti-elite perception.
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Figure 3D.3: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Religion)
Figure 3D.2 reveals two patterns. First, older respondents seem to be less certain about 
their opinions. Second, an anti-elite sentiment seems to decrease quite substantially as 
the age of the respondents seem to increase. While it would not be possible to argue 
what the results would be  if the respondents grow older or how they felt when they were 
younger, one can clearly say that the younger population today is relatively more anti-
elitist than the elder population, and that the latter is less certain as to where they stand 
on the ‘elite versus the people’ divide.
With the exception of Christians, almost all other non-Hindu religions seem to hold an 
anti-elite attitude particularly Sikhs, other religions, and Muslims (Figure 3D.3). While the 
antagonism is most stark amongst the Sikhs, Christians seem to be equally divided on this 
question. However, Hindu’s being the largest religious group, the analysis warrants that 
we examine if there are further divisions within the Hindus.
Figure 3D.4: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Caste)
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Dalits and other castes within the Hindu population seem to have a higher proportion of 
respondents who share an anti-elitist attitude more than the other caste groups (Figure 
3D.4). Interestingly, the Adivasi caste group seems to be as divided as the Christians 
on this question. In sum, one could speculate that the lower castes and Dalits may be 
reflecting a sentiment against upper and OBC caste groups even though the latter groups 
are divided on this question.
Figure 3D.5: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Education Level)
The education table reflects two interesting patterns – an upward linear line among 
those who believe that elites are not blocking their progress, and a U-shaped curved line 
among those who believe that they are indeed blocking their progress (Figure 3D.5).  
Education seems to play a role among those who feel that elites are not blocking their 
progress, as college educated respondents seem to feel less strongly anti-elite compared 
to the non-literates. Simultaneously however, among those who feel that elites are 
blocking their progress, both the non-literates and the college educated hold relatively 
strong anti-elite views.
II. Is Politics a Battle or Compromise between Good and Evil?
While 48 percent believe that elites are blocking their progress on the one hand, 47 
percent believe that politics is ultimately a compromise between starkly divergent 
views on politics on the other. Put another way, while an anti-elite based antagonism is 
widespread, it is heartening to note that almost an equally substantial number believe 
that compromises more than ‘battles’ lies at the core of political contestations.  That 
being said, 29 percent believe that it is a battle, and therefore this result requires further 
analysis.
Our results show, predictably, that those belonging to urban areas and the upper 
class seem to endorse the idea of politics being a compromise. Interestingly however, 
Christians, other religious groups and Adivasi groups seem to share a similar view of 
politics as well.  However, state, age, and education seem to show distinctions in terms of 
populist attitudes. Finally, gender does not seem to make a difference as the division is 
almost uniform across the categories. Hence, we present the results related to state, age, 
and education below.
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Figure 3D.6: Battle or Compromise (by State)
An antagonistic relationship between political contestants seems to be a feeling 
concentrated in fewer states compared to an anti-elite attitude, as seen above 
(Figure 3D.6). Respondents in Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh seem to have a 
stronger populist perception relative to other states, but respondents in Punjab seem 
to distinguish between anti-elite perceptions and the nature of political contestants.  
Interestingly, Kerala seems to share this idea of antagonistic political contestants, whereas 
Nagaland is exactly on the opposite end. Even more interesting, respondents in Delhi 
seem to overwhelmingly think that politics is a compromise and not a battle between 
good and bad.
Figure 3D. 7: Battle or Compromise (by Age Group)
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Interestingly, while the idea of an antagonistic relationship is equally shared across all 
age groups, younger people seem to be more persuaded by the idea of a compromise 
between good and bad political contestants. However, the latter pattern needs to be 
understood carefully as around 56 percent of those who agree that it is a compromise 
have not revealed their age (Figure 3D.7).
Figure 3D. 8: Battle or Compromise (by Education Level)
On education, those who hold a high school or college level education seem to have an 
opinion on this question relative to those who have lower levels of education – only 17 
percent in the former two groups do not have an opinion on this question (Figure 3D.8). 
Although education matters in the forming of an opinion, these opinions also diverge as 
32 percent of the respondents who have studied up to middle school seem to believe 
that politics is a battle. Put another way, education seems to help form opinions but not 
necessarily in the direction that politics is a compromise between good and bad. 
III. Can Elected Leaders Override Courts on Behalf of the People?
The third question related to populist attitudes is whether respondents believe that 
elected leaders should be able to override courts, reflecting an attitude that popular 
sovereignty can undermine public institutions because they may feel that such sacrosanct 
institutions are in fact not representative of popular interests. Predictably, respondents 
that are upper class and those that are in urban locations believe that courts are 
sacrosanct. Interestingly divergent results are revealed when one considers states, 
age and education. Gender, caste and religion (excepting Sikhs) do not seem to show 
divergent patterns with the larger majority for courts and a significant minority for elected 
leaders. On this question then, we present results related to state, age and education.
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Figure 3D. 9: Elected Leaders can Override Courts (by State)
Clearly, the eastern states of West Bengal, Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura do not 
feel that elected leaders can override courts (Figure 3D.9). At the other end, Punjab, Tamil 
Nadu followed by Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and Kashmir have more than a quarter of 
the respondents who think that elected leaders can override courts. Delhi is an interesting 
case in that most people feel that courts should be able to limit elected leaders as against 
the opposite perception.
Figure 3D. 10: Elected Leaders can Override Courts (by Age Group)  
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While one should note that around 54 percent of respondents who believe that courts 
should limit elected leaders have not mentioned their age, it is interesting that the older 
respondents don’t seem to have an opinion on this question (Figure 3D.10). Seen another 
way, a substantial number of young respondents believe in the courts, and around one 
fifth of respondents across all age groups affirm the contrary. There are larger numbers 
of older groups who do not share an opinion and so remain non-committal about the 
relationship between the courts and the elected leaders.
Figure 3D. 11: Elected Leaders can Override Courts (by Education Level) 
Education clearly shows that educated people have formed opinions on this question 
with the majority affirming that courts should be able to limit elected leaders (Figure 
3D.11). However, one cannot ignore that the percentage of people who believe that 
elected leaders can override courts is also higher among college educated respondents. 
Strong and Moderate Populism
Finally, to understand the prevalence of a populist attitude better, we present results 
below of respondents who affirm all three ‘populist’ statements – that elites are blocking 
their progress, politics is a battle between good and bad, and that elected leaders should 
be able to override courts. We characterise those respondents – who affirm all three 
statements – as strong populists. Those respondents who affirm any two of the three 
statements are considered moderate populists.
Out of the total number of 24197 respondents, only 1326 answered the question. Among 
those that answered the question, around 10 percent affirmed all three statements, while 
almost 29 percent affirmed any two of the statements. For the purpose of the report, 
we will only present the results of the strong populists and only in the cases where the 
percentages were equal or more than 12 percent.  In this case, class, location and age do 
not seem to matter in that percentages were close to 10 percent, but clear patterns can 
be seen in the case of state, education, gender, religion and caste.
149
Figure 3D. 12: Populism (by State)
Strong populists were concentrated in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu 
and Kashmir (Figure 3D.12). In all the other states, strong populists were less than 10 
percent with Kerala, Nagaland and Delhi below 5 percent. Further, more than 50 percent 
of the respondents were either strong or moderate populists in Punjab, Tamil Nadu and 
Uttar Pradesh.
Figure 3D. 13: Populism (by Education Level)
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In the case of education, the non- literate respondents seem to have a higher share of 
strong populists relative to other groups with different levels of education (Figure 3D.13). 
But it is also the case, that the levels of education and the degree of populist attitudes 
seem to share similar results across the groups.
Figure 3D. 14: Populism (by Religion)
In the case of religion, clearly the Sikhs and the Muslims hold stronger populist views 
relative to other religious groups with the Christians and other religious groups being 
least persuaded by populist statements (Figure 3D.14).
Figure 3D. 15: Populism (by Caste)
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In terms of caste, Dalits and other caste groups have relatively higher respondents who 
have strong populist leanings relative to other groups. Interestingly, Upper Castes, OBC 
and Adivasi seem to share similar distributions (Figure 3D.15). 
Conclusion
Based on the results from the above questions, we can claim that India is not 
overwhelmingly populist because almost two-thirds of the population seem to affirm the 
opposite on most of the questions. On the contrary, we cannot say that India is pluralist, 
but it is essentially non-populist. However, it is disconcerting that around 20 – 30 percent 
on an average seem to affirm questions that can be construed as highly strong assertions 
of populism. 
It is also important to note that the spread and depth of populist sentiment clearly 
indicates that there is much research to be done in this area. It is clear that state-level 
characteristics do seem to matter as much as individual characteristics especially age, 
education, religion and caste. Interestingly, rural urban locations, gender and class do not 
seem as significant as originally presumed. 
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4.
Political 
Institutions
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1.  Most Important Issue
This chapter attempts to understand people’s perceptions in 12 states about important 
issues and also whether these issues shape their view on what the government’s 
responsibilities or priorities should be. In order to understand what the important issues 
are for the voters, a question on issues was operationalised into the survey questionnaire 
(Q4) as an open-ended question (post coded later into crisper categories for the purpose 
of better analysis): In your opinion, what is the most important issue facing India today? 
19 per cent of the respondents state unemployment to be the single biggest problem 
in the country today. Development, Growth and Poverty is at 15 per cent, of which 
poverty alone is stated by 11 per cent of the respondents. Physical infrastructure and law, 
governance and corruption are at 13 per cent each and price rise was affirmed by 11 per 
cent. These make up the top five issues for the people of 12 states (Figure 4A.1). One in 
every five respondents did not offer any response on this question.
4.A / Ascertaining 
Citizen Preferences
Figure 4A.1: Unemployment is the primary issue concerning the people
There is a fair degree of variation on significant issues across the states.  Unemployment 
does not emerge as the most important issues for all the states. Figure 4A.2, represents 
a heatmap of issues across states in which the darker shades represent a larger share of 
respondents who cite the issue. Of the 12 states where the study was conducted, only 
six stated it as the most important issue. These states were Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar 
Pradesh, Tripura, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. Amongst these six states, the issue is 
the most predominant for Uttarakhand where the figure was 17 percentage points higher 
than the average. Though the biggest issue for Jammu and Kashmir is unemployment 
and development, growth and poverty, but when we segregate the data for the Jammu 
and Kashmir regions, we see clear variation on what is considered the predominant issue.  
While unemployment is the biggest issue in Jammu region, in Kashmir, however, it is 
the Kashmir problem; two in every five respondents in valley state this to be the most 
important issue. For Kerala the top two issues are development’ growth and poverty 
and law, governance and corruption. Physical infrastructure, which includes the issue of 
drinking water, electricity, housing, roads, cleanliness and other basic amenities, is the 
biggest issue for the people in the states of Assam, Mizoram, and West Bengal. Two 
in every five respondent of Assam state physical infrastructure as the most important 
issue. In Tamil Nadu the top issues are physical infrastructure and law, governance and 
corruption. Law, governance and corruption is also the biggest issue in Kerala and 
Nagaland. 
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When we look at the issue of farmers and agriculture one notes a clear disappointment 
regarding farmers issues in Tamil Nadu and 4 per cent of the farmers report this to 
be the issue of significance. In March 201760 and November 2018 61, farmers from the 
state protested in Delhi with a series of demands to alleviate the farmer’s plight and 
government apathy towards their cause 62. They carried the skulls of other farmers who 
had committed suicide and demanded removal of all farmer loans, profitable price for 
their agricultural products and a ₹5,000 pension for farmers per month.
Figure 4A.2: State- wise breakup of the concerned issues.
On segregating important issues by education of the respondents, Figure 4A.3, we 
observe that education makes a significant difference on only two issues: unemployment 
and law governance and corruption. Unemployment as an issue find more support 
when one moves from non-literate voters to highly educated voters. For the college 
educated respondents, unemployment is an issue for 26 per cent of the respondents. The 
corresponding figures for the matriculate, the primary educated and the non-literate were 
19, 13 and 12 per cent respectively. The biggest issue clearly differs across education. 
Among the non-literates, the predominant issue was of growth and development (18 per 
cent), for primary educated respondents, it was physical infrastructure (19 per cent) and 
for the matriculate and college educated voters it was unemployment (19 and 26 per cent 
respectively).
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Figure 4A.3: Education makes significant difference only on two Issues
Unemployment is also the prime concern for young Indians as can be seen in Figure 
4A.4. Undoubtedly as one moves from young voters to comparatively older voters, one 
notices a decline in unemployment as the important issue.  Unemployment is the biggest 
issue for those belonging to the age group of 18- 35 years and this issue takes a back 
seat for those respondents above the age of 36 years. The only significant difference with 
regard to gender on the most important issue facing India is in the case of unemployment 
where more men state it as an issue than women. This difference remains even when we 
analyse at college educated men and women. We do not observe much difference on 
issues across locality, except for the two topics of law governance and corruption and 
physical infrastructure. Where on one hand physical infrastructure, is an important issue 
for those residing in rural areas (15 vis-à-vis10 per cent), law, governance and corruption 
is a predominant concern for those in urban localities (17 vis-à-vis 11 per cent). All other 
issues were more or less of equal concern to both rural and urban residents.
Figure 4A.4: Unemployment a bigger issue for the young
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Different Issues During and Between the Time of Elections
A similar question was asked in the post poll survey conducted by Lokniti-CSDS in 2014 
where the voters were asked identify the issue of utmost significance when deciding their 
vote-choice. We find that people prioritize different issues during the time of elections 
compared to periods between elections (Figure 4A.5). Where on one hand, the top two 
dominant issues for the 12 states in 2014 were price rise (20  per cent) followed by law, 
governance & corruption (18 per cent), the voters of the same states identify different 
issues in 2018.  From 20 per cent in 2014 to 11 per cent in 2018, the issue of price rise 
has seen a steep decline. Law, governance and corruption is another topic which has seen 
a similar decline from 18 to 13 per cent.  On the other hand the issue of unemployment 
has seen a massive increase in support from 2014 to 2018. In 2014, only 6 per cent of 
the voters stated this to be an important issue for them while voting, while in 2018, the 
figure increased three fold to 19 per cent. The other issues which are given comparatively 
lesser importance during elections but are more important during the inter-election 
period are development, growth and poverty, physical infrastructure, social issues and 
social infrastructure. The only states which reported the same issue both during election 
and between elections are Tamil Nadu and Tripura. In Tamil Nadu the issue is physical 
infrastructure and in Tripura it is unemployment. All other states reported different issues 
during elections and after.
Figure 4A.5: Citizens prioritize different issues during the time of elections
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2. Citizen Defined Government Priorities
The earlier section highlighted the issues that were important to citizens and how 
these issues differed across states and at the time of elections.  This section will focus 
on whether the citizens identify the same topics as the most pressing issues and as 
government’s priority. In order to gauge this, an open-ended question (Q45) with post-
coded categories was asked on what the most important responsibility of a government is 
towards its citizens: “What is the most important responsibility of a government towards 
its citizens?” 
Figure 4A.6 shows the spread of responses. The citizens prioritize unemployment and 
development, growth and poverty as the primary responsibilities of the government 
(15 per cent each). It was closely followed by physical infrastructure (14 per cent) and 
law, governance and corruption (13 per cent). While 19 per cent of the respondents 
find unemployment to be the most important issue facing the country, a slightly lower 
15 per cent identify the same as government responsibility; it does not retain the same 
prominence as a government responsibility. For all other topics roughly the same 
proportion of respondents identify them as important issues and also as important 
governmental responsibilities. 
The inter-state variation in Figure 4A.7 show interesting results. Figure 4A.7, like Figure 
4A.2, is a heatmap. The darkers parts of the graph show greater support for an issue to 
be considered as government priority. While the most pressing issue is also identified 
the government priority in all states, there is much variation in the extent to which the 
predominant issues find support as important government responsibilities. The states 
can be classified into three groups based on support for topics as important issues and 
important government responsibilities. In most states, a smaller share of respondents 
identify topics as government responsibilities compared to the share of respondents who 
consider these topics to be predominant issues. In Mizoram and Punjab, unlike other 
states, a higher proportion of respondents support certain topics as government priorities 
compared to the share who consider these topics to be pressing issues. This begs the 
question, why it that some issues are find more support as  important issues but do not 
retain the same importance when it comes to government’s responsibilities? Do citizens 
doubt government ability to deliver in the areas they consider important or so they feel 
that the government is responsible for some issues and not for others?
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Figure 4A.6: Citizen defined government priorities in aggregate terms.
Figure 4A.7: State- wise government priorities of citizens
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Government’s Priority across Various Socio-Economic 
Groupings
There is no significant difference across different economic classes on government 
responsibilities barring unemployment and law, governance and corruption which a 
greater proportion of upper class citizens want the government to prioritize. 19 per 
cent of the respondents belonging to the upper class report unemployment to be 
the most important responsibility of the government, however the figure drops by 9 
percentage points among the poor (10 per cent). The topic of development, growth 
and poverty is the biggest priority at 16 per cent among the poor respondents. Of the 
16 per cent, poverty alone was mentioned by 8 per cent of the respondents. For those 
belonging to the upper class, the top government priority is unemployment followed 
by law, governance and corruption. Unemployment is the biggest priority for the 
younger respondents (18 – 36 years), but for the older respondents (36 years and above) 
the biggest priority shift to development, growth and poverty. Among the educated 
respondents too, unemployment is the biggest government priority (20 per cent).  
Among respondents of all other categories, the same figure was below 15 per cent. 
On disaggregating the responses by caste, we find that across caste groups, 
unemployment is the biggest government priority with the exception of Adivasis and 
Muslims. Where on one hand Adivasis state physical infrastructure as the biggest 
government responsibility (24 per cent), Muslims consider development, growth and 
poverty (18 per cent) and followed by unemployment (17 per cent). In Punjab, price 
rise is considered government priority by almost twice the average figure (14 per cent 
and opposed to average of 6 per cent). This state also has the highest proportion of 
respondents who feel that unemployment as the biggest issue facing India (25 per cent). 
While unemployment, price rise and law, governance and corruption are considered as 
government responsibility in the urban parts of the states, physical infrastructure, social 
infrastructure and development, growth and poverty find more support in rural areas. On 
all the other issues, there is no significant difference. 
To sum up, this chapter tried to delve into what people identify as important issues 
and whether these issues also shape their view on what the utmost responsibility of 
the government should be. The finding of this section reveals some interesting trends. 
Firstly, unemployment, followed by development, growth and poverty, are the most 
important issues facing India according to the respondents. However, the salience of 
these issues differ across states. Secondly, people report different issues at the time of 
elections and periods between elections. The findings of this section reveals that price 
rise and law, governance and corruption were the most important issues during national 
elections of 2014, however the voters identify vastly different issues in 2018. Thirdly, 
though there is similarity in the topics that are considered as the most important issue 
and those identified as biggest government responsibilities, the support for certain topics 
as pressing issues do not find similar support as government responsibilities. Finally, in 
most states the topics identified as the most important issues rank lower as government 
priorities, barring the states of Mizoram and Punjab.
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One of the most important channels of interaction between the state and its citizens is 
through schemes and public services provided by governments. The state and citizens 
also interact through various political and social institutions which safeguard the interest 
of citizens and resolve issues or challenges faced by them. People approach such 
institutions for dispute resolution, get services, and to get their work done. However, are 
citizens aware of opportunities provided by Central and State governments? Do they 
have access to schemes that have the potential improve livelihoods? And what are kinds 
of challenges they face while accessing public services? And what sorts of institutions do 
citizens approach for dispute resolution and to access services?
We explore these questions in the following sections through multiple lenses: across 
States, across caste and religious identities, levels of education, and class. The first 
section examines the awareness of citizens with regard to both Central and State level 
schemes. These schemes cover four broad areas: agriculture, housing, employment, and 
health care. We find that awareness of both Central and State schemes is influenced by 
the social position of the respondent. In the second section, we focus on the beneficiaries 
of these schemes. Do targeted groups benefit from these schemes? Section three 
considers the experiences of citizens in availing public services such as education, 
health services, sanitation, water and electricity. The final section reports on the kinds of 
institutions citizens approach for dispute resolution and get important work done.
The questions asked in the survey that identify this information are as follows: (a) “Now 
I am going to name a few schemes (PM Fasal Bima Yojana, PM Jan Avas Yojana, PM 
Jan Aushadi Yojana, and MGNREGA) that the Central Government has initiated for the 
benefit of people. Have you or your family availed any benefit from these schemes?” 
The responses are “Benefitted”, “Not benefitted” and “Not Heard.” (Q5); and (b) “Now 
I am going to name a few schemes (agriculture schemes, medical/health schemes, 
employment schemes, edcuation schemes) which have been launched by the (State) 
government for the benefit of the people. Have you or anyone in your family benefitted 
from these schemes.” The responses are “Benefitted”, “Not benefitted” and “Not 
Heard.” (Q19).
1.  Awareness of Central and State Welfare Schemes
For availing the benefits of the schemes, awareness about them is very important. 
Therefore, to understand the level of awareness about the schemes launched by the both 
Centre and state governments, respondents were asked various questions regarding 
various welfare schemes – agriculture, housing, employment and health related schemes.
4.B / The State-Citizen 
Interface
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Figure 4B.1: Awareness of Central and State schemes (by State)
We find that, with the exception of employment schemes, respondents are marginally 
more aware about state schemes compared to central schemes (Figure 4B.1). Awareness 
of Central agriculture schemes is high in Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Tripura, Punjab and 
Kerala. With the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, Tripura, and West Bengal, the level 
of awareness about State agriculture schemes among farmers across the States is also 
high. There are a few States where awareness about the central agricultural scheme is 
higher that state schemes such as Tripura, West Bengal, Uttarakhand, Delhi and Jammu 
and Kashmir. In Assam, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand approximately nine in ten 
respondents are aware of a Central housing scheme, Pradhan Mantri Jan Avas Yojna. In 
Punjab, West Bengal and Delhi the level of awareness about Central and State housing 
schemes is about the same. And in Kerala, Mizoram and Tamil Nadu, we find more 
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respondents aware of State housing schemes compared to Central housing schemes. 
Greater than 80 percent of respondents are aware of Central employment schemes. The 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme is widely recognized 
relative to State employment schemes across most States. In Tamil Nadu and Delhi, 
however, more respondents are aware of State employment schemes. In Kerala and 
Mizoram awareness for both schemes are somewhat same.
When it comes to the health scheme, the awareness about state health schemes is much 
higher than the central health scheme, Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojna. Overall, 85 
percent of the respondents  are aware of state health schemes, whereas 73 percent are 
aware of central health scheme. In Mizoram, Punjab, West Bengal, Delhi and Uttarakhand 
there is a greater awareness of State health schemes relative to Central health schemes. 
In Assam, however, the Central health scheme is recognized more than state heath 
scheme. In the other States, awareness about the both central and state health schemes 
are somewhat equal.  
Figure 4B.2: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes (by States)
We create a summative index of awareness that ranges from low awareness to high 
awareness. for both Central and State schemes. In Assam, Tripura, Delhi and Uttarakhand 
respondents reveal a high level of awareness across Central schemes compared to State 
schemes (Figure 4B.2). In Kerala, Mizoram, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, there is 
a high level of awareness regarding State schemes. In Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir, 
more respondents indicate a low level of awareness when it comes to Central schemes 
(note that except agricultural schemes in Jammu and Kashmir, respondents were not 
asked about State schemes in these two States). For instance, approximately 42 percent 
of respondents in Nagaland have low levels of awareness regarding Central schemes and 
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a third of respondents in Jammu and Kashmir indicate a low level of awareness). In Uttar 
Pradesh, level of awareness about the state and central scheme is about the same. Eighty 
one percent of respondents in Tripura are highly aware of Central schemes. In Assam and 
Kerala, respondents are also highly aware of Central schemes. In Kerala, Mizoram, and 
Tamil Nadu, respondents indicate a high level of awareness of State schemes.
Figure 4B.3: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes 
(by Caste/Communities) 
When we examine levels of awareness across caste and religion, we find that Christian 
Adivasi respondents have the lowest awareness of schemes introduced by the Centre. 
Approximately 35 percent of Christian Adivasi respondents have a low level of awareness 
of Central schemes. Repsondents   with 35 percent of people who were less aware 
about the central schemes. On the other hand, 13 percent of Hindu Adivasis exhibit a 
low awareness of Central schemes, while 66 percent indicate high awareness. Among 
State schemes Christian Adivasis reflect the lowest proportions of low awareness, and 84 
percent indicate a high awareness.  (Figure 4B.3).
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Figure 4B.4: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes 
(by Education Levels)
Could differences in education be a possible reason for the degree of awareness (Figure 
4B.4). As levels of education increase we find that the proportion of respondents who 
have a low level of awareness of either Central or State schemes decreases. Similarly, the 
proportion of respondents who exhibit high awareness about Central and State schemes 
increases. Twenty five percent of non-literates have a low level of awareness while 17 
percent of respondents with a college education have low awareness. While 50 percent of 
non-literate have a high level of awareness, the proportion increases to 66 percent.
Figure 4B.5: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes 
(by Economic Class)
We find that economic class of an individual is correlated to awareness as well (Figure 
4B.5). Respondents classified as poor have lower levels of awareness compared to those 
considered wealthier. For instance, about 20 percent of respondents among the poor 
have a low level of awareness of Central schemes. This proportion drops to about 19 
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percent among the upper classes. While 56 percent of poor have a high awareness, 
the proportion increases to 63 percent for the upper class. Awareness of State schemes 
follows similar lines. Sixteen percent of poor respondents reflect a low aware ness of 
Central schemes and 57 percent show a high level of awareness.  The proportions for 
those classified as upper class, the proportions are 9 and 67 percent. Awareness of both 
Central and State schemes across class and education exhibit similar patterns.
2. Beneficiaries of the Central and State Welfare Schemes
Who benefits from Central and State schemes? We organize the different Central and 
State schemes into the following categories - agriculture, employment, housing and 
health.
Figure 4B.6: Beneficiaries of Schemes (by States)
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We find that the  beneficiaries of State agricultural schemes (14 percent) are higher than 
Central agricultural scheme (7 percent). The largest proportion of beneficiaries of Central 
agriculture schemes are farmers in Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh with 16 and 15 percent 
respectively. The counterparts for State agricultural schemes are in Mizoram and Tamil 
Nadu. Close to half of the farmers in Mizoram and 21 percent of people in Tamil Nadu 
report benefits of state agricultural schemes. 
We find that Central housing schemes has a greater proportion of beneficiaries (10 
percent) relative to State housing schemes (8 percent). The largest proportions of 
beneficiaries of Central housing schemes are in Assam and Uttarakhand (Figure 
4B.6). In rest of the states, we do not observe much difference in the proportions of 
the beneficiaries of Central and State housing schemes. The greater difference in 
beneficiaries was observed in employment schemes. Overall, only 7 percent of the 
respondents say they got benefits of state employment scheme, but 32 percent say they 
have availed the central employment scheme, NREGA. In Mizoram and Tripura, close 
to two-third of the respondents indicate benefits of NREGA, and the proportions for 
Nagaland and West Bengal are about 45 and 43 percent respectively.
Unlike employment scheme, more respondents indicate benefits from from State health 
schemes as compared to Central health scheme. Data indicate that only eight percent of 
the respondents report benefits from a Central health schemes whereas when it comes 
to the state health schemes, every one out of five respondents availed the benefits of 
health schemes launched by their respective state governments. Larger proportions of 
beneficiaries are in Tripura and Kerala, about 17 percent and 13 percent respectively. 
Mizoram and Delhi are found to be performing well in delivering state health schemes. 
Forty-five percent in Mizoram and 39 percent of respondents in Delhi claim benefits of 
the state health schemes. Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand and West Bengal also report close to 
twenty five percent respondents as benefiting from State health schemes.
Figure 4B.7: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Agricultural Schemes 
(by Type of Farmer)
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We find smaller proportions of farmers have availed the benefits from the central 
agriculture scheme , Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (PMFBY), introduced by the 
central government in 2016 to ensure crop insurance for farmers in India (Figure 4B.7). 
However, big and small farmers have benefitted from State agricultural schemes with 24 
and 22 percent respectively. benefitted from the state agriculture scheme as compared to 
tenant cultivator and agricultural laborers .
Figure 4B.8: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Agricultural Schemes 
(by Caste/Communities)
 
When viewed through caste we notice that Hindu Dalits (12 percent) report the highest 
percentage of beneficiaries of housing schemes at the central level followed by Hindu 
Adivasi and Hindu upper castes with 11 percent each (Figure 4B.8). Christian Adivasis and 
Dalit Sikhs have the lowest percent of respondents who benefit at the central level with 
only five percent each. At State level, Hindu Adivasi have highest percentage of people 
who benefitted from housing schemes at 11 percent. Hindu OBC, Hindu Dalit and OBC 
Muslims are not far behind with nine percent each. Here as well Dalit Sikhs have the 
lowest percentage of people, who benefited from the housing schemes at the state level, 
with only three percent. 
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Figure 4B.9: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Housing Schemes (by Economic Class)
Economic class of the respondents does not have much impact in availing benefits of 
housing schemes (Figure 4B.9). Eleven percent of the poor benefit from the housing 
scheme introduced by the Centre. Smaller proportions across class groups benefit from 
state housing schemes. 
Figure 4B.10: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Housing Schemes (by Rural-Urban)
Rural areas seem to have benefited more than the urban areas at the central and the state 
level, but difference in not much (Figure 4B.10).
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Figure 4B.11: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Employment Schemes 
(by Caste/Communities)
We find that across caste and religious groups, Christian Adivasis appear to have 
benefitted the most (72 percent) from the Central employment scheme, NREGA 
(Figure 4B.11).  Hindu Adivasis and Dalits are also beneficiaries with 53 and 42 percent 
respectively. Other Sikhs and other Christians are the castes that benefited the least with 
11 and 13 percent. The state employment schemes have relatively have low percentages 
of beneficiaries across all castes and religions, with only 3 percent of Muslims reporting 
benefits.
Figure 4B.12: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Health Schemes (by Rural-Urban)
There isn’t much variation when we look at Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojna a 
health scheme offered by the Centre with 8 percent of rural and 7 percent urban 
respondents reporting benefits (Figure 4B.12). State health schemes have comparatively 
more beneficiaries than the Central schemes. Urban areas have higher percentage of 
beneficiaries with 25 percent and rural with 18 percent. 
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Figure 4B.13: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Health Schemes 
(by Economic Class)
The beneficiaries of Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojana are same across all classes - 8 
percent of people across all classes are the beneficiaries of the scheme (Figure 4B.13). 
When we look at state health scheme middle classes have the highest percentage 
of beneficiaries with 22 percent of people who benefitted from the health scheme 
introduced by the state.
Figure 4B.14: Beneficiaries of Central and States’ Health Schemes 
(by Caste/Communities)
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Across caste and religioin groups, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojana does not 
appear to have found purchase (Figure 4B.14). We see that State health schemes are 
much more beneficial - 43 percent of Christians Adivasis say that they have benefited 
from the schemes. 
3. Citizens’ Experience in Availing Public Services 
In availing public services like education, healthcare, electricity, water and sanitation, 
citizen experiences vary – some find it easy while others experience difficulty. 
Respondents were asked to share their experience of how easy or difficult it was for 
them to avail public services like education, healthcare, electricity, water and garbage 
collection.
Figure 4B.15: Experience in availing public services
Overall, access to education system is reported as the easiest, as eight out of ten 
reported that getting admission for their child in government school was easy – if we 
combine the categories of very easy and somewhat easy. In contrast, getting a water 
connection is not as easy; more than one third of the respondents availing water 
connection find it to be very difficult (Figure 4B.15).
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Figure 4B.16: Experience in availing public services (by States)
Figure 4B.16 represent a heat map of ease of availing various services across 12 states. 
In this heat map, the darker parts represent a higher share of respondents who find it 
easy to avail a particular service in a state. Access to the government education services 
is the easiest in Uttarakhand compared to other states as 92 percent of the respondents 
in Uttarakhand say it is easy for them to avail the education services, followed by Kerala, 
Assam and Tamil Nadu. On the contrary, access to the education services is not as easy 
in Delhi. Access to healthcare services at a government medical hospital was reported 
as easiest by the people of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, while less than 50 percent of 
respondents in Delhi and West Bengal find it easy. Electricity and water connections are 
reported as easiest by respondents in Kerala and Mizoram, though in West Bengal the 
proportions drop to 38 and 21 percent for these services.
Figure 4B.17: Experience in availing public services (by Rural-Urban)
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Figure 4B.18: Experience in availing public services (by Caste/Communities)
Availing education services is easier in rural areas compared to urban locations (Figure 
4B.17). However, all other services are easier to obtain in urban localities compared to 
rural areas. Data also  indicates that factors such as level of education, economic class 
and caste and religious identity of the respondents have an impact on their experience 
in availing public services. Generally, respondents from higher economic classes, and 
those with higher levels of education find it easier to avail public services compared to 
respondents from lower economic classes, and those less educated.
Figure 4B.18 represent a heat map of ease of availing various services across caste 
communities. In this heat map, the darker parts represent a higher share of respondents 
who find it easy to avail a particular service. Caste and religious identity of respondents 
also shapes the experience in availing the public services, and it is general notion that a 
person placed high on social hierarchy can easily avail the services. Sikhs as a community 
and Hindu OBCs find it easy to to avail education services. Christians (both Adivasi and 
others) report education as the easiest followed by electricity. Hindu OBC groups also 
follow a similar pattern. Christian Adivasis and Hindu OBC report sanitation as the easiest 
service. Christians and Hindu upper castes find it easy to avail electricity services.
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Figure 4B.19: Experience in availing public services (by Economic Class)
Education services is easy for middle and lower class groups compared to upper class 
respondents (Figure 4B.19). The possible reason for this is likely that wealthier citizens are 
not likely to avail government school education for their children, and have difficulty in 
getting admission to private schools. With the exception of education services, wealthier 
classes find it easier to access medical, sanitation, electricity and water connection 
services compared to poorer respondents.
Figure 4B.20: Experience in availing public services (by Education Levels)
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Similarly, respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to report ease in 
accessing services such as electricity, water, and medical services (Figure 4B.20). 
4. Preference for Institutions Citizen Approach  
There are several political, non-political, formal and non-formal institutions or individuals 
whom citizens directly or indirectly approach to get the services or to get their important 
work done. Figure 4B.21 shows the people and institutions that citizens of different states 
approach to get important work done. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph 
represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. 
In Punjab, a little less than eight of ten respondents, and Assam, about one in two 
respondents, report they will approach councillor to get important work done. In Tripura 
respondents report approaching  local political leaders to get their important work done. 
In Nagaland preference to approach elder outside family is higher. In Tripura one of 
three respondents are likely to approach local political leaders to get their work done. In 
Mizoram 13 percent of respondents say that they will approach religious leaders.  
Figure 4B.21: Institutions to approach to get an important work done (by States)
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In rural areas more number of respondents (32%) report they will approach the sarpanch 
or councillor followed by local political leaders (15 %) to get their work done (Figure 
4B.22).  In the urban localities  a little less than one of five respondents say they will 
approach councillor to get their work done. In urban areas, 14 percent of respondents 
approach an MLA and government officials to get their work done. Compared to rural 
areas (10%) a marginally higher proportion of respondents in urban areas (11%) report 
they would approach elder outside family. 
Figure 4B.22: Institutions to approach to get an important work done (by Rural-Urban)
Figure 4B.23 show the people that citizens of different caste communities approach 
to get important work done. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent 
a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. Caste and 
community data indicates that a large proportion of respondents approach a councillor. 
Hindu Adivasis also indicate approaching local political leader to get an important work 
done. Muslims as a community preferred to approach MLA. Hindu upper caste say 
they would approach government officials while Christians are more likely to approach 
religious leaders and elders outside their family to get their work done.
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Figure 4B.23: Institutions to approach to get an important work done 
(by Caste/Communities)
Across levels of education, we find that most of the respondents like to approach 
councillor or sarpanch followed by local political leaders to get important work done. 
Figure 4B.24 show the people that citizens at different levels of education approach 
to get important work done. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent 
a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. A large 
proportion of non-educated respondents (39%) said they would approach sarpanch or 
councillors to get their work done and this proportion is higher as compared to those 
respondents who were college and above educated (23%) said they will approach 
councillor or sarpanch.
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Figure 4B.24: Institutions to approach to get an important work done 
(by Education Level)
College educated respondents also report that they approach government officials. Local 
political leaders also play an important role among those with lower levels of education.
Figure 4B.25: Different forums to resolve various disputes
There are multiple institutions, state as well as non-state, that citizens approach to resolve 
disputes. Figure 4B.25 show the persons and institutions that citizens approach to resolve 
various disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share 
of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. Most respondents find family 
members as most reliable forum to resolve property disputes, marital disputes and those 
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related to domestic violence). A village elder is found to be an important forum to resolve 
neighbourhood disputes. Around one of five respondents say they would approach police 
to resolve domestic violence. In case of property disputes, 16 percent of respondents also 
said they will approach a court as forum to resolve property disputes.
Figure 4B.26: Preferred forums to resolve property disputes (by States)
Figure 4B.26 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach to 
resolve property disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a 
greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. In Punjab, 60 
percent of respondents prefer family members as the forum to resolve property disputes. 
In Kerala, 50 percent of respondents prefer to resolve property disputes through family. 
In Mizoram (47%) respondents prefer to approach court to resolve their property related 
disputes while in Assam, (36 percent) and in West Bengal (30 percent) respondents prefer 
neighbourhood or village elder. Caste and community organisations are found to be an 
important forum in Nagaland (16%) and Jammu and Kashmir (14%) to resolve property 
disputes, and 15 percent in Tamil Nadu prefer the police.
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Figure 4B.27: Preferred forums to resolve marital disputes (by States)
Figure 4B.27 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach to 
resolve marital disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a 
greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. In most States, 
a large proportion of citizens prefer family members to resolve marital disputes. In 
Nagaland (67%), Punjab (65%) and in J&K (61%) respondents said that they would prefer 
to resolve marital disputes through family members. One third of respondents in Assam 
prefer to resolve marital disputes through neighbourhood and village elders. In Uttar 
Pradesh, Tripura, West Bengal, Uttarakhand and Delhi after family members, respondents 
prefer neighbourhood or village elder to resolve marital disputes. In Mizoram after 
family members, respondents prefer to resolve marital disputes through courts. In Kerala 
(21%) of respondents prefer Police to resolve their marital disputes. Beside this one of 
ten respondents in Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir prefer caste and community 
organisation to resolve marital disputes. 
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Figure 4B.28: Preferred forums to resolve neighbourhood dispute (by States)
Figure 4B.28 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach 
to resolve neighbourhood disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph 
represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. Most 
respondents in the states prefer to resolve neighbourhood disputes through village elders 
and the proportion is higher in north-eastern states like Assam (65%) and Nagaland (56%). 
In Punjab, one third of respondents prefer to resolve neighbourhood disputes by family 
members. One of five respondents in Nagaland also prefers to resolve neighbourhood 
disputes by caste community organisations. In Delhi and Kerala, a little more than one 
fourth of respondents say they would approach the police to resolve neighbourhood 
disputes. One sixth of respondents in Mizoram prefer to resolve neighbourhood disputes 
through courts.
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Figure 4B.29: Preferred forums to resolve dispute related to domestic violence 
(by States)
Figure 4B.29 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach to 
resolve domestic violence. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent 
a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. A large 
proportion of people in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir approach family members 
to resolve disputes related to domestic violence. In Kerala (44%) and Mizoram (49%) 
respondents said they would like to approach Police to resolve disputes related to 
domestic violence. In Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal people prefer to approach 
neigbourhood or village elder to resolve disputes of domestic violence. In Nagaland and 
Tripura, preferences for caste or community organization to resolve domestic violence 
disputes is high as compare to other state. In Mizoram (14%) people prefer to approach 
court to resolve disputes related to domestic violence.
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Governance has been a catchphrase and extremely popular in the discourse of post-
liberalisation India. Corruption, public service delivery, institutional efficiency are but 
some of the concepts that have found resonance in the discourses on governance. In 
this section, we explore two other aspects of governance: economic governance, and 
education. The first part of this section pertains to eminent domain and the contentious 
issue of land acquisition in India. The second part relates to the preference for public and 
private schools, and the rationale for such choices.
1. Economic Governance
How people perceive modes of land acquisition by state? How do people perceive their 
ability to respond to land acquisition by state? And how do people perceive the dispute 
resolution mechanism over land acquisition disputes? These are some of the questions 
that this section will look into.
As per the February 2015 data from the Ministry of Finance, in response to the RTI query 
filed by RTI activist Mr. Venkatesh Nayak, about 8 per cent of the 804 projects were 
stalled due to land acquisition issues 63. As per the information provided by Minister 
of State for road transport and highways in December 2018 in the lower house of the 
parliament 64, land acquisition was one of the reasons why 435 infrastructure and highway 
projects were hindered. It is clear that land acquisition is a contentious issue when it 
comes to the state polices for development, infrastructure and transport projects. 
According to the 2011 census, about 24 per cent of the population is dependent on 
agriculture. Land thus holds a much importance in the livelihood of at least one fourth 
of the Indian population. Besides this, about ten per cent of the population work as 
agricultural labourers. The varied impact that land acquisition issues have on the lives 
of the people dependent on agriculture can be seen in the land holding pattern. The 
agricultural census of 2010-11 shows that—while an average marginal farmer holds 0.39 
hectare, an average large farmer holds about 17.38 hectares.  Further, 5 per cent of the 
farmers (medium and large) account for about 32  per cent of the cultivated land, while 
about 95 per cent of the farmers (marginal, small, and semi-medium) hold the rest of it. 
Land is a difficult subject to legislate on in India. While land falls under state list, various 
aspects of land acquisitions fall under the concurrent list. Thus, both centre and state 
have power to create and amend laws related to land acquisition. Land acquisition has 
often emerged as a political issue with different political parties and social movements 
organized around this issue. States have often taken remarkably distinct trajectories 
on the issues of land acquisition and land reforms. Land acquisition has different 
nuances attached to it, from moral dilemmas to economic issues of compensation and 
rehabilitation, from coercion by state in lives of the people to the issue of agricultural 
and rural distress. Almost every aspect of this issue requires a careful scrutiny on its own. 
While the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (LARR) in 2013 provided 
a framework for land acquisition for all states in India (except Jammu and Kashmir), 
various states like Telangana, Haryana, Tripura, Chhattisgarh have continued to add their 
own twists to it. A study by Centre for Policy Research 65 suggests that between 1992 and 
2016, there were about 102 laws that were legislated on with regard to land acquisition; 
87 out these were legislated by state assemblies. Apart from highlighting different state 
4.C / Governance
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trajectories, this study also shed light on the centrality of the judiciary in the disputes over 
land acquisition.
In this chapter, we look at the responses of the people on three issues: a) whether the use 
of force by state is preferable or should the landowners voluntarily give up the land, b) 
whether the landowners should be allowed to resist the government in peaceful manner 
or by violent methods, and c) whether the court has any role in settling the disputes 
over land acquisition. We asked the respondents to choose between two contrasting 
statements on each of these three issues. 
A. Modes of land acquisition:
On the issues of mode of land acquisition, we asked the respondents to choose one 
statement amongst two following statements:
Statement 1: Landowners should give up their land in the larger interest of development
Statement 2: The government should be allowed to use force to displace local villagers/
landowners.
On an average, about 60 per cent of the respondents agree with the first statement, 
while about 13 per cent agree with the second statement. As Figure 4C.1 shows, more 
than one-fifth of the respondents in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh support the use of 
force by state to displace landowners. On the other hand, North-Eastern states (Assam, 
Tripura, Nagaland, and Mizoram) seem to be particularly less inclined, compared to the 
other states, to agree with the use of force by the government to displace local villagers 
and landowners. A reason for this could be a closer experience with Armed Force Special 
Powers Act (AFSPA), which might have highlighted the negative side of the excesses 
of state. Kerala, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir are also significant in their extremely 
low preference for the use of force by state for land acquisition. While both Punjab and 
Jammu and Kashmir have had a history of military and police operations, Kerala remains 
an aberration. Nagaland and Uttarakhand are two states that stand out in their relatively 
higher preference for voluntarily giving up the land in interest of development.
Figure 4C.1: Modes of Land Acquisition (by State)
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Figure 4C.2: Modes of Land Acquisition (by Farmer-Non-Farmer)
There is no major difference between the broader categories of farmers and non-farmers 
on the mode of land acquisition, Figure 4C.2.
Figure 4C.3: Modes of Land Acquisition (by Type of Farmer)
As the land holdings decrease, Figure 4C.3, we see that the tendency to give up the 
land voluntarily for development projects increases. This is counter-intuitive if we assume 
that small farmers or tenant cultivators are at a greater risk of marginalization due to 
land acquisition. One of the possible interpretations of this puzzle could be that small 
farmers are more likely to engage with the state as they might see greater incentive in 
the compensation and rehabilitation. On the other hand, the other possible interpretation 
could be that big farmers are better equipped to negotiate with the state and hence less 
likely to give up the land, even when threatened by the use of force by state.
Figure 4C.4: Modes of Land Acquisition (by Rural-Urban)
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Since rural economy is comparatively more shaped by agrarian economy, it would be 
intuitive to expect a greater resistance to give up the land voluntarily.  This expectation 
is borne out as we see that rural respondents are less likely to give up their land for 
development projects as compared to urban counterparts, Figure 4C.4.
B. Response to land acquisition
In the face of land acquisition, what options do the citizens have to respond to such a 
situation? We asked the respondents to choose between two statements:
“Statement 1: Villagers/Landowners should be allowed to continue their protest in a 
peaceful manner.
Statement 2: Villagers/Landowners should be allowed to resist the government by violent 
methods.”
Out of the surveyed states, Figure 4C.5, every second respondent was more likely to 
espouse resistance by violent means than peaceful protests. Nagaland, Kerala, and 
Mizoram stand out in their support for resisting by violent means as opposed to only 
protesting by peaceful means. The militarisation of North-Eastern states (as well as 
Jammu and Kashmir) could be a reason for the preference for violent dissent over 
peaceful protests. However, within the North-Eastern states, the inclination towards 
violent means in Assam and Tripura is significantly less. Perhaps the influence of 
communist parties might be a factor for higher tendency for violent response in West 
Bengal, Kerala and Tripura.  Only Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Delhi show 
greater support for peaceful protests over violent methods.  Tamil Nadu is more in 
tune with the average figures. One possible explanation could be that the State has 
penetrated enough in the daily lives that the people have escaped the language of 
violent means.  The other interpretation could be that in the central parts of India, as 
you move closer to the capital region, one is more likely to be politically mobilised in 
organising protests or showing dissent.  
Figure 4C.5: Response to Land Acquisition (by State)
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Figure 4C.6: Response to Land Acquisition (by Farmer-Non-Farmer)
There is no major difference between the broader categories of farmers and non-farmers 
on the responses to land acquisitions either, as show in Figure 4C.6. While amongst 
farmers, there is not much variation in the response to the use of violent means, Figure 
4C.7, we also observe that agricultural labourers are comparatively less likely to see the 
merit in resisting the government by peaceful means. This is in line with the assumption 
that agricultural labourers are more likely to face the precarious situation arising out of ill-
designed land acquisition policies.
Figure 4C.7: Response to Land Acquisition (by Type of Farmer)
Figure 4C.8: Response to Land Acquisition (by Rural-Urban)
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Similarly, in Figure 4C.8, if we assume that people staying in rural locations have lesser 
avenues to register their dissent as compared to their urban counterparts, they are 
less likely to believe in the merit of only peaceful protests. We see a significant drop 
in the proportion of the people in rural regions who believe that they should resist the 
government by peaceful means as against violent means. 
C. Dispute resolution over land acquisition
With respect to dispute resolution in land acquisition problems, we asked the 
respondents to choose one statement amongst the following two statements:
Statement 1: Dispute over land between the government and local villagers/land owners 
should be settled by the court.
Statement 2: The courts have no role to play in these disputes over land between the 
government and the local villagers/land owners.
As Figure 4C.9 shows, about three fifths of the respondents agree that the courts 
should settle the disputes between the government and the landowners and villagers. 
This highlights the central role that the judiciary plays in the imagination of the Indian 
population. Tamil Nadu and West Bengal show the least amount of faith in the role of 
the courts. On the other hand, Delhi, Kerala, Punjab and Uttarakhand show much higher 
degree of faith in the role of courts than the average respondent of the surveyed states. 
Perhaps the performance of district courts and high courts in these states needs to be 
reviewed in this light.
Figure 4C.9: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by State)
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In continuation to the earlier theme, as Figure 4C.10 shows, we find no major difference 
between the broader categories of farmers and non-farmers on the role of the courts in 
dispute settlement over land acquisition issues.
Figure 4C.10: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by Farmer-Non-Farmer)
As the proportion of land holding decreases, we can see a corresponding fall in the role 
that courts occupy for dispute resolution between the government and land owners/
villagers, see Figure 4C.11. The big farmers are more likely to have enough resources and 
knowledge to deal with the legal system than agricultural labourers.
Figure 4C.11: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by Type of Farmer)
As Figure 4C.12 shows, the urban respondents are more likely to espouse dispute 
resolution by courts as compared to the rural counter parts. This again could be an 
indicator of a stronger State presence (in general) in the urban areas.
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Figure 4C.12: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by Rural-Urban)
To sum up, we do not find any major difference of opinion among farming and non-
farming communities on aspects of modes, responses and dispute resolution over 
land acquisition issues. However, the differences creep in, when we factor variations 
on account of state, location, and land-holding patterns. While some states prefer a 
more peaceful and voluntary manner of handling land acquisition, in many other states 
the respondents prefer to resist through force. This may be due to the history of leftist 
movements, land reform legislations and militarization in the area. While farmers with 
large land holdings are less likely to give up land voluntarily and more likely to approach 
courts to settle the land dispute, farmers with smaller holdings and agricultural labourers 
are less likely to support dispute resolution through courts and more likely to support the 
use of violence against the state. The affluence of big farmers is visible in the choice of 
approaching courts and the rejection of voluntarily giving up the land. Finally, the urban 
and rural differences has been as expected with more rural residents, who are more likely 
to be dependent on land for agricultural purposes, to refuse voluntary giving up of land, 
likely to resort to violent means to protect their land and to avoid the legal system for 
resolution.
2. School Choice
Family decisions related to a child’s schooling, especially the choice between public and 
private schooling, are complex, and many factors influence this choice. In developing 
societies, socio-economic factors are shown to be key drivers behind decisions regarding 
the type of school a child attends 66.
In this survey, we find that about 71 per cent of respondents report having children of 
school going age (below 18 years). The remaining respondents do not report children of 
school going age as part of a family unit. Of the respondents that have children of school 
going age, 58 per cent report that their children attend government school and about 42 
per cent attend a private school. These numbers are consistent with the national averages 
from other sources. For instance District Information System for Education (DISE) data 
shows about 60 per cent students across the country receive their education from a 
government school 67.
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Figure 4C.13: School Enrolment (by State)
In the twelve states surveyed, in shown in Figure 4C.13, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura 
have the highest enrolment in government schools, with 89 per cent, 83 per cent and 81 
per cent respectively. Kerala and Tamil Nadu follow with more than 60 per cent children 
enrolled in government schools. Jammu and Kashmir (52 per cent), Delhi (50 per cent) 
and Punjab (47 per cent) have almost equal enrolment in government and private schools. 
Mizoram and Nagaland indicate higher private school enrolment relative to public school 
– about 65 and 70 per cent respectively. These proportions are also consistent with other 
state-level data related to schooling. Overall, 75 per cent of all elementary schools are 
run by the state or the union government. Data for 2016-17 reported by DISE shows that 
there is some variation in this number across states. For example close to 90 per cent of 
schools in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura are managed by the government. Kerala is the 
only state where only 29 per cent of schools are managed by the government. Mizoram 
and Nagaland have 25 per cent privately managed schools. Yet, these schools account for 
about 65 per cent of total school enrolment in each of the states.
Figure 4C.14: School Enrolment (by Parental Education Level)
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Figure 4C.15: School Enrolment (by Rural-Urban)
Extant research suggests that a parent’s level of education plays a significant role in 
whether they choose public or private schools for their children’s’ education 68. Consistent 
with these findings, our data indicates, Figure 4C.14, that as parental level of education 
increases the likelihood that the child attends a government school decrease. About 
75 per cent of non-literate parents have their child enrolled in a government school. 
Approximately 70 per cent of parents who have some school education report children 
enrolled in government schools, with the number dropping to 39 per cent when parents 
have a college education.
We also find significant urban rural differences in school choice in Figure 4C.15. In rural 
areas 68 per cent respondents said that they send their child to a government school. 
Whereas 39 per cent urban respondents had children enrolled in a government school.
Figure 4C.16: School Enrolment (by Rural-Urban and Parental Education Level)
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When we further disaggregate school choice by location and parents’ education, Figure 
4C.16, we find that while 78 per cent of rural non-literate respondents have a child in a 
government school this proportion drops by about 16 percentage points for the urban 
counterparts. Similarly, we observe a 23 percentage point increase in private school 
choice among respondents with a college degree (or above) as we move from rural to 
urban locations. Among non-literate respondents, the proportion reporting private school 
choice is 38 per cent and 22 per cent for urban and rural locations respectively. More 
broadly, respondents reporting higher levels of education tend to choose private schools 
over public schools regardless of whether they are located in urban or rural areas.
Have government schools in India become the last option for families with higher levels 
of education and wealth? Are children from relatively poor, marginalised, and minority 
communities notably Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims, and Christians left behind by private 
education sector?
Figure 4C.17: School Enrolment (by Caste)
Research suggests that minority communities are moving to public education 69. In 
Figure 4C.17, we find that Dalit and OBC respondents report higher levels of enrolment 
in government schools with 73 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. Upper caste 
respondents also indicate high enrolment in private schools – about 49 per cent. 
Interestingly, Adivasis are the only social category that report higher private school 
enrolment with 52 per cent versus 49 per cent in government schools.
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Figure 4C.18: School Enrolment (by Religion)
In Figure 4C.18, Muslim respondents also had high enrolments in government schools 
with 66 per cent. However, we find that about 63 per cent of Christian respondents 
indicate private school enrolment. It is likely that Christian enrolment in private schools 
are being driven by Nagaland and Mizoram as a result of the large number of Christian 
respondents from these two States (as noted earlier in Table).
In addition to level of parental education and location (whether rural or urban), what other 
factors determine a preference for private or public education? We find that respondents 
with children enrolled in a government school said that affordability of the school was the 
most important factor, followed by proximity to the school and the provision of a mid-day 
meal. We find these reasons are common for both rural and urban respondents, in Figure 
4C.19. For instance, approximately 85 per cent respondents in rural areas and 86 per 
cent respondents in urban areas cite affordability as the primary reason for choosing a 
government school over a private school. Similarly, 85 per cent of rural respondents and 
82 per cent of urban respondents choose a government school over a private school 
due to proximity of the school, and about 75 per cent rural respondents and 72 per cent 
urban respondents indicate the provision of mid-day meals as a reason for their choice.
In Figure 4C.19, among respondents with children enrolled in government schools, 
school facilities, teacher quality, and discipline play a secondary role. Once again, these 
preferences are similar across rural and urban respondents. For instance, 62 per cent 
of rural respondents and 65 per cent of urban respondents note that school facilities 
are an important factor in school choice. Similarly, 66 per cent of rural respondents and 
73 per cent of urban respondents choose a government school over a private school 
due to teacher quality, and about 62 per cent rural respondents and 72 per cent urban 
respondents indicate discipline as a reason for their choice.
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Figure 4C.19: Reasons for School Choice (by Rural-Urban)
In stark contrast, respondents who had children enrolled in private schools say that school 
facilities, teacher quality and student discipline in school are the most important reasons 
for school choice. As with government school choice, we find reasons for choosing a 
private school are similar across both rural and urban locations. For instance, 82 per cent 
of rural respondents and 89 per cent of urban respondents cite school facilities as an 
important reason; 86 per cent of rural respondents and 93 per cent of urban respondents 
note teacher quality, and 86 per cent of rural respondents and 91 per cent of urban 
respondents point to student discipline as important reasons for choosing a private 
school over a government school.
We find that only about half the respondents, 50 per cent of rural respondents and 54 
per cent urban respondents say school proximity plays a role in school choice. The cost 
of schooling isn’t an important factor when parents choose private schools: only about 42 
per cent in rural areas and about 40 per cent in urban areas note affordability as a reason. 
Similarly, the availability of a mid-day meal at school does not appear to be important for 
either rural or urban respondents with only 17 per cent and 11 per cent respectively.
Finally, just about more than half, about 52 per cent, of rural respondents say their child is 
enrolled in a government school as it is the only available school, while this number drops 
to 28 per cent in urban areas, suggesting that rural respondents are faced with a limited 
choice of schools compared to urban respondents.
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Figure 4C.20: Government School or Private School? (by Current School Choice)
Given current school choice, would respondents prefer to send their children to a 
private school or a public school? We find that, in Figure 4C.20, about 50 per cent of 
respondents who send their children to a public school prefer to continue with private 
school. However, only 20 per cent of respondents who send their children to a private 
school would choose to send their child to a public school. It appears that respondents 
hold a preference for a private education over a public one.
We generally find that both parental education as well as location, whether urban or 
rural, influences whether a child attends a private or public school. We also find that the 
reasons why parents send their children to a public or private school differs.
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Trust is the underpinning of all human contact and institutional interaction70. This section 
evaluates political trust by which we mean the “judgment of the citizenry that the system 
and the political incumbents are responsive and will do what is right even in the absence 
of constant scrutiny”71 which is “… a central indicator of public’s underlying feeling about 
its polity”72. Political trust serves as a conceptual device that serves as a ‘‘middle-range 
indicator of support between the specific political actors in charge of every institution and 
the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a 
given polity’’ 73.
This chapter discusses trust in both macro-level institutions, as well as trust in public 
offices and actors at the micro or individual level. The confidence people place on their 
governments come with the payment of taxes, acceptance of legislative and judicial 
decisions, compliance with social service programmes, and support of military objectives 
among others, all factors that reaffirm public faith in the state 74. Trust has been studied in 
different forms, both at the aggregate 75 and individual levels 76. While some studies have 
focused on falling levels of trust in developed countries 77, few 78 focus on South Asia. This 
report aggregates understandings around trust in political institutions and actors in India. 
1. Trust in Institutions
In this section, we explore public trust in various elected and non-elected political 
institutions (Q14, Q15, Q16, Q17, Q24, Q31 and Q37). The respondents were asked: 
“How much trust do you have in the following institutions?”
The responses were constructed along a four-point Likert Scale, ranging from ‘No trust 
at all’ to ‘Great deal of trust’. In the rest of this section, we use the measure of ‘effective 
trust’, calculated by subtracting the share of respondents who claimed to have either ‘No 
trust at all’ or ‘Not a lot of trust’ from those who claimed to have either ‘Great deal of 
trust’ or ‘Quite a lot of trust’. This measure seeks to understand a ‘net’ level of trust that 
these political institutions enjoy.
Figure  4D .2 shows that the military seems to enjoy the highest levels of trust (80 
percent), followed by the Supreme Court (69 percent) which is consistent with the findings 
of the last two reports. While political parties continue to have the lowest levels of 
public trust, the Prime Minister enjoys more net trust at 42 percent, than Chief Ministers, 
government officials and the police. However, he has lost ground compared to the other 
states surveyed in the last reports which were 62 percent (in Politics and Society between 
Elections 2018) and 68 percent (in Politics and Society between Elections 2017).
The District Collector continues to experience high levels of trust, faring better than the 
Tehsildar and President. The Election Commission receives higher net trust (42 percent) 
than the Gram Sabha (29 percent) which has seen a marked erosion of trust since the first 
report (52 percent) and the second (56 percent). While the variation between the Election 
Commission and Gram Sabha might be explained by the fact that elected institutions do 
not necessarily enjoy high levels of trust, the marked decline of trust in the Gram Sabha, 
compared to other institutions, is something to be noted.
4.D / Institutional Trust
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Overall trust levels show an interesting trend, regarding the Panchayat and its comparison 
to the Parliament and the Vidhan Sabha, clustered together as elected institutions rather 
than offices. Our Politics and Society between Elections 2017 data showed the Panchayat 
enjoyed higher trust than both the parliament and the Vidhan Sabha. Politics and Society 
between Elections 2018 saw more equal levels of trust between the three institutions. 
However, this situation shows a complete reversal in the states surveyed in the current 
report with the Gram Panchayat showing the lowest effective trust between the three.
Figure 4D.1: Trust in Institutions
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Figure 4D.2: Effective Trust in Institutions
We analyse the variations in effective trust across elected and non-elected institutions 
and offices. According to Fritz Scharpf 79, citizens evaluate political institutions and actors 
based on two different sets of performance criteria: those related to “input” or procedural 
performance and those related to “output” or policy performance. The former would 
include institutions and actors in executive functions like the Prime Minister, bureaucracy 
and policy and the latter would include the legislative institutions like the Vidhan Sabha, 
Parliament and Panchayats.
Figure 4D.3 shows effective trust in institutions across states; the darker parts of the heat 
map represent a higher share of effective trust in a particular institution. In comparing 
effective trust across states, we find the Prime Minister enjoys high levels of trust in 
Mizoram (88 percent), Tripura (84 percent) and Assam (82 percent), with the highest 
distrust in Punjab (-29 percent), followed by Jammu and Kashmir (-20 percent) and Tamil 
Nadu (-15 percent). Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West 
Bengal, Delhi and Uttarakhand show higher effective trust in the Army, and Supreme 
Court, over all other institutions. In general, these states tend to favour institutions that 
are further from everyday interaction. In all states, political parties registered the lowest 
effective trust. This is especially the case in the north-eastern border states. In contrast, 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu, while showing high levels of trust in the army also consider the 
District Collector, who has less institutional distance, to be credible. A striking outlier 
is Jammu and Kashmir which shows an overall low level of trust, across institutions but 
high levels of trust in the District Collector, Tehsildar and District Court as compared to 
the other institutions we surveyed. This points to an inversion of our understanding that 
institutional distance affects trust, in the sense that more distance inspires greater trust.
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Figure 4D.3: Effective Trust in Institutions (by State)
Figure 4D.4 shows effective trust in institutions across levels of education. In comparing 
trust across levels of literacy, we find that the non-literate respondents have lowest 
levels of trust across all institutions except political parties, who record the lowest trust 
among the college educated and above. Effective trust is highest among those who have 
completed primary school for all institutions. Thus, we find that effective trust increases 
substantially with primary education and then plateaus with higher education.
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Figure 4D.4: Effective Trust in Institutions (by Education Level)
In Figure  4D .5, a heat map which shows effective trust in institutions among religious 
communities, we find that the army enjoys comparatively high effective trust among all 
communities except the Muslims and Christians who trust the Supreme Court more than 
the army. If we rank the institutional effective trust according to community, we find that 
the Prime Minister is ranked higher among Hindus (11th) than Christians (12th), however 
Christians (58 percent) show higher absolute effective trust than Hindus (52 percent). The 
Prime Minister is among the least trusted elected office among the Sikhs (-19 percent) 
and Muslims (5 percent), ranking 15th and 14th respectively, among the 16 institutions. 
The overall ranking of effective trust places the Prime Minister ahead of the Chief Minister, 
however, when disaggregated by religion, this trend holds true only among the Hindus 
and Christians.
Figure 4D.5: Effective Trust in Institutions (by Religion)
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Figure 4D.6 shows effective trust in institutions among caste groups; in the heat map, 
the darker parts represent a higher effective trust. As Figure  4D .6 shows, the army is 
the most trusted institution among the upper caste, Dalit and OBC categories while the 
Adivasis trust the army but second to the Supreme Court. The top three institutions that 
enjoy high effective trust are Army, Supreme Court and High Court, across caste. The 
District Collector is trusted more than the Chief Minister and Prime Minister in all caste 
categories. Interestingly, the Parliament also enjoys high levels of trust among Adivasis.
Figure 4D.6: Effective Trust in Institutions (by Caste)
2. Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness
Effective trust encompasses two main aspects: gaining immediate and long-term 
compliance with decisions made by legal authorities like the courts and police, for 
specific interactions between public and the state apparatus and secondly, encouraging 
general cooperation and compliance. Psychological research on procedural justice 80 and 
courts and police 81 finds that the public’s behaviour with relation to the apparatus of law 
(police and courts) are powerfully influenced by subjective perceptions of fairness in the 
process of exercising authority by these institutions. 
Procedural fairness consists of the quality of decision-making and the quality of treatment. 
Both these aspects are ultimately rooted in a feeling of legitimacy, that is, people believe 
that police and judges are entitled to be obeyed and that their actions are legitimate in 
particular contexts. Legitimacy is encouraged by the perception of fairness, both towards 
communities, as well as in individual interactions and encounters 82. 
This survey explores the concept of trust in the light of aspects such as effectiveness and 
procedural fairness which have been posited to contribute to perceptions of trust. The 
respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed on a battery of four 
statements pertaining to three institutions: Police (Q34), Government Officials (Q32) 
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and Courts (Q39). The statements consist of positive and negative assertions that point 
to effectiveness in action and fairness in procedure. As noted in Figure  4D .7 below, 
for Police and Government Officials, the statements consist of two positive assertions 
on respectful interaction and quick action, and two negative assertions on bribery and 
political influence. For courts, four negative assertions on effectiveness were measured by 
respondents’ opinion on whether individuals would be wrongly convicted or acquitted. 
Procedural fairness was interrogated through perceived corruption of the courts by 
money and political influence.
Figure 4D.7: Statements on Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness
a. If a citizen were to re-
port a crime to the police, 
quick action would be 
taken.
b. The police in the (State) 
generally take bribes.
c. The decisions made 
by the police are unduly 
influenced by political par-
ties/ politicians.
d. Police generally treats 
people with respect.
a. If a citizen approached 
with a problem, quick 
action would be taken. 
b. The government offi-
cials in (State) generally 
take bribes.
e.The decisions taken by 
the government officials 
are unduly influenced by 
political parties/politi-
cians.
f. Government officials 
generally treats people 
with respect.
a. It is highly likely that an 
innocent person will be 
convicted.
g. It is highly likely that 
a guilty person will be 
acquitted.
h. The decisions made by 
the court are unduly influ-
enced by political parties/
politicians.
i. Court officials in (State) 
generally take bribe.
Police Government Officials Courts
Based on responses, ranging from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’, for positive 
and negative assertions, three indices of effectiveness and procedural fairness for Police, 
Government Officials and Courts were created. The index consists of three levels ‘Largely 
Positive’, ‘Largely negative’ and ‘Neutral’. This section explores the results of the indices 
for the three institutions.  
Figure  4D .8 shows that while less than 20 percent of the respondents held a positive 
view of the Police and Government Officials, a larger share of respondents (24 
percentage points higher) felt negatively about the police and 18 percentage points more 
for government officials. Interestingly, more than half of the respondents held a negative 
perception about effective and procedural fairness of the courts, compared to only 21 
percent who held a positive view. 42 percent and 45 percent of the respondents held 
a neutral view of both police and government officials respectively, but not the courts. 
We will analyse these numbers, according to their respective intuitions, in the upcoming 
sections.
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Figure 4D.8: Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, 
and Courts
Figure  4D.9 shows that a significant share of respondents in eight of the 12 states hold 
a neutral view of the police. Similarly, for government officials, a large of proportion of 
respondents in seven of the states surveyed hold neutral perceptions on effective and 
procedural fairness. However, this contrasts with the perceptions on courts, where over 40 
percent in each of the 12 states - with the highest in Tamil Nadu (78 percent) and Tripura 
(68 percent) - hold a negative perception regarding procedural fairness of the courts. 
Nine out of 12 states hold negative perceptions of the police. However, Mizoram (19 
percent), Uttarakhand (8 percent) and Kerala (5 percent) hold a more positive perception 
of the same institution. The perceptions fairness of the police was recorded at its lowest 
in Punjab (63 percent), Delhi (65 percent), West Bengal (65 percent) and Jammu and 
Kashmir (54 percent).
For government officials, nine out of the 12 states hold a more negative view, with Delhi 
(64 percent), West Bengal (59 percent) and Punjab (57 percent) recording the highest 
negative perception. Kerala is twenty percentage points higher than Uttarakhand (eleven 
percentage points) and Mizoram (four percentage points) who all generally hold a more 
positive perception.
Courts in general are perceived as having the least effective and procedural fairness. 
Within this generally poor opinion, Uttarakhand holds the highest positive perception 
with 36 percent.
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Figure 4D.9: Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, 
and Courts (by State)
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Figure 4D.9 (Continued) : Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, 
Government Officials, and Courts (by State)
Our research shows that most respondents, across religions, hold either a neutral or 
negative perception of the police and government officials (Figure 4D.10). Most Sikhs 
(58 percent) and Muslims (47 percent) hold a negative perception of the police, while a 
larger share of Christians (46 percent) and Hindus (42 percent) hold a neutral opinion. A 
larger share of Christians (47 percent), Muslims (46 percent) and Hindus (45 percent) have 
a neutral opinion of government officials, whereas more than half (53 percent) of the Sikh 
community holds a negative opinion. 
As seen in previous figures, a significant proportion of respondents hold a negative 
perception about the effective and procedural fairness of courts. When disaggregated 
across religion communities, we find that a significantly larger proportion of Hindus, 
compared to other communities have a negative perception of the courts - five 
percentage points more than Muslims and Christians and twelve percentage points more 
than Sikhs.
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Figure 4D.10: Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, 
and Courts (by Religion)
Caste differences with respect to perceptions of police, Figure 4D.11, show that 
most respondents hold either a neutral or negative perception of the police. A larger 
proportion of upper caste (43 percent) and Dalits (49 percent) hold a largely negative 
perception, whereas, a large proportion of Adivasis (44 percent) and OBCs (45 percent) 
hold a neutral opinion.  A larger share of OBCs (50 percent), Adivasis (43 percent) and 
upper caste (42 percent) have a neutral opinion of government officials, whereas over 40 
percent of Dalits hold a negative opinion. 
As seen in Figure 4D.11, over 50 percent across all categories, hold a negative perception 
about the effective and procedural fairness of courts. Within this general trend, OBCs, 
at 61 percent, have the highest share of respondents with a negative perception of the 
courts.
Figure 4D.11:  Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, 
and Courts (by Caste)
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3. Distributive Fairness
Distributive or outcome fairness refers to the way people respond to the fairness of the 
outcomes they receive. This concept relates to perceptions of ‘‘violations in principles 
of fairness in the allocation of outcomes’’83 and is conceived as an expression of what 
people think is just. Three different principles underpin the notion of distributive 
justice: equity, equality and meeting the basic needs of everybody 84. While all three are 
legitimate and complementary criteria, societies as well as individuals of different socio-
economic backgrounds may vary according to the importance they assign to these three 
principles 85. This lends itself to a psychological model that contends that values held by 
individuals influence how they cognitively perceive the world 86. This also relates to the 
cognitive frame of ‘perceived legitimacy’ of various institutions. The perception of equal 
treatment among communities is often considered as either a cause or consequence of 
institutional trust. In this study, perception of distributive fairness of the institutions is 
captured using questions on preferential or equal treatment by the Police, the Courts and 
the Government Officials, also mapped according to socio-economic backgrounds and 
their ideas on fairness of outcomes. The respondents were asked in Q28, Q34 and Q40: 
Which group do you think the police will treat better?
a. A Rich person or a Poor person?
b. An Upper caste or a Dalit?
c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu?
d. A Man and a Woman? 
A. Rich versus Poor
In evaluating distributional justice overall, Figure  4D .12, we find that almost 70 percent 
of the respondents feel that the rich will be favoured by the police and government 
officials and over 50 percent hold the same view for courts. While the courts in the 
previous section on effective and procedural fairness, fared very poorly, we find more 
support for the perception for the distributive fairness of the courts. 46 percent of the 
respondents feel that both rich and poor will be treated fairly by the courts, which is 
twenty percentage points more than for government officials and the police.
Figure 4D.12: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Police/Government Officials/
Courts favour?
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In comparing distributional justice across states, Figure  4D .13-15, 10 out of the 12 
states feel that the rich will be treated comparatively better than the poor. Uttarakhand 
(55 percent) and Kerala (54 percent) stand out as states where a larger proportion 
of the respondents feel that both will be treated equally. The results are similar for 
government officials across states, with Kerala (52 percent) and Uttarakhand (55 percent) 
both perceiving equal treatment. The trend remains consistent for these two states with 
respect to the court as well.
Figure 4D.13: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Police favour? (by State)
Figure 4D.14: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Government Officials favour? (by State)
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Figure 4D.15: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)
Figure 4D.16: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Police/Government Officials/
Courts favour? (by Education Level)
In comparing perception of distributional justice across literacy for the police, Figure 
4D.16, we find that the percentage of people who believe that the rich will be treated 
better decreases with college education. It falls 11 percentage points as we move 
across the category from non-literate to college educated. Similarly, it decreases by nine 
percentage points for government officials and 16 percentage points for courts. The 
trend we find, therefore, is that the perception of distributional justice increases with 
education.
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B. Upper Caste versus Dalits
Evaluating distributional justice through the lens of caste, Figure  4D .17, we find that a 
larger share of respondents overall perceives that both upper castes and Dalits will be 
treated equally by the courts and government officials. An equal share of respondents (47 
percent) perceive that the police will treat the upper castes better and in proportion to 
that, an equal number (47 percent) believe that both groups will be treated equally.
Figure 4D.17: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ 
Courts favour?
As Figure  4D .18-20 shows, a significant proportion of respondents (over 50 percent) 
in eight states out of 12 believe that the upper castes will be treated better by the 
police. However, Kerala (73 percent), Uttarakhand (69 percent), Tripura (57 percent) and 
Assam (55 percent) hold differing views, believing that both will be treated equally. For 
government officials too, the same set of states hold the view that upper castes will be 
treated better, a view opposed to the majority view. Interestingly in Nagaland an equal 
share of respondents hold opposing views, in that, 48 percent of the respondents feel 
that both upper castes and Dalits will be treated equally and the other 48 percent feel 
upper castes will be treated better. For courts, a majority of respondents across states 
believe that both will be treated equally. While the average number of respondents who 
feel that Dalits will be treated better by the different institutions remain low, Tamil Nadu 
and Uttar Pradesh are outliers in that a significant proportion of respondents feel that 
Dalits will be treated better. Around the question of distributional justice, we find that 
there is maximum consensus around courts, across states.
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Figure 4D.18: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Police favour? (by State)
Figure 4D.19: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Government Officials favour? 
(by State)
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Figure 4D.20: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)
Figure 4D.21: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ 
Courts favour? (by Education Level)
In Figure  4D .21, the share of respondents that says upper castes will be treated 
better decreases with greater literacy, with a greater share of non-literate respondents 
perceiving institutions to be unfair. A majority of college educated respondents perceive 
that the police, courts and government officials treat upper castes and Dalits equally.
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C. Hindu versus Non-Hindu
In analysing distributive trust according to religion, Figure  4D .22, we find that there is 
a greater proportion of respondents (70 percent) who consider that police, courts and 
government officials are fair. This is in direct contradiction to their negative perception on 
procedural fairness, and a variation from the trends noticed in wealth and caste, in that 
they believe that all institutions do not discriminate based on religion.
Figure 4D.22: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ 
Courts favour?
Across states, Figure  4D .23-25, we find that a majority of respondents feel that Hindus 
and Non-Hindus will be treated equally, for all three institutions. The sentiment is 
highest in Kerala (over 90 percent) and Tripura (over 85 percent). The outliers in this 
regard are Uttar Pradesh (13 percent) and Tamil Nadu (11 percent) with a higher share of 
respondents who feel that Non-Hindus will be treated better than Hindus. 
In disaggregating Jammu and Kashmir as separate regions, we find that Jammu has 
a higher share of respondents who feel that both communities are treated equally, as 
compared to Kashmir, where a significant proportion of respondents (five times higher 
than Jammu) believe that Hindus will be treated better. For instance, 5 percent of 
Hindus from Jammu feel that courts would favour Hindus, whereas 30 percent of Hindus 
in Kashmir believe that Hindus would be treated better by the courts. Interestingly, 
Christians in Kashmir, in relatively high numbers (13 percent on average), feel that Non-
Hindus would be favoured by all three institutions. There is also a relatively high number 
of Sikhs in Jammu, as compared to other Non-Hindu minorities, who believe that Hindus 
would be favoured by all three institutions, with a majority (57 percent) believing that 
government officials show a marked preference for Hindus.
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Figure 4D.23: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Police favour? (by State)
Figure 4D.24: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Government Officials favour? 
(by State)
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Figure 4D.25: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)
The perception on distributive fairness across institutions according to levels of 
education, in Figure  4D .26, shows a consistency of perception around both Hindus and 
Non-Hindus being treated equally. We find only a marginal increase (2 percent increase) 
in the belief that both communities are treated equally, with a corresponding increase in 
education levels.
Figure 4D.26: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Courts favour? 
(by Education Level)
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D. Men versus Women
As Figure  4D .27 shows, in analysing distributive fairness across gender, we find that 
most respondents feel that both men and women are treated equally across institutions, 
but a significant proportion also feel that women are treated better. 
In disaggregating the results of the survey by state, Figure  4D .28-30, we find that a 
significant share of the respondents in 10 states believe that the police treats both men 
and women equally. Interestingly, Delhi (51 percent) and Uttar Pradesh (43 percent) 
are the only states where a majority of the respondents perceive that the police treat 
women better than the men. With respect to the courts and government officials, most 
respondents across all states feel that both are treated equally. across In 10 states out 
of 12 respondents who believe that courts and government officials favour women form 
the second largest category of responses. Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi 
have the highest number of respondents who believe that women are treated better, 
compared to all the other states.
Figure 4D.27: Men versus Women - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ 
Courts favour?
Figure 4D.28: Men versus Women - Who will the Police favour? (by State)
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Figure 4D.29: Men versus Women - Who will the Government Officials favour? (
by State)
Figure 4D.30: Men versus Women - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)
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Figure 4D.31: Men versus Women - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ 
Courts favour? (by Education Level)
As Figure  4D .31 shows, literacy doesn’t seem to show any significant or clear variation in 
the perceptions of the respondents. While is there is some marginal changes across the 
levels of literacy, the numbers seem to remain consistent.
In comparing perceptions of distributive justice with respect to gender, we notice a very 
marginal increase with a corresponding increase in education, in the share of respondents 
who believe that both are treated equally. While most men and women feel that all three 
institutions do not discriminate on the basis of gender, we find that both men and women 
believe that the opposite sex is treated better by all three institutions.
Figure 4D.32: Men versus Women - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ 
Courts favour? (by Gender)
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5. 
Conclusion
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How do interactions between the state and the citizen unfold in periods between 
elections? What characterizes interactions between citizens across class, caste and 
community? And what sorts of perceptions, attitudes, and opinions do everyday forms of 
governance engender within society? These questions are of importance in a democracy 
undergoing significant economic and social transformation. Governments consolidate 
their political mandate, outline new directions in policy, mould institutions, and routinize 
governance in periods between elections. New ideas emerge or older ideologies 
resurface in public discourse. Spaces for engagement between state and citizens either 
expand or contract, and extant forms of vertical and horizontal citizenship strengthen or 
fray in times between elections. And equally important are the perceptions, attitudes, and 
opinions citizens hold about others across caste, community and geography, as well as 
those relating to their relationship with state institutions and officials that both shape and 
in turn are shaped by politics and society between elections.
This report examines perceptions, public opinion, and political subjectivities of citizens in 
twelve States, focusing specifically on social identity, political identity, political institutions 
and governance. The chapter on social identity explores how inter-caste and inter-
community networks shape perceptions of social and political relations: the nature of 
friendships, the overlap between social and political networks, and gender equality. 
The chapter on political identity broadly focuses on stereotypes, the regional-national 
dichotomy in political expression, as well as the libertarian and majoritarian impulses that 
characterize the debates on freedom of expression and nationalism respectively. The 
chapter on political institutions explores citizens’ perceptions of their performance in 
public service delivery, their role in economic governance, and the degree of trust they 
inspire among citizens cutting across social categories.
The results for Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil 
Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West Bengal, and Delhi, the twelve States 
covered in this study, suggest that public opinion and social attitudes exhibit remarkable 
variation across space, community. For instance, preferences for a conservative form of 
nationalism cohere around specific religious or caste identities rather than being defined 
by class or levels of education. Social ties, on the other hand, are produced not just by 
ascriptive identities but through education as well. Social identities appear to strengthen 
intra-group ties and opinions tend to reflect these bonds. On questions such as the most 
important issue facing India today there is greater unanimity across space and other 
socio-economic categories. In addition, issues identified as important between elections 
(unemployment) is markedly different from those considered important during elections 
(inflation). While across States there is a high awareness of State schemes, and to an 
extent, Central schemes, the distribution of benefits is varied. For instance, big farmers 
are clear beneficiaries of schemes aimed at crop insurance, while Adivasis and Dalits 
appear to be benefitting from housing and employment schemes. In the States covered, 
the ‘national’ and ‘regional’ appear equally as identities, and a significant number of 
respondents support the use of any language, not just the local language, in public 
places. 
These results also indicate the growing importance of local governments in India given 
that a large number of respondents repose faith in the district collector, and a significant 
number approach municipal corporator or sarpanchin order to get important work 
done. Institutions enjoy varying levels of trust. Courts enjoy high levels of trust and are 
associated with distributive fairness, yet seen as procedurally unfair. Police appears as 
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among the least trusted institution, and score on both procedural as well as distributive 
fairness. Interpreting results proves to be trickier in the case of gender related attitudes. 
A majority indicate that women should prioritize home over outside work, but at the same 
time call for greater reservation in all jobs for women and subscribe to equal responsibility 
in child rearing. Contrary to the commonly held view that the medium of instruction is the 
driver for school choice, there appear differences among rural and urban respondents in 
their reasons for choice. Rural respondents are concerned with proximity and affordability 
of schools, while teachers and discipline emerge as primary concerns for urban residents.
Normative interpretations of the results are likely to view some - such as high levels 
of trust in national institutions - as contributing to improved democratic deepening 
and governance and others - such as weak cross-caste and cross-community personal 
friendships, prejudicial notions about other castes or communities, and low support for 
liberal attitudes - as markers of a dilution in the quality of democracy.
Two aspects of the analysis must be stressed here. First, the results are primarily 
descriptive and seek to identify broad patterns across key social groups. While inferential 
analysis requires controls and robustness checks, the initial results presented here 
open possibilities for empirically testing theoretically driven hypotheses relating to the 
horizontal and vertical relationships in society and politics between elections. Second, 
the results are a comparative analysis of twelve States and cannot be generalized to a 
national public opinion. They can however be considered a barometer of public opinion 
within a State as the data allows for an analysis of political and social preferences and 
opinions within a single State across relevant groups. However, inter-State comparisons 
become increasingly meaningful as more States are compared, and results will 
approximate a national picture. 
Nevertheless, the findings from the twelve States help us hypothesize about the broader 
patterns that obtain. As has been already noted in the previous studies (such as the two 
rounds of South Asia study), trust in institutions can at best be described as mixed and at 
a middling level only. Similarly, delivery of public goods leaves a lot to be desired and yet 
unlike what the critics of India’s public delivery system would like to believe, people are 
not very strongly disappointed with the system. The broader patterns of political culture 
however throw up more complex patterns that may require further investigation both in 
the States studied here and through an expansion of this study in other States. Just as the 
findings about institutions and delivery mechanisms have implications for the governance 
regime in India, the findings about citizen attitudes and values hold important lessons 
for contemporary India’s political culture that provides the basis for the way democracy 
functions and what it means for citizens. 
These political cultural patterns may be summarized as follow: (a) the caste-community 
driven social universe and the somewhat broad-based political universe constitute the 
context in which citizens relate to each other; (b) More importantly, caste-community 
based identities are not only inward looking images of the self, they also impose deep 
burdens on certain communities. (c) Third, the study hints at the need to more carefully 
redefine the meanings and significance of ideas of freedom of expression and revisit 
liberal fundamentals in an Indian context (d) Fourth, several large States under study 
indicate strong public support for emerging majoritarian nationalism as well as a tendency 
toward populism which must be taken very seriously as it is likely to dominate both public 
discourse and our collective lives in the near future.
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Lokniti – Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), in collaboration with 
Azim Premji University (APU) conducted a round of surveys in Assam, Delhi, Jammu 
and Kashmir, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, 
Uttarakhand and West Bengal between September and October 2018. These twelve 
states were selected because they provided the proximity to study politics between 
elections closely and accurately. The study was conducted between election and aims to 
capture public opinion and perception on the interaction between the state and citizens. 
It covers various aspects related to delivery of public services, law and order, identities, 
discrimination and violence, economic processes and governance. The study was an 
attempt to know whether various social groups get access to better public services such 
as water, sanitation, roads, electricity among others, which groups do the police protect.  
whether the rate of discrimination towards marginal groups has reduced over a period of 
time and which states do a better job in providing public services.  The survey provides a 
broad perspective on everyday governance and development in India. 
The survey was conducted among 24,092 respondents in 22 assembly constituencies 
each across 12 states. The assembly constituencies where the survey was conducted were 
randomly selected using the probability proportionate to size method (See Table A.1). 
Thereafter four polling stations within each of the sampled constituencies were selected 
using the systematic random sampling method. Finally, 30 respondents were also 
randomly selected using the same method from the latest electoral rolls of the sampled 
polling stations. This procedure ensures that the selected sample is fully representative of 
the cross-section of voters in the country. Specially trained field investigators asked the 
respondents, in a face-to-face interview a detailed set of questions which could take up 
to 20-25 minutes. They were instructed to interview only those whose names were given 
to them. At some locations the non-availability of sampled respondents or difficulty in 
finding households necessitated replacements or substitutions.
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Table A.1: Distribution of the achieved sample 
Assam
Jammu and Kashmir
Kerala
Mizoram
Nagaland
Punjab
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Delhi
Uttarakhand
All 
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
264
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
1056
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
2640
31680
2095
2011
1943
2199
1886
2041
2028
1717
2151
1860
2098
2063
24092
Sampled 
assembly 
constituencies
Sampled 
polling 
station
Sampled 
respondents
Achieved 
sample
To make the sample more representative and for the cross-community analysis, a booster 
was conducted in each state. The booster was conducted to perform cross-sectional 
analysis to ensure equal representation of targeted communities in each state. The 
rationale behind conducting the interviews of selected communities in the booster was to 
include the perspective of the dominant communities as well as to include the perception 
of the communities that are not adequately represented in the respective states. For the 
representativeness of the sample see Table A.2. 
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Research Instruments 
Questionnaire:  The questionnaire was carefully designed and was in the language 
mainly spoken in the respondents’ state. The translation process was carefully monitored, 
so that a question in one state did not have a different meaning in another. Most 
questions were well structured, with a few exceptions of open-ended questions. The 
questionnaire was based on six broad themes: citizen perception and state institutions, 
delivery of public services, economic policy and governance, identity, corruption, and 
consciousness. 
Fieldwork manual: A fieldwork manual has been specially designed for field investigators 
with general instructions in how to conduct standard interviews. It also contains question 
specific instructions explaining skip patterns in questions and probing levels for the right 
responses. The manual also has numerical codes for background variables like education, 
occupation, caste and so on, with pre-codes for some open-ended questions.
Table A.2: Representativeness of sample
Assam
Jammu and 
Kashmir
Kerala
Mizoram
Nagaland
Punjab
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar 
Pradesh
West Bengal
Delhi
Uttarakhand 
48.9
47.0
52.0
49.4
48.2
47.2
49.9
49.0
47.7
48.7
46.5
49.1
46.0
43.5
53.1
51.1
47.1
44.5
49.4
47.9
42.0
51.2
38.5
40.6
14
27
48
52
29
37
48
26
22
32
98
30
7.0
23.5
22.4
52.9
34.0
30.4
49.5
25.0
14.4
12.9
99.6
29.0
7.15
7.38
9.1
0.11
0
31.94
20.01
17.83
20.7
23.51
16.75
18.76
11.3
6.0
11.8
0.1
2.6
31.0
17.1
19.7
22.2
23.2
19.4
14.2
12.45
11.91
1.45
94.43
86.48
0
1.1
31.76
0.57
5.8
0
2.89
17.1
8.6
1.3
99.6
91.3
0.3
1.4
35.4
0.5
11.5
8
1.7
34.22
68.31
26.56
1.35
2.47
1.93
5.86
8.6
19.26
27.01
12.86
13.95
29.8
71.4
22.7
0.2
1.0
7.2
2.8
8.2
17.1
25.8
12.7
8.4
Census
2011 Survey
Census
2011 Survey
Census
2011 Survey
Census
2011 Survey
Census
2011 Survey
Women Urban Dalit Adivasi Muslim
227
Training
Training workshop: A day long training workshop is organised before the survey 
fieldwork starts at various places in the state to train the field investigators (FIs) and 
supervisors who carry out the fieldwork operations. State coordinators conduct an 
intensive and interactive workshop for training field investigators on conducting face-
to-face interviews based on the questionnaire. The investigators undergo an orientation 
programme and train rigorously about interviewing techniques and communications 
with the respondents. A comprehensive and detailed interviewing guide, based on the 
questionnaire and survey methodology, is designed for the interviewers.
Field Work
Procedures: The interviews of the selected respondents are conducted at their residence 
or place of work. Field investigators meet the respondents and explain the purpose of the 
interview, establish their identity and inform them about the expected research output 
of the study. The field investigators conduct the interview of the selected respondent 
in face-to-face interactions using the questionnaires designed for this purpose. The 
investigators follow the standard and accepted practices of fieldwork and all information 
collected is kept strictly confidential.
Data Processing
Data coding and cleaning: All questionnaires were manually screened for consistency 
and quality checks. The questionnaire had codes (of pre-coded questions) that were used 
for data punching. A team constituted for data checking checked the code and made 
corrections if there was any mistake made by investigators while filling the code.
Data entry and analysis: Codes on the questionnaire are punched into an electronic 
database. Punched data was then edited  through a specially written edit programme, 
which checks for eligibility criteria, range and logic errors. 
The fieldwork of the study was coordinated by Dr. Dhurba Pratim Sharma in Assam, 
Dr. Biswajeet Mohanty in Delhi, Dr. Aijaz Ashraf Wani and Dr. Ellora Puri in Jammu and 
Kashmir, Dr. Sajad Ibrahim in Kerala, Dr. Lallian Chunga in Mizoram, Dr. Amongla N. Jamir 
in Nagaland, Dr. Jagroop Kaur in Punjab, Dr. P. Ramajayam in Tamil Nadu, Anindya Sarkar 
in Tripura, Dr. Shashi Kant Pandey and Dr. Sudhir Khare in Uttar Pradesh, Rakesh Negi in 
Uttarakhand and Dr. Suprio Basu and Jyotiprasad Chatterjee in West Bengal.
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Dominant Castes in 
different states
Assam
Delhi
Jammu and Kashmir
Kerala
Mizoram
Nagaland
Punjab
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
Uttarakhand
West Bengal
Ahom
Jat
--
Nair
Mizo
Aos
Jat
Vanniyar
Debnath
Yadav
---
---
Kalita
Gujjar
 
Ezhavas
Pawi
Angamis
Khatri
Gounder
Debbarma
Thakur
States Dominant Castes/Communities
229
Questionnaire
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231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
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